A theory of the optimal cost barrier to corporate takeovers

International Economic Review

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 657-675

  Garvey, Gerald T ^a   Gaston, Noel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347937771     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527286     Document Type: Article

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