Contractual incompleteness and the optimality of equity joint ventures

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 391-413

  Dasgupta, Sudipto ^a   Tao, Zhigang ^b  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

D23; Equity joint ventures; Equity shares; Incomplete contracts; L22; Profit sharing contracts; Wholly owned subsidiaries

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040674746     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00117-6     Document Type: Article

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