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Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 376-397

Hold-up, stakeholders and takeover threats

Author keywords

Bargaining; Hold up; Investment; Stakeholder; Takeovers

Indexed keywords


EID: 20444479134     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2004.08.004     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

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