Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures

Public Choice

Volumn 122, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 333-354

  Parker, Glenn R ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22044436493     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-5733-0     Document Type: Review

References (51)

1. Akerlof, G.H. (1970). The market for 'lemons': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 74: 488-500.
2. Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review 62: 777-795.
3. Barro, R.J. (1973). The control of politicians: An economic model. Public Choice 14: 19-42.
4. Becker, G.S. and Stigler, G.J. (1974). Law enforcement, malfeasance, and the compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3: 1-18.
5. Commission on Administrative Review, U.S. House of Representatives. (1977). Final report, 95th Congress, 1st session, H. Doc. 95-272.
6. Cook, T.D. and Campbell, D.T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
7. Crain, W., Leavans, D.R. and Tollison, R.D. (1986). Final voting in legislatures. American Economic Review 76: 833-841.
8. Davis, M.L., and Ferrantino, M. (1996). Towards a positive theory of political rhetoric: Why do politicians lie? Public Choice 88: 1-13.
9. Dougan, W.R. and Munger, M.C. (1989). The rationality of ideology. Journal of Law and Economics 32: 119-142.
10. Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 327-349.
11. Fenno, R.F., Jr. (1973). Congressmen in committees. Boston: Little, Brown.
12. Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50: 5-25.
13. Figlio, D.W. (2000). Political shirking, opponent quality, and electoral support. Public Choice 103: 271-284.
14. Fiorina, M.P. (1977). Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment. New Haven: Yale University Press.
15. Goldenberg, E.N. and Traugott, M.W. (1984). Campaigning for Congress. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
16. Goodrich, L.J. (1998). Congress gets an 'a' for voter participation. The Christian Science Monitor, January 29. http//search.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/ 01/29/us/us.5.html (Sept. 26, 2003).
17. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
18. Kalt, J.P. and Zupan, M.A. (1990). The apparent ideological behavior of legislatures: Testing for principal-agent slack in political institutions. Journal of Law and Economics 33: 103-131.
19. Kalt, J.P. and Zupan, M.A. (1984). Capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics. American Economic Review 74: 279-300.
20. Kau, J.B. and Rubin, P.H. (1979). Self-interest, ideology, and logrolling in congressional voting. Journal of Law and Economics 22: 365-384.
21. Klein, B. and Leffler, K.B. (1981). The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy 89: 615-641.
22. Klein, B., Crawford, R.G. and Alchian, A.A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics 21: 297-326.
23. Korin, B.P. (1975). Statistical concepts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers.
24. Kostroski, W.E. (1973). Party and incumbency in post-war senate elections: Trends, patterns, and models. American Political Science Review 67: 1213-1234.
25. Lott, J.R. (1990). Attendance rates, political shirking, and the effect of post-elective office employment. Economic Inquiry 28: 133-150.
26. Lott, J.R. (1987). Political cheating. Public Choice 74: 461-484.
27. Lott, J. R. (1986). Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets. Public Choice 51: 87-92.
28. Lott, J.R. and Davis, M. (1992). A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature. Public Choice 74: 461-484.
29. Mann, T.E. (1978). Unsafe at any margin. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
30. Markus, G.B. (1979). Analyzing panel data. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
31. Mayhew, D.R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
32. McCurley, C. and Mondak, J.J. (1995). Inspected by #1184063113: The influence of incumbents' competence and integrity in U.S. House elections. American Journal of Political Science 39: 864-885.
33. Nelson, P. (1976). Political information. Journal of Law and Economics 19: 315-336.
34. Niskanen, W.A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Rand McNally.
35. Ornstein, N.J., Mann, T.E. and Malbin, M.J. (1996). Vital statistics on Congress 1995-1996. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
36. Parker, G.R. (1996). Congress and the rent-seeking society. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
37. Parker, G.R. (2004). Self-policing in politics: The political economy of reputational controls on politicians. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
38. Parker, G.R. (1989). The role of constituent trust in congressional elections. Public Opinion Quarterly 53: 175-196.
39. Parker, G.R. and Parker, S. (1998a). The economic organization of legislatures and how it effects congressional voting. Public Choice 60: 117-129.
40. Parker, G.R. and Powers, S. (2002). Searching for symptoms of political shirking: Congressional foreign travel. Public Choice 110: 173-191.
41. Polsby, N.W. (1968). The institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. American Political Science Review 62: 144-168.
42. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government. New York: Cambridge University Press.
43. Shepsle, K.A. and Weingast, B.R. (1987). The institutional foundations of committee power. American Political Science Review 81: 85-104.
44. Stigler, G.J. (1972). Economic competition and political competition. Public Choice 13: 91-106.
45. Telser, L.G. (1980). A theory of self-enforcing agreements. Journal of Business 22: 27-44.
46. Tuckman, B.W. (1972). Conducting educational research. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
47. Vanbeck, J.R. (1991). Does the decision to retire increase the amount of shirking? Public Finance Quarterly 19: 444-456.
48. Weingast, B.R. and Marshall, W.J. (1998). The industrial organization of Congress, or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy 96: 132-163.
49. Williamson, O.E. (1981). The modern corporation: Origins, evolution, and attributes. Journal of Economic Literature 19: 1537-1568.
50. Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press.
51. Zupan, M.A. (1990). The last-period problem in politics: Do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior? Public Choice 65: 167-180.