Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Economic Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 455-475

  Aoyagi, Masaki ^a  

^a OSAKA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Communication; Joint monitoring; Mediation; Private monitoring; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244489295     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0436-6     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Aoyagi, M.: Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication. Journal of Economic Theory 102, 229-248 (2002)
2. Ben-Porath, E., Kahneman, M.: Communication in repeated games with private monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 70, 281-297 (1996)
3. Bhaskar, V., Obara, I.: Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 102, 40-69 (2002)
4. Bhaskar, V., Van Damme, E.: Moral hazard and private monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 102, 16-39 (2002)
5. Compte, O.: Private observations, communication and coordination in repeated games. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University (1994)
6. Compte, O.: Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. Econometrica 66, 597-626 (1998)
7. Doyle, M. P., Snyder, C. M.: Information sharing and competition in the motor vehicle industry. Journal of Political Economy 107, 1326-1364 (1999)
8. Ellison, G.: Cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma with anonymous random matching. Review of Economic Studies 61, 567-588 (1994)
9. Ely, J., Valimaki, J.: A robust folk theorem for the prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 102, 84-105 (2000)
10. Fletcher, C.: Appraisal - routes to improved performance, 2nd edn. London: Institute of Personnel Development 1997
11. Forges, F.: An approach to communication equilibria. Econometrica 54, 1375-1385 (1986)
12. Genesove, D. Mullin, W. P.: Rules, communication, and collusion: narrative evidence from the Sugar Institute case. American Economic Review 91, 379-398 (2001)
13. Kandori, M., Matsushima, H.: Private observation, communication and collusion," Discussion Paper 94-F-33, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo (1994)
14. Kandori, M., Matsushima, H.: Private observation, communication and collusion. Econometrica 66, 627-652 (1998)
15. Mailath, G., Morris, S.: Repeated games with almost-public monitoring. Mimeo (1999)
16. Mailath, G., Samuelson, L.: Your reputation is who you are not, not who you would like to be. Mimeo (1998)
17. Matsushima, H.: On the theory of repeated games with private information. Part II: Revelation through communication. Economics Letters 35, 257-261 (1990)
18. Mitusch, K., Strausz, R.: Mediation in situations of conflict. Mimeo (2000)
19. Myerson, R.: Multistage games with communication. Econometrica 54, 323-358 (1986)
20. Obara, I.: The repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring: an N-player case. Mimeo (2000)
21. Piccione, M.: The repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 102, 70-83 (1999)
22. Scherer, F. M.: Industrial market structure and economic performance, 2nd edn. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1980
23. Sekiguchi, T.: Efficiency in repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 76, 345-361 (1997)
24. Sekiguchi, T.: Robustness of efficient equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. Mimeo (1998)
25. Stigler, G.: A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy 72, 44-61 (1964)