On the epistemic foundation for backward induction

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 121-144

  Asheim, Geir B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Backward induction

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036837740     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00011-2     Document Type: Article

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