On-going board reforms: One size fits all and regulatory capture

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 269-282

  Hertig, Gerard ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE; REFORM PROCESS; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK;

EID: 23844488724     PISSN: 0266903X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/gri016     Document Type: Article

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