Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership

International Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 609-635

  Dasgupta, Sudipto ^a   Tao, Zhigang ^b  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346048018     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00078     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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