Assisting democrats or resisting dictators? The nature and impact of democracy support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990-99

Democratization

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 439-460

  Scott, James M ^a   Steele, Carie A ^b  

^a INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

US democracy promotion; US National Endowment for Democracy

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; GOVERNMENT;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES; WESTERN HEMISPHERE; WORLD;

EID: 27144448029     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340500225947     Document Type: Review

References (154)

1. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1991).
2. See James M. Scott, 'Transnationalizing Democracy Promotion: the Role of Western Political Foundations and Think-Tanks', Democratization, Vol.6, No.3 (1999), pp. 146-70;
3. Political Foundations and Think Tanks', in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs Reality (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 2002), pp. 193-213;
4. James M. Scott and Kelly J. Walters, 'Supporting the Wave: Western Political Foundations and the Promotion of a Global Democratic Society', Global Society, Vol.14, No.2 (2000), pp.237-57.
5. This article is part of a larger examination of democracy promotion by the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. The larger project examines foundation assistance provided by all three countries, as well as the democracy aid provided by the US Agency for International Development and corresponding agencies in the other countries. This broad project utilizes an extensive dataset of democracy-assistance programmes in these countries along with variables on political, economic and social characteristics to: (a) compare the approaches of these three countries to democracy support; (b) identify patterns in official and foundation strategies and outcomes; and (c) assess the overall relationship between democracy assistance and democratization in the developing world.
6. See Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999) p.4.
7. For entries to the democracy-promotion literature, see Peter Burnell, Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization (London: Frank Cass, 2000);
8. Peter Burnell and Alan Ware, Funding Democratization (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998);
9. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (eds), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000);
10. Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995);
11. Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case for North Africa (London: Frank Cass, 2002);
12. Amy W. Hawthorne, Democracy Deficit: US Democracy Promotion Efforts in the Arab World (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001);
13. Christopher Layne and Sean M. Lynn-Jones (eds), Should America Promote Democracy? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998);
14. Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1991);
15. William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);
16. Schraeder (note 2);
17. Peter J. Schraeder, 'The State of the Art in International Democracy Promotion: Results of a Joint-European-North American Research Network', Democratization, Vol.10, No.2 (2003), pp.21-44;
18. Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994;
19. and Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe's Mediterranean and Asian Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), for entries to the literature.
20. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White House, 1995), p.2.
21. Ibid., p.i.
22. Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi (note 4), pp.5-6.
23. See Burnell (note 4);
24. Gillespie and Youngs (note 4);
25. Schraeder, Exporting (note 2)
26. and Youngs (note 4),
27. as well as Kevin F. Quigley, For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democratization in Central Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
28. Robert G. Herman and Theodore S. Piccone (eds), Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends, 1992-2002 (Washington, DC: Democracy Coalition Project, 2002);
29. electronic version available at
30. Good entry points include Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, Vol.80, No.4 (1986): pp.1151-69;
31. Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003);
32. James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995);
33. R.J. Rummell, The Just Peace, Volume 5 of Understanding Conflict and War (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981);
34. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993);
35. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001);
36. and Spencer Weart, Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight Each Other (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
37. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 69.
38. See for example, Carothers, Aiding (note 4),
39. Diamond (note 4),
40. Steven Hook, 'Inconsistent US efforts to promote democracy abroad', in Schraeder, Exporting (note 2) pp. 109-28;
41. and Rick Travis, 'The Promotion of Democracy at the End of the Twentieth Century: a New Polestar for American Foreign Policy?' in James M. Scott (ed.), After the End: Making American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), pp.251-76.
42. See Sebastian Bartsch, 'The German Political Foundations Foreign Policy: of What is it an Instance?, paper presented at the annual International Studies Association, Toronto, 18-22 March 1997;
43. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, 'Foreign Political Aid: the German Political Foundations and their US Counterparts', International Affairs, Vol.67, No. 1 (1991), pp.33-64;
44. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Latin America', in Laurence Whitehead (ed.), International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.227-55;
45. and 'The Rise of Political Aid', in Larry Diamond et al. (eds), Consolidating Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp.295-324;
46. Quigley (note 8);
47. Scott, 'Transnationalizing' (note 2);
48. Scott, 'Political Foundations' (note 2),
49. and Scott and Walters (note 2).
50. See, for example, Thomas Carothers, 'The National Endowment for Democracy at Ten', Foreign Policy, No.95 (1994), pp. 123-8;
51. Democracy Promotion under Clinton', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.18, No.4 (1995), p.13-28;
52. Scott, 'Transnationalizing' (note 2);
53. Scott, 'Political Foundations' (note 2),
54. and Scott and Walters (note 2).
55. See the IRI at
56. See 'National Democratic Institute for International Affairs' at
57. These 'labour institutes' - the Free Trade Union Institute, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (Latin America), the Aftican-American Labor Center, and the Asian-American Free Labor Institute - have their own networks of field representatives.
58. See (http://www.cipe.org/obj.html>.
59. Scott, 'Transnationalizing' (note 2);
60. Scott, 'Political Foundations' (note 2),
61. and Scott and Walters (note 2).
62. For instance, NED support was purportedly instrumental in voter registration for the plebiscite. The Chile case is interesting for other reasons as well, including the example it provides for complementary efforts by different political foundations, in this case, the NED and the German Stiftungen, who were active in a range of efforts. Such parallel efforts would appear to magnify the effects of foundation efforts.
63. Interview with Jane Riley Jacobsen, manager of public affairs, National Endowment for Democracy, 12 July 1999.
64. Interviews with Jane Riley Jacobsen (note 21)
65. and Kathryn Mudge, program officer for Latin America, National Endowment for Democracy, 10 May 1999.
66. See, for example, Robert Dahl, 'Development and Democratic Culture', in Diamond et al. (note 13), pp.34-9;
67. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992)
68. and 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal of Democracy, Vol.6 (1995), pp.65-78;
69. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995);
70. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (eds), Funding Virtue: Civil Society and Democracy Promotion (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).
71. Kathryn Sikkink, 'Human Rights, Principled Issue-networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America', International Organization, Vol.47, No.3 (1993), p.415.
72. Interview with Jane Riley Jacobsen (note 21). Analysts of issue networks have argued that such networks expand communication and resource-sharing, apply pressure for policy or behaviour change, spread norms, condition perceptions of interests, and offer alternative routes to implement policy.
73. See Sikkink (note 24)
74. and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
75. David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello, 'Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of US Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries', American Journal of Political Science, Vol.29, No.3 (1985), pp.539-63.
76. Steven C. Poe, 'Human Rights and the Allocation of US Military Assistance', Journal of Peace Research, Vol.28, No.2 (1991), pp.205-16;
77. and 'Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocation under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter', American Journal of Political Science, Vol.36, No.1 (1992), pp. 147-67.
78. Steven C. Poe and James Meemik, 'US Military Aid in the 1980s: a Global Analysis', Journal of Peace Research, Vol.32, No.4 (1995), pp.399-411.
79. James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger and Steven C. Poe, 'Testing Models of US Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War', Journal of Politics, Vol.60, No.1 (1998), pp.63-85.
80. Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, 'United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.43, No.1 (1999), pp.185-98.
81. See, for example, Muravchik (note 4);
82. Smith (note 4)
83. and Carothers, Aiding (note 4).
84. Steven Finkel, 'Can Democracy be Taught?', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No.4 (2003), pp.137-51.
85. Carothers, Aiding (note 4).
86. Burnell (note 4)
87. and Youngs (note 4).
88. Schraeder, Exporting (note 2);
89. Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi (note 4).
90. See, for example, Robinson (note 4),
91. and Marina Ottaway and Theresa Chung, 'Toward a New Paradigm', Journal of Democracy, Vol.10, No.4 (1999), pp.99-113.
92. Steven Hook, 'Building Democracy through Foreign Aid: the Limitations of United States Political Conditionalities, 1992-1996', Democratization, Vol.5, No.3 (1998), pp.156-80;
93. Patrick M. Regan, 'US Economic Aid and Political Repression: an Empirical Evaluation of US Foreign Policy', Political Research Quarterly, Vol.48, No.3 (1995), pp.613-28;
94. Steven Hook, Charles Kegley, Jr and Margaret Hermann, 'Dollar Diplomacy: Foreign Aid and the Promotion of Democracy', paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 20-24 February 1995;
95. Stephen Knack, 'Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.48, No. 1 (2004), pp.251-66.
96. See also Gordon Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
97. Shannon Lindsay Blanton, 'Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in the Developing World: US Rhetoric versus US Arms Exports', American Journal of Political Science, Vol.44, No.1 (2000), pp.123-31.
98. James Meemik, 'United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy', Journal of Peace Research, Vol.33, No.4 (1996), pp.391-402.
99. Mark Peceny, 'Two Paths to the Promotion of Democracy during US Military Interventions', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.39, No.3 (1995), pp.371-401;
100. Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (College Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999);
101. Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
102. 'Democracy by Force: a Renewed Commitment to Nation Building', The Washington Quarterly, Vol.23, No.1 (2000), pp.95-112.
103. See Valerie Bunce, 'Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.33, No.6 (2000), pp.703-34;
104. Barbara Geddes, 'What do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?, Annual Review of Political Science, No.2 (1999), pp. 129-48.
105. John F. Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.24, No.2 (1992), pp.225-48;
106. Huntington, Third Wave (note 1);
107. Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974);
108. Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', American Political Science Review, Vol.53, No.1 (1959), pp.245-59;
109. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981);
110. Mancur Olsen, 'Dictatorship, Democracy and Development', American Political Science Review, Vol.87, No.3 (1993), pp.567-77;
111. Adam Przeworksi and Fernando Limongi, 'Political Regimes and Economic Growth', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.7, No.3 (1993), pp.51-70;
112. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
113. Henry S. Rowen, 'The Tide Underneath the "Third Wave"', Journal of Democracy, Vol.6, No.1 (1995), pp.52-64.
114. See, for example, Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996);
115. and Huntington, Third Wave (note 1).
116. Mary Comerford Cooper, International Organization and Democratization: Testing the Effect of GATT/WTO Membership, Working Paper, Asia/Pacific Research Center, (Stanford, CA: Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 2003);
117. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Anchor Books, 2000);
118. as well as discussion in Bunce (note 41)
119. and Geddes (note 41).
120. See, for example, Steven Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 1995).
121. There are also those who are sceptical about the very premise that there is any promotion of democracy going on at all, such as Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang 1992)
122. and Robinson (note 4).
123. We recognize that operationalizing democracy is contentious, and that different measures such as Freedom House, Polity IV, or the index offered by Tatu Vanhanen, 'A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998', Journal of Peace Research, Vol.37, No.2 (2000), pp.251-65 have different strengths and weaknesses. We opt for the Freedom House indicators as they are commonly used and, despite their weaknesses, implement a more maximalist definition of democracy.
124. See Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen, 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.35, No.1 (2002), pp.5-35. We also ran equations using the Polity IV scores for democracy. Our results were not appreciably different, so we report only the results with the Freedom House scores here.
125. We opt for a two-year lead to allow aid decisions to be made, the aid distributed, and the impact to begin. With respect to the democracy consolidation model, it also seems plausible that changes in democracy scores in year x would impact aid allocations in year x+2 (i.e., changes at year x call attention to the situation and prompt grant applications in x+1 which are awarded/allocated at x + 2). We concede that the impact of NED aid might take longer than a two-year lead, and therefore that we might underestimate the effect of NED assistance. We are confident that modestly shorter or longer leads do not change our results, as we ran our models with 1- and 3-year lags with little effect on our parameter estimates. Moreover, excessive leading/lagging complicates cause-and-effect arguments, as lags between cause and effect increase the possibility that intervening factors not in the model may play a role in the effect.
126. Huntington, Clash (note 43).
127. See 'US Military Deployments/Engagements, 1975-2001', at the Center for Defense Information (
128. For an analysis of these and other aspects of NED aid in the 1990s, see Scott and Walters (note 2), which also compares the NED activities to those of similar foundations in Canada and the United Kingdom.
129. There is evidence that the NED shifts its efforts from region to region per opportunity and US interests. As another empirical analysis of NED aid notes, 'NED grants have shifted substantially in regional priorities over the time period [1990-1997]... Latin America and Eastern Europe are initially major targets [1990-1992], then the former Soviet Union in its initial democratization efforts [1992-1993], and finally, Asia and Africa as top priorities from 1994-1997. It would seem that, while the NED has become a global operation over time, dispersing its funds more widely, it has also been somewhat opportunistic, moving its grants from region to region as democratizations opportunities emerge'. See Scott and Walters (note 2), p.248. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the Bush administration has targeted the Middle East, long ignored in US democracy promotion efforts, for increased attention since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, in 2003, President Bush called for a doubling of NED grants (from $40 to $80 million), mostly targeted to new efforts in the Middle East. At the time of this writing, the House of Representatives had pared back the request to a mere $1 million, while the Senate had reduced it to $10 million. Under White House pressure the House-Senate conference restored most of the Funds, increasing the NED's budget to $60 million, an amount which then passed both chambers.
130. See, for example, Ottaway and Carothers (note 23)
131. and Putnam (note 23),
132. as well as Benjamin Barber, A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998);
133. Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Civil Society: The Constitutional Matrix of Modern Democracy (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997);
134. and Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
135. Carothers, Aiding (note 4), p.86.
136. Ibid., p.95 (emphasis added).
137. See 'How the NED Works' at
138. Statement of Carl Gershman to the House International Relations Committee, 7 July 2004, obtained via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, accessed 9 November 2004.
139. Polity IV scores show a similar decline, although not as dramatic, from a solidly democratic score of 9 in 1990 to a more marginal score of 7 in 1999. Typically, a score of 6 is used as the cutoff for labeling a regime 'democratic'.
140. United States activities, including NED grants, have been as controversial as the rule of Hugo Chávez. In 2002, for example, the United States was accused of acquiescing, at the least, in a coup attempt against Chávez. The Bush administration initially recognized the coup leaders before reversing itself in the face of pressure from other states in the region. This did not put an end to suspicion that the United States might have supported the coup. Moreover, the NED provided some of its grants in 2003-2004 to groups who were supporters of the coup attempt, leading to criticism, as well as condemnation by the Chávez regime. The August 2004 referendum favored Chávez, and subsequent October 2004 regional and local elections resulted in victories for Chávez supporters.
141. See, for example, Helliwell (note 42);
142. Huntington, Third Wave (note 1);
143. Inkeles and Smith (note 42);
144. Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites' (note 42);
145. Lipset, Political Man (note 42);
146. Olsen (note 42);
147. Przeworksi and Limongi (note 42);
148. Przeworski et al. (note 42)
149. and Rowen (note 42).
150. See Schraeder, Exporting (note 2)
151. and Scott and Walters (note 2).
152. Another approach would be detailed, country-by-country evaluations. Such assessments are being undertaken at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in its 'Democracy Project', directed by Thomas Carothers. This effort evaluates democracy-building programmes and policies through case studies, study groups with national and international participants, and workshops and other meetings on democracy promotion. Carothers' Aiding Democracy Abroad (note 4) is based on this project.
153. See also Gordon Crawford, 'Promoting Democracy from Without - Learning from Within (Part I)', Democratization, Vol.10, No.1 (2003): pp.77-98;
154. and 'Promoting Democracy from Without - Learning from Within (Part II)', Democratization, Vol.10, No.2 (2003): pp.1-20 on methodologies for evaluating democracy assistance.