Control allocation, revenue sharing, and joint ownership

International Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 895-915

  Wang, Susheng ^a   Zhu, Tian ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744445333     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00350.x     Document Type: Review

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