Trust and control in Anglo-American systems of corporate governance: The individualizing and socializing effects of processes of accountability

Human Relations

Volumn 54, Issue 12, 2001, Pages 1547-1571

  Roberts, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040374506     PISSN: 00187267     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/00187267015412001     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. Alchian, A. & Demsetz, H. Production, information costs, and economic organization. The American Economic Review, 1972, 62, 777-95.
2. Argyris, C. Overcoming organizational defences. Needhan, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1990.
3. Barker, R. The market for information: Evidence from finance directors, analysts and fund managers. Accounting and Business Research, 1998, 29(1), 3-20.
4. Baysinger, B. & Hoskisson, R. The composition of boards of directors and strategic control. Academy of Management Review, 1990, 15, 72-87.
5. Berger, P. & Luckman, T. The social construction of reality. Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1967.
6. Boeker, W. Power and managerial dismissal: Scapegoating at the top. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1992, 37, 400-21.
7. Butler, J. The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
8. Cadbury, A. Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance. London: Gee, 1992.
9. Charan, R. Boards at work: How corporate boards create competitive advantage. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1998.
10. Charkham, J. Keeping good company. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
11. Clegg, S. Frameworks of power. London: Sage, 1989.
12. Collins, J. & Porras, J. Built to last: Successful habits of visionary companies. London: Century Business, 1994.
13. Conyon, M. & Peck, S. Board control, remuneration committees and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 1998, 41(2), 146-57.
14. Conyon, M., Gregg, P. & Machin, S. Taking care of business: Executive compensation in the United Kingdom. Economic Journal, 1995, 105, 704-14.
15. Cosh, A., Hughes, A., Lee, K. & Singh, A. Institutional investment, mergers and the market for corporate control. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1989, March, 73-100.
16. Coughlan, A. & Schmidt, R. Executive compensation, managerial turnover and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985, 7, 43-66.
17. Dalton, D. & Kesner, I. Organizational performance as an antecedent of inside/outside chief executive succession: An empirical assessment. Academy of Management Journal, 1985, 28, 113-38.
18. Davis, G. & Thompson, T. A social movement perspective on corporate control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1994, 39(1), 141-74.
19. Davis, J., Schoorman, F. & Donaldson, L. Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 1997, 22(1), 20-47.
20. Daudi, P. Power in the organisation. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
21. de Mare, P., Piper, R. & Thompson, S. Koinonia: From hate, through dialogue, to culture in the large group. London: Karnac, 1991.
22. Dissanaike, G. Long-term stock price reversals in the UK: Evidence from regression tests. British Accounting Review, 1999, 31, 1-13.
23. Donaldson, L. The ethereal hand: Organizational economics and management theory. Academy of Management Review, 1990, 15(3), 369-81.
24. Donaldson, L. & Davis, J. Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 1991, 16, 49-64.
25. Eisenhardt, K. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 1989 14(1), 57-74.
26. Elkington, J. Cannibals with forks: The triple bottom line of 21st century business. Oxford: Capstone, 1997.
27. Ezzamel, M. & Watson, R. Wearing two hats: The conflicting control and management roles of non-executive directors. In K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright (Eds), Corporate governance: Economic and financial issues. Chichester: Oxford University Press, 1997.
28. Fama, E. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88, 288-307.
29. Fama, E. & Jensen, M. The separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26, 301-25.
30. Forbes, D. & Milliken, F. Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy of Management Review, 1999, 24(3), 489-505.
31. Foucault, M. Discipline and punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979.
32. Froud, J., Haslam, C., Sukdev, J. & Williams, K. Shareholder value and financialisation: Consultancy promises, management moves. Economy and Society, 2000, 29(1), 80-110.
33. Garratt, R. The fish rots from the head. London: Harper Collins, 1996.
34. Ghoshal, S. & Moran, P. Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory. Academy of Management Review, 1996, 21(1), 13-47.
35. Giddens, A. Central problems of social theory. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1979.
36. Giddens, A. The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity, 1984.
37. Giddens, A. Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Cambridge: Polity, 1991.
38. Greenbury, R. Director's remuneration. London: Gee, 1995.
39. Gulati, R. & Westphal, J. Cooperative or controlling? The effects of CEO-board relations and the content of interlocks on the formation of joint ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1999, 44(3) 473-506.
40. Hambrick, D. Fragmentation and the other problems CEOs have with their top management teams. California Management Review, 1995, 37(3), 110-28.
41. Hambrick, D. & Mason, P. Upper echelons: The organisation as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 1984, 9, 193-206.
42. Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership structure. The Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3, 305-60.
43. Jones, M. Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. Academy of Management Review, 1995, 20(2), 404-38.
44. Kay, J. The business of economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
45. Kets de Vries, M. Prisoners of leadership. New York: Wiley, 1989.
46. Kets de Vries, M. Whatever happened to the philosopher king? The leader's addiction to power. Journal of Management Studies, 1991, 28(4), 339-51.
47. Knights, D. & Willmott, H. Power and subjectivity at work: From degradation to subjugation in social relations. Sociology, 1989, 23(4), 1-24.
48. Kosnik, R. Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1987, 32, 163-85.
49. Krammer, R. Intergroup relations and organizational dilemmas: The role of categorization processes. Research in Organizational Behaviour, 1991, 13, 191-228.
50. Lazonick, W. & O'Sullivan, M. Maximising shareholder value: A new ideology of corporate governance. Economy and Society, 2000, 29(1), 13-35.
51. Lorsch, J. & MacIver, E., Pawns or potentates: The reality of America's corporate boards. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1989.
52. McNulty, T. & Pettigrew, A. Strategists on the board. Organization Studies, 1999, 20(1), 47-74.
53. Mace, M. Directors: Myths and reality. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1971.
54. Mayer, R., Davis, J. & Schoorman, F. An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 1995, 20(2), 709-34.
55. Miller, P. & O'Leary, T. Accounting and the construction of the governable person. Accounting, Organization and Society, 1986, 12(3), 235-65.
56. Monks, R. & Minnow, N. Power and accountability. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.
57. Morck, R., Schleifer, A. & Vishny, R. Alternative mechanisms for corporate control. The American Economic Review, 1989, 842-52.
58. Munro, R. & Mouritsen, J. Accountability: Power, ethos and the technologies of managing. London: International Thompson Business Press, 1997.
59. O'Neil, J. The paradox of success. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
60. O'Sullivan, M. The innovative enterprise and corporate governance. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2000, 24(4), 393-416.
61. Perrow, C. Complex organizations: A critical essay (3rd edn). New York: McGraw Hill, 1986.
62. Peters, T. & Waterman, R. In search of excellence. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.
63. Pettigrew, A. On studying managerial elites. Strategic Management Journal, 1992, 13, 163-82.
64. Pettigrew, A. & McNulty, T. Power and influence in and around the boardroom. Human Relations, 1995, 48, 845-73.
65. Pettigrew, A. & McNulty, T. Sources and uses of power in the boardroom. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 1998, 7(2), 197-214.
66. Pfeffer, J. Power in organizations. Boston, MA: Pitman, 1981.
67. Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. The external control of organizations. New York: Harper & Row, 1978.
68. Powell, W. Trust-based forms of governance. In R. Kramer and T. Tyler (Eds), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research. London: Sage, 1996.
69. Roberts, J. The possibilities of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1991, 16(4), 355-68.
70. Roberts, J. From discipline to dialogue: Individualizing and socializing forms of accountability. In R. Monro and J. Mourutsen (Eds), Accountability: Power, ethos and the technologies of managing. London: International Thompson Business Press, 1996.
71. Roberts, J. Corporate governance and the ethics of narcissus. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2001, 11(1), 109-28.
72. Roberts, J. & Stiles, P. The relationship between chairmen and chief executive: Competitive or complementary roles? Long Range Planning, 1999, 32(1), 36-48.
73. Rose, M. Governing the soul. London: Routledge, 1989.
74. Rustin, M. The good society and the inner world. London: Tavistock, 1988.
75. Schein, E. Organizational culture and leadership. Oxford: Jossey-Bass, 1989.
76. Tricker, R. Corporate governance. London: Gower Press, 1980.
77. Useem, M. Executive defence: Shareholder power and corporate reorganization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
78. Useem, M. Investor capitalism: How money managers are changing the face of corporate America. New York: Harper Collins, 1996.
79. Walsh, J. & Seward, J. On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 1990, 15(3), 421-58.
80. Weber, M. Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
81. Westphal, J. Board games: How CEO's adapt to increases in structural board independence from management. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1998, 43(3), 511-37.
82. Westphal, J. Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioural and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties. Academy of Management Journal, 1999, 42, 7-24.
83. Westphal, J. & Zajak, E. The symbolic management of stockholders: Corporate governance reforms and shareholder reactions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1998, 43, 127-53.
84. Williams, K. From shareholder value to present day capitalism. Economy and Society, 2000, 29(1), 1-12.
85. Williamson, O. The mechanisms of governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
86. Zadek, S., Pruzan, P. & Evans, R. Building corporate accountability: Emerging practices in social and ethical accounting, auditing and reporting. London: Earthscan, 1997.
87. Zaleznick, A. & Kets de Vries, M. Power and the corporate mind. Chicago, IL: Bonus Books, 1985.