'Building democracy' through foreign aid: the limitations of United States political conditionalities, 1992-96

Democratization

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 156-180

  Hook, Steven W ^a  

^a KENT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIZATION; DEVELOPMENT AID; FOREIGN POLICY; NATIONAL POLITICS;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0032432321     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349808403576     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglington, Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid? (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992), p.1.
2. See Olav Stokke, 'Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art,' in Olav Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality (London, Frank Cass/EADI, 1995), pp.1-87.
3. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1994).
4. See, for example, James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists; Democratic States and War,' American Political Science Review, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.24-37.
5. See, for example, James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists; Democratic States and War,' American Political Science Review, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.24-37.
6. See, for example, James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists; Democratic States and War,' American Political Science Review, Vol.86, No.1 (1992), pp.24-37.
7. Most industrialized countries have participated in the development aid regime, both during and since the cold war, indirectly through United Nations development agencies and directly through the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The aid regime, like other transnational regimes, represented a convergence of the norms, principles, practices, and institutional arrangements in a specific area of world politics. In addition to advancing the shared principle that the provision of assistance to developing countries unattractive to private investment is a responsibility of the world's most affluent states, DAC members established non-binding qualitative standards for aid such as grant-to-loan ratios, restrictions on aid tied to domestic goods and services, and minimal levels of multilateral versus bilateral aid. The United States has routinely lagged behind other DAC members in most of these categories, particularly in the category of aid commitments as a percentage of US gross national product. But its departures have not led to a weakening of the norms by other members of the international aid regime, who provided smaller aid volumes but adhered more closely to agreed-upon standards of quality. For an overview of regime theory, see Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); for a detailed application of the theory to development aid, see Robert E. Wood, From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986).
8. Most industrialized countries have participated in the development aid regime, both during and since the cold war, indirectly through United Nations development agencies and directly through the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The aid regime, like other transnational regimes, represented a convergence of the norms, principles, practices, and institutional arrangements in a specific area of world politics. In addition to advancing the shared principle that the provision of assistance to developing countries unattractive to private investment is a responsibility of the world's most affluent states, DAC members established non-binding qualitative standards for aid such as grant-to-loan ratios, restrictions on aid tied to domestic goods and services, and minimal levels of multilateral versus bilateral aid. The United States has routinely lagged behind other DAC members in most of these categories, particularly in the category of aid commitments as a percentage of US gross national product. But its departures have not led to a weakening of the norms by other members of the international aid regime, who provided smaller aid volumes but adhered more closely to agreed-upon standards of quality. For an overview of regime theory, see Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); for a detailed application of the theory to development aid, see Robert E. Wood, From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986).
9. Richard Grant and Jan Nijman, 'Historical Changes in US and Japanese Foreign Aid to the Asia-Pacific Region', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol.87, No.1 (1997), p.33.
10. See Steven W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, 'Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows', World Politics, Vol.50, No.2 (1998), pp.294-323.
11. See Steven W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, 'Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows', World Politics, Vol.50, No.2 (1998), pp.294-323.
12. David C. Hendrickson, 'The Democratist Crusade: Intervention, Economic Sanctions, and Engagement', World Policy Journal, Vol.11, No.4 (1994-95), pp.18-30.
13. Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.12.
14. See, for example, Marcus Linear, Zapping the Third World: The Disaster of Development Aid (London: Pluto Press, 1985), and Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971).
15. See, for example, Marcus Linear, Zapping the Third World: The Disaster of Development Aid (London: Pluto Press, 1985), and Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971).
16. Stanley Hoffmann, 'The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,' Foreign Policy, Vol.98 (Spring 1995), p.161. Of this total, $244 billion took the form of economic assistance and $146 billion was disbursed as military aid. USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, DC: USAID, 1992), p.4.
17. Stanley Hoffmann, 'The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,' Foreign Policy, Vol.98 (Spring 1995), p.161. Of this total, $244 billion took the form of economic assistance and $146 billion was disbursed as military aid. USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, DC: USAID, 1992), p.4.
18. Quoted in Stokke, op. cit., p.23.
19. USAID, Democracy and Governance (Washington, DC: USAID, Nov. 1991), p.3.
20. Other regional programmes included the Democratic Pluralism Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990 and the Asia Democracy Programme in 1991.
21. Federal funding for the NED rose from $16 million in 1990 to a 1994 peak of $35 million before falling to $30 million in 1996 and 1997. For a more detailed analysis, see Thomas Carothers, 'The NED at 10', Foreign Policy, No.95 (Summer 1994), pp.123-38.
22. USAID, SEED Act Implementation Report, Fiscal Year 1994 (Washington, DC: USAID, 1995).
23. See Thomas Friedman, 'Clinton's Foreign Policy: Top Adviser Speaks Up', The New York Times (31 Oct. 1993), p.7A.
24. See United Nations, Agenda 21 (New York: United Nations, 1992). For a critique of the Clinton administration's environmental policies, see Marvin S. Soroos, 'From Stockholm to Rio and Beyond: The Evolution of Global Environmental Governance,' in Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (eds.), Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Reform or Reaction? (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997), pp.294-5.
25. See United Nations, Agenda 21 (New York: United Nations, 1992). For a critique of the Clinton administration's environmental policies, see Marvin S. Soroos, 'From Stockholm to Rio and Beyond: The Evolution of Global Environmental Governance,' in Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (eds.), Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Reform or Reaction? (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997), pp.294-5.
26. USAID, Strategies for Sustainable Development (Washington, DC: USAID, 1994).
27. Secretary of State Warren Christopher articulated these themes in 'America's Leadership, America's Opportunity', Foreign Policy, Vol.98 (Spring 1995), pp.6-27.
28. Bilateral aid flows from the United States greatly exceeded multilateral flows, which averaged .04 per cent of US GNP during the period under review, less than one-half the OECD average. See OECD, Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, various years).
29. Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgeting, 2nd rev. ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986), p.7.
30. See Gregory A. Raymond, 'Evaluation: A Neglected Task for the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, MA: Alien & Unwin, 1987), pp.96-110.
31. USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, DC: USAID, 1992, 1997), p.4. See also Michael O'Hanlon and Carol Graham, A Half penny on the Dollar: The Future of Development Aid, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), p.7.
32. USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, DC: USAID, 1992, 1997), p.4. See also Michael O'Hanlon and Carol Graham, A Half penny on the Dollar: The Future of Development Aid, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), p.7.
33. OECD, Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, 1997), pp.A7-A8.
34. Nearly all of this aid to Egypt and Israel came in the form of Economic Support Funds which were not associated with the democratization programme overseen by USAID. The figure does not include military aid to the two countries, which averaged another $2 billion each year.
35. Ibid., PP.A13-A14.
36. USAID, Congressional Presentation, FY 1996-1997 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996). A similar breakdown of spending for Fiscal Year 1996 was not available due to a change in USAID's reporting process.
37. While all attempts to measure democratic development are inherently fraught with difficulties, the comprehensive reporting by Freedom House has provided a basis for scholarly investigation. For a previous application of Freedom House ratings, see Gordon Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency', Democratization, Vol.4, No.3 (1997), pp.69-108. The Freedom House country ratings have additionally served as a basis for evaluation by the US government, which has relied upon the ratings as well as annual reports on human rights compiled by the State Department when considering the progress of recipients in adhering to aid conditionalities.
38. These Pearson correlations are drawn from a data-set encompassing the annual bilateral commitments of US ODA to 115 developing countries for each year between 1991 and 1996, along with the Freedom House democratization ratings for both the democratic status and change indicators. A one-year lag between aid disbursements and reported recipient characteristics, commonly used in the scholarly literature, is employed in this analysis. Israel and Egypt, which received a disproportionate share of US ODA, are excluded from the data set given their status as statistical outliers that would skew the bivariate relationship.
39. Thomas Carothers, 'The Reagan Years: The 1980s', in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp.90-122.
40. See Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy', Democratization, Vol.4, No.3 (1997), pp.109-32.
41. To Freedom House, political rights 'enable people to participate freely in the political process,' whereas civil liberties 'are the freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state'. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World: the Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1996-1997 (New York: Freedom House, 1997), p.18.
42. This multivariate OLS regression analysis draws upon the same data set used in the correlation analysis. American ODA commitments to each recipient are considered as dependent variables against a variety of recipient characteristics reported in the previous year. These characteristics, considered as independent variables, represent commonly used measures of potential foreign-policy interests of the aid donor. The measure for democratic development is derived from the pooled mean of political rights and civil liberties in each recipient country. To test for the potential importance of human needs considerations, the UN Human Development Index is utilized that incorporates recipient life expectancy, per capita income, and educational attainment. The measure for US economic interest is derived from the volume of US exports to each recipient minus imports. Finally, evidence of potential security interest is derived from the sum of military spending by each developing country and the volume of US military aid to each. Israel and Egypt are again excluded from the data set given their status as statistical outliers.
43. For an early application of this model, see R.D. McKinlay, 'The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the Distribution of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960-1970', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.11, No.4 (1979), pp.411-63.
44. For a full account of these measures, see United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp.146-8.
45. See Hook, op. cit., p.118.
46. This pattern applied most consistently to Latin American recipients of US aid, with whom the United States often registered trade surpluses. By contrast, developing countries in East Asia, who received less US aid, generally exported more goods to the United States than they imported.
47. The conception of the United States as a 'weak state' was developed by Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).
48. See Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, 'Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy', International Security, Vol.21, No.3 (1996-97), pp.5-53. To the authors, four contending strategies emerged during this period: cooperative security (most closely associated with sustainable development), primacy, selective engagement, and neo-isolationism.
49. John Gerard Ruggie, 'The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy', International Security, Vol.21, No.4 (1997), p.91.
50. William Schneider, 'The New Isolationism', in Robert J. Lieber (ed.), Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman, 1997), pp.27-8.
51. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion Report, 1995 (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). For an elaboration, see John E. Rielly, 'The Public Mood at Mid-Decade', Foreign Policy, Vol.98 (Spring 1995), pp.76-93.
52. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion Report, 1995 (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). For an elaboration, see John E. Rielly, 'The Public Mood at Mid-Decade', Foreign Policy, Vol.98 (Spring 1995), pp.76-93.
53. Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, 'Saving Failed States', Foreign Policy, No.89 (Winter 1992-93), pp.3-20.
54. See Steven W. Hook, 'Mission Without a Mandate: US Foreign Aid After the Cold War,' Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1997).
55. US General Accounting Office, Promoting Democracy: Foreign Affairs and Defense Agencies Funds and Activities, 1991-1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994).
56. Much larger volumes of US and IMF emergency funding were required in 1997 and 1998 to prevent an economic calamity in East Asia which resulted from many of the same domestic failures as those which drew the Mexican economy to the brink of bankruptcy.
57. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Direct Investment Abroad (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, various years).
58. The average rating for political rights increased from 3.1 to 3.4 during this period, and the average rating for civil liberties increased from 3.4 to 3.7, with the higher Freedom House ratings representing less respect for democracy.
59. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996 (Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996). In each of these years, the US government spent more than 40 per cent of the global total. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1996 (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996, pp.45-6).
60. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996 (Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996). In each of these years, the US government spent more than 40 per cent of the global total. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1996 (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996, pp.45-6).
61. Israel received $3 billion annually from the US government between 1992 and 1996, including $1.2 billion in economic aid and $1.8 billion in military aid, while Egypt received an average of $2.1 billion annually during this period. (USAID: US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations. Washington: USAID, 1997, pp.10, 13).
62. US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 (Washington, DC: US State Department, 1995), Israel Country Report.
63. US State Department, 1995 Egypt Country Report.
64. USAID (1997), op. cit., p.14.
65. Ibid., p.183.
66. US State Department, 1993 Turkey Country Report.
67. USAID (1997), op. cit, p.197.
68. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: the Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1996-1997, p.324.
69. The US State Department reported 'numerous killings and serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights' by both sides in the Chechen conflict, although 'violations committed by Russian military forces occurred on a much greater scale than those of the Chechen separatists'. US State Department, 1995 Russia Country Report.
70. See, for example, Peter Burnell, 'Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and Political Conditionality', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1994), pp.485-503.
71. See Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie Eglington, 'The International Donor Community: Conditioned Aid and the Promotion and Defense of Democracy,' in Tom Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp.169-86.
72. See Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.6 (1997), pp.22-43.
73. See Burnell, op. cit., pp.488-91.
74. OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients (Paris: OECD, 1995), p.145.
75. Aggregate ODA disbursements fell from a 1992 peak of $60.9 billion to $55.5 billion in 1996. Other major donors reporting substantial cutbacks included Canada, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, although some countries' ODA disbursements revived somewhat in 1996 after several years of reductions. See OECD, Development Cooperation (Paris, OECD, 1997), pp.A7-A8.
76. For a recent cross-national perspective, see Steven W. Hook (ed.), Foreign Aid Toward the Millennium (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).
77. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).