Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 229-243

  Govindan, Srihari ^a   Klumpp, Tilman ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Finite characterization; Independence; Lexicographic beliefs; Perfect equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037000359     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820200113     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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