Prognosticating about extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Implications from strategic selection

World Affairs

Volumn 168, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 13-25

  Chan, Steve ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOPOLITICS; PEACEKEEPING; REGIONAL SECURITY; STRATEGIC APPROACH; WAR;

ASIA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; FAR EAST; TAIWAN STRAIT; WORLD;

EID: 26844461444     PISSN: 00438200     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3200/WAFS.168.1.13-25     Document Type: Article

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