Testing threats in repeated games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 121, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 214-235

  Spiegler, Ran ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Justifiability; Reciprocity; Repeated games; Solution concepts; Threat testing; Trigger strategies

Indexed keywords

EID: 15844373325     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.003     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Axelrod R. The Evolution of Cooperation 1984 Basic Books New York
2. E. Eyster, M. Rabin, Cursed Equilibrium, Mimeo, 2001.
3. P. Jehiel, Analogy-based expectation equilibrium, J. Econ. Theory, 2004, forthcoming.
4. Kalai E. Lehrer E. Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium Econometrica 61 1993 1019-1045
5. Kreps D. Milgrom R. Roberts J. Wilson R. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated PD J. Econ. Theory 27 1982 245-252 486-502
6. Osborne M. Rubinstein A. A Course in Game Theory 1994 MIT Press Cambridge, MA
7. Osborne M. Rubinstein A. Games with procedurally rational players Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 1998 834-847
8. Spiegler R. Equilibrium in justifiable strategies: A model of reason-based choice in extensive-form games Rev. Econ. Stud. 69 2002 691-706
9. Watson J. Cooperation in the infinitely repeated PD with perturbations Games Econ. Behav. 7 1994 260-285