Economic Reform and Democratization: Evidence from Latin America and Post-Socialist Countries

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 357-368

  Kwon, Hyeok Yong ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842783939     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123404210080     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: A. Tentative Conclusion (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reform in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Philippe C. Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, 'The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?', Slavic Review, 53 (1994), 173-85.
2. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: A. Tentative Conclusion (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reform in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Philippe C. Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, 'The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?', Slavic Review, 53 (1994), 173-85.
3. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: A. Tentative Conclusion (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reform in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Philippe C. Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, 'The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?', Slavic Review, 53 (1994), 173-85.
4. Gregory Ekiert, 'Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 285-313; Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', Social Research, 58 (1991), 865-92; Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?' Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 111-27; Valerie Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers', Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 979-87; Valerie Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization: The East versus the South', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 187-211.
5. Gregory Ekiert, 'Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 285-313; Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', Social Research, 58 (1991), 865-92; Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?' Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 111-27; Valerie Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers', Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 979-87; Valerie Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization: The East versus the South', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 187-211.
6. Gregory Ekiert, 'Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 285-313; Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', Social Research, 58 (1991), 865-92; Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?' Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 111-27; Valerie Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers', Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 979-87; Valerie Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization: The East versus the South', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 187-211.
7. Gregory Ekiert, 'Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 285-313; Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', Social Research, 58 (1991), 865-92; Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?' Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 111-27; Valerie Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers', Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 979-87; Valerie Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization: The East versus the South', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 187-211.
8. Gregory Ekiert, 'Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 285-313; Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', Social Research, 58 (1991), 865-92; Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?' Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 111-27; Valerie Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers', Slavic Review, 54 (1995), 979-87; Valerie Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization: The East versus the South', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 187-211.
9. In this Note, I use the terms 'Latin America and southern Europe' and 'the South' interchangeably. In the same vein, the terms 'the East' and 'the post-socialist countries' are used interchangeably.
10. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
11. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
12. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
13. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
14. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
15. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
16. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
17. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
18. Several works have engaged in cross-regional comparisons of democratization processes. For instance, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Joan Nelson, Intimate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis, 'Democratic Capitalism and the State in Eastern Europe and Latin America' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999); Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies are based on comparative case studies of selected countries across regions, however (but see Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development). For a recent review of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between economic reform and democratization, see Valerie Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform', Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 43-65; Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
19. Schmitter with Karl, 'The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists'; Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers'.
20. Schmitter with Karl, 'The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists'; Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers'.
21. Schmitter with Karl, 'The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists'; Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers'.
22. Schmitter with Karl, 'The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists', p. 173.
23. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; José M. Maravall, 'Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe', in L. C. Bresser Pereira, J. M. Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 77-131; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. This perspective has been challenged by Hellman. Contrary to the logic of 'diffuse benefits and concentrated costs', he finds that in the post-socialist countries benefits of economic reforms (partial reforms) were concentrated, whereas costs were dispersed across groups and classes. He further argues that the 'winners' of partial economic reform hinder completion of democratization processes, halting the process at 'partial reform equilibrium'. A similar argument for Latin America was made by Schamis. See Joel Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics, 50 (1998), 203-34; Hector E. Schamis, 'Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America', World Politics, 51 (1999), 236-68.
24. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; José M. Maravall, 'Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe', in L. C. Bresser Pereira, J. M. Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 77-131; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. This perspective has been challenged by Hellman. Contrary to the logic of 'diffuse benefits and concentrated costs', he finds that in the post-socialist countries benefits of economic reforms (partial reforms) were concentrated, whereas costs were dispersed across groups and classes. He further argues that the 'winners' of partial economic reform hinder completion of democratization processes, halting the process at 'partial reform equilibrium'. A similar argument for Latin America was made by Schamis. See Joel Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics, 50 (1998), 203-34; Hector E. Schamis, 'Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America', World Politics, 51 (1999), 236-68.
25. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; José M. Maravall, 'Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe', in L. C. Bresser Pereira, J. M. Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 77-131; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. This perspective has been challenged by Hellman. Contrary to the logic of 'diffuse benefits and concentrated costs', he finds that in the post-socialist countries benefits of economic reforms (partial reforms) were concentrated, whereas costs were dispersed across groups and classes. He further argues that the 'winners' of partial economic reform hinder completion of democratization processes, halting the process at 'partial reform equilibrium'. A similar argument for Latin America was made by Schamis. See Joel Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics, 50 (1998), 203-34; Hector E. Schamis, 'Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America', World Politics, 51 (1999), 236-68.
26. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; José M. Maravall, 'Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe', in L. C. Bresser Pereira, J. M. Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 77-131; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. This perspective has been challenged by Hellman. Contrary to the logic of 'diffuse benefits and concentrated costs', he finds that in the post-socialist countries benefits of economic reforms (partial reforms) were concentrated, whereas costs were dispersed across groups and classes. He further argues that the 'winners' of partial economic reform hinder completion of democratization processes, halting the process at 'partial reform equilibrium'. A similar argument for Latin America was made by Schamis. See Joel Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics, 50 (1998), 203-34; Hector E. Schamis, 'Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America', World Politics, 51 (1999), 236-68.
27. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; José M. Maravall, 'Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe', in L. C. Bresser Pereira, J. M. Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 77-131; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. This perspective has been challenged by Hellman. Contrary to the logic of 'diffuse benefits and concentrated costs', he finds that in the post-socialist countries benefits of economic reforms (partial reforms) were concentrated, whereas costs were dispersed across groups and classes. He further argues that the 'winners' of partial economic reform hinder completion of democratization processes, halting the process at 'partial reform equilibrium'. A similar argument for Latin America was made by Schamis. See Joel Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics, 50 (1998), 203-34; Hector E. Schamis, 'Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America', World Politics, 51 (1999), 236-68.
28. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; José M. Maravall, 'Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe', in L. C. Bresser Pereira, J. M. Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 77-131; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. This perspective has been challenged by Hellman. Contrary to the logic of 'diffuse benefits and concentrated costs', he finds that in the post-socialist countries benefits of economic reforms (partial reforms) were concentrated, whereas costs were dispersed across groups and classes. He further argues that the 'winners' of partial economic reform hinder completion of democratization processes, halting the process at 'partial reform equilibrium'. A similar argument for Latin America was made by Schamis. See Joel Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics, 50 (1998), 203-34; Hector E. Schamis, 'Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America', World Politics, 51 (1999), 236-68.
29. Steven M. Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World', East European Politics and Societies, 12 (1998), 31-77.
30. Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization', pp. 199-200. In fact, it is striking to see that empirical analyses of the post-socialist transitions employing various data and/or estimation techniques have reported almost identical results: a positive association between economic and political reforms in the region. See Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform'; Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World'; Steven M. Fish, 'Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 212-47; but see Andrew Barnes and Marcus Kurtz, 'Ten Years of Post-Communist Transitions', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 524-53.
31. Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization', pp. 199-200. In fact, it is striking to see that empirical analyses of the post-socialist transitions employing various data and/or estimation techniques have reported almost identical results: a positive association between economic and political reforms in the region. See Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform'; Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World'; Steven M. Fish, 'Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 212-47; but see Andrew Barnes and Marcus Kurtz, 'Ten Years of Post-Communist Transitions', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 524-53.
32. Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization', pp. 199-200. In fact, it is striking to see that empirical analyses of the post-socialist transitions employing various data and/or estimation techniques have reported almost identical results: a positive association between economic and political reforms in the region. See Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform'; Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World'; Steven M. Fish, 'Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 212-47; but see Andrew Barnes and Marcus Kurtz, 'Ten Years of Post-Communist Transitions', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 524-53.
33. Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization', pp. 199-200. In fact, it is striking to see that empirical analyses of the post-socialist transitions employing various data and/or estimation techniques have reported almost identical results: a positive association between economic and political reforms in the region. See Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform'; Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World'; Steven M. Fish, 'Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 212-47; but see Andrew Barnes and Marcus Kurtz, 'Ten Years of Post-Communist Transitions', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 524-53.
34. Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization', pp. 199-200. In fact, it is striking to see that empirical analyses of the post-socialist transitions employing various data and/or estimation techniques have reported almost identical results: a positive association between economic and political reforms in the region. See Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform'; Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World'; Steven M. Fish, 'Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 212-47; but see Andrew Barnes and Marcus Kurtz, 'Ten Years of Post-Communist Transitions', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 524-53.
35. Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization', pp. 199-200. In fact, it is striking to see that empirical analyses of the post-socialist transitions employing various data and/or estimation techniques have reported almost identical results: a positive association between economic and political reforms in the region. See Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be Grounded?'; Bunce, 'Democratization and Economic Reform'; Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World'; Steven M. Fish, 'Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998), 212-47; but see Andrew Barnes and Marcus Kurtz, 'Ten Years of Post-Communist Transitions', Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 524-53.
36. For Schmitter and Karl, the degree of economic reform is in large part a function of the years after democratic transitions, provided that the regime proceeds towards consolidation. Bunce's emphasis on the mutuality of reforms in the post-socialist regions implies a positive effect of levels of political reform on economic reform.
37. Indeed, studies continue to find a positive association between economic development and democracy. There have been counter-arguments to this dominant perspective - for instance, arguing that the level of economic development has more to do with the sustainability than with the rise of democracy or that the positive association that modernization theory posits does not hold in a certain region, notably in Latin America. Nonetheless, various studies have shown positive effects (direct or indirect) of economic development on democratization. See Ross E. Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 903-10; John B. Londregan and Keith Poole, 'Does High Income Promote Democracy?' World Politics, 49 (1996), 1-30; J. Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth', British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 225-48; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, 'Modernization: Theories and Facts', World Politics, 49 (1997), 155-83; Todd Landman, 'Economic Development and Democracy: The View from Latin America', Political Studies, 47 (1999), 607-26.
38. Indeed, studies continue to find a positive association between economic development and democracy. There have been counter-arguments to this dominant perspective - for instance, arguing that the level of economic development has more to do with the sustainability than with the rise of democracy or that the positive association that modernization theory posits does not hold in a certain region, notably in Latin America. Nonetheless, various studies have shown positive effects (direct or indirect) of economic development on democratization. See Ross E. Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 903-10; John B. Londregan and Keith Poole, 'Does High Income Promote Democracy?' World Politics, 49 (1996), 1-30; J. Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth', British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 225-48; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, 'Modernization: Theories and Facts', World Politics, 49 (1997), 155-83; Todd Landman, 'Economic Development and Democracy: The View from Latin America', Political Studies, 47 (1999), 607-26.
39. Indeed, studies continue to find a positive association between economic development and democracy. There have been counter-arguments to this dominant perspective - for instance, arguing that the level of economic development has more to do with the sustainability than with the rise of democracy or that the positive association that modernization theory posits does not hold in a certain region, notably in Latin America. Nonetheless, various studies have shown positive effects (direct or indirect) of economic development on democratization. See Ross E. Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 903-10; John B. Londregan and Keith Poole, 'Does High Income Promote Democracy?' World Politics, 49 (1996), 1-30; J. Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth', British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 225-48; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, 'Modernization: Theories and Facts', World Politics, 49 (1997), 155-83; Todd Landman, 'Economic Development and Democracy: The View from Latin America', Political Studies, 47 (1999), 607-26.
40. Indeed, studies continue to find a positive association between economic development and democracy. There have been counter-arguments to this dominant perspective - for instance, arguing that the level of economic development has more to do with the sustainability than with the rise of democracy or that the positive association that modernization theory posits does not hold in a certain region, notably in Latin America. Nonetheless, various studies have shown positive effects (direct or indirect) of economic development on democratization. See Ross E. Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 903-10; John B. Londregan and Keith Poole, 'Does High Income Promote Democracy?' World Politics, 49 (1996), 1-30; J. Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth', British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 225-48; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, 'Modernization: Theories and Facts', World Politics, 49 (1997), 155-83; Todd Landman, 'Economic Development and Democracy: The View from Latin America', Political Studies, 47 (1999), 607-26.
41. Indeed, studies continue to find a positive association between economic development and democracy. There have been counter-arguments to this dominant perspective - for instance, arguing that the level of economic development has more to do with the sustainability than with the rise of democracy or that the positive association that modernization theory posits does not hold in a certain region, notably in Latin America. Nonetheless, various studies have shown positive effects (direct or indirect) of economic development on democratization. See Ross E. Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 903-10; John B. Londregan and Keith Poole, 'Does High Income Promote Democracy?' World Politics, 49 (1996), 1-30; J. Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth', British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 225-48; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, 'Modernization: Theories and Facts', World Politics, 49 (1997), 155-83; Todd Landman, 'Economic Development and Democracy: The View from Latin America', Political Studies, 47 (1999), 607-26.
42. See Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.
43. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); For the impact of international actors and institutions on the eastern European transitions, see Daniel Thomas, Norms, Politics, and Human Rights: The Helsinki Process and the Decline of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Archie Brown, 'Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism', Post-Soviet Affairs, 16 (2000), 177-200.
44. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); For the impact of international actors and institutions on the eastern European transitions, see Daniel Thomas, Norms, Politics, and Human Rights: The Helsinki Process and the Decline of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Archie Brown, 'Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism', Post-Soviet Affairs, 16 (2000), 177-200.
45. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); For the impact of international actors and institutions on the eastern European transitions, see Daniel Thomas, Norms, Politics, and Human Rights: The Helsinki Process and the Decline of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Archie Brown, 'Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism', Post-Soviet Affairs, 16 (2000), 177-200.
46. Unfortunately, mainly due to the lack of reliable measures or to conceptual concerns, this analysis does not include variables that might affect democratization. Distribution of power among social classes/groups is not included in the analysis, because it is not clear whether sectoral composition of the economy or sectoral values added to GDP can capture the precise map of socio-economic power relations among classes/groups. Though the literature has emphasized political pacts, 'crafting', 'elite settlement' and 'elite consensus', maintaining that 'transition via political pact' is more likely to be sustainable, unfortunately, the coding of the modes of transition for each country has yet to be done precisely enough for use in quantitative analysis. Although 'state-ness' might exert an important effect on democratization, I am aware of no convincing and reliable measures of stateness, let alone conceptual problems, in terms of both the accuracy of measurement and the desirable property of over-time variance of the measure. Lastly, including the 'political [civic] culture' approach into this analysis would cause a set of problems. On the one hand, the accurate measurement of civic culture is highly debatable. On the other, much of what the literature has considered as the preconditions for democracy may be better conceived as the outcomes of democracy. Therefore, including the political culture variable would cause a simultaneity bias. See, Terry Lynn Karl, 'Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 196-219; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes', in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-37; Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 635-52.
47. Unfortunately, mainly due to the lack of reliable measures or to conceptual concerns, this analysis does not include variables that might affect democratization. Distribution of power among social classes/groups is not included in the analysis, because it is not clear whether sectoral composition of the economy or sectoral values added to GDP can capture the precise map of socio-economic power relations among classes/groups. Though the literature has emphasized political pacts, 'crafting', 'elite settlement' and 'elite consensus', maintaining that 'transition via political pact' is more likely to be sustainable, unfortunately, the coding of the modes of transition for each country has yet to be done precisely enough for use in quantitative analysis. Although 'state-ness' might exert an important effect on democratization, I am aware of no convincing and reliable measures of stateness, let alone conceptual problems, in terms of both the accuracy of measurement and the desirable property of over-time variance of the measure. Lastly, including the 'political [civic] culture' approach into this analysis would cause a set of problems. On the one hand, the accurate measurement of civic culture is highly debatable. On the other, much of what the literature has considered as the preconditions for democracy may be better conceived as the outcomes of democracy. Therefore, including the political culture variable would cause a simultaneity bias. See, Terry Lynn Karl, 'Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 196-219; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes', in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-37; Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 635-52.
48. Unfortunately, mainly due to the lack of reliable measures or to conceptual concerns, this analysis does not include variables that might affect democratization. Distribution of power among social classes/groups is not included in the analysis, because it is not clear whether sectoral composition of the economy or sectoral values added to GDP can capture the precise map of socio-economic power relations among classes/groups. Though the literature has emphasized political pacts, 'crafting', 'elite settlement' and 'elite consensus', maintaining that 'transition via political pact' is more likely to be sustainable, unfortunately, the coding of the modes of transition for each country has yet to be done precisely enough for use in quantitative analysis. Although 'state-ness' might exert an important effect on democratization, I am aware of no convincing and reliable measures of stateness, let alone conceptual problems, in terms of both the accuracy of measurement and the desirable property of over-time variance of the measure. Lastly, including the 'political [civic] culture' approach into this analysis would cause a set of problems. On the one hand, the accurate measurement of civic culture is highly debatable. On the other, much of what the literature has considered as the preconditions for democracy may be better conceived as the outcomes of democracy. Therefore, including the political culture variable would cause a simultaneity bias. See, Terry Lynn Karl, 'Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 196-219; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes', in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-37; Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 635-52.
49. Unfortunately, mainly due to the lack of reliable measures or to conceptual concerns, this analysis does not include variables that might affect democratization. Distribution of power among social classes/groups is not included in the analysis, because it is not clear whether sectoral composition of the economy or sectoral values added to GDP can capture the precise map of socio-economic power relations among classes/groups. Though the literature has emphasized political pacts, 'crafting', 'elite settlement' and 'elite consensus', maintaining that 'transition via political pact' is more likely to be sustainable, unfortunately, the coding of the modes of transition for each country has yet to be done precisely enough for use in quantitative analysis. Although 'state-ness' might exert an important effect on democratization, I am aware of no convincing and reliable measures of stateness, let alone conceptual problems, in terms of both the accuracy of measurement and the desirable property of over-time variance of the measure. Lastly, including the 'political [civic] culture' approach into this analysis would cause a set of problems. On the one hand, the accurate measurement of civic culture is highly debatable. On the other, much of what the literature has considered as the preconditions for democracy may be better conceived as the outcomes of democracy. Therefore, including the political culture variable would cause a simultaneity bias. See, Terry Lynn Karl, 'Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 196-219; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes', in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-37; Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 635-52.
50. Unfortunately, mainly due to the lack of reliable measures or to conceptual concerns, this analysis does not include variables that might affect democratization. Distribution of power among social classes/groups is not included in the analysis, because it is not clear whether sectoral composition of the economy or sectoral values added to GDP can capture the precise map of socio-economic power relations among classes/groups. Though the literature has emphasized political pacts, 'crafting', 'elite settlement' and 'elite consensus', maintaining that 'transition via political pact' is more likely to be sustainable, unfortunately, the coding of the modes of transition for each country has yet to be done precisely enough for use in quantitative analysis. Although 'state-ness' might exert an important effect on democratization, I am aware of no convincing and reliable measures of stateness, let alone conceptual problems, in terms of both the accuracy of measurement and the desirable property of over-time variance of the measure. Lastly, including the 'political [civic] culture' approach into this analysis would cause a set of problems. On the one hand, the accurate measurement of civic culture is highly debatable. On the other, much of what the literature has considered as the preconditions for democracy may be better conceived as the outcomes of democracy. Therefore, including the political culture variable would cause a simultaneity bias. See, Terry Lynn Karl, 'Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 196-219; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes', in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-37; Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 635-52.
51. The purpose of this study is mainly to assess empirically the debate about regional differences between Latin America and the post-socialist countries. Analysis of all new democracies including, say, Asia and Africa would be another project. South European countries (Portugal, Spain and Greece) are excluded due to the differences in transition time period.
52. Note that Latin American countries in the dataset have a variation in the timing of transitions, while it is not the case for the post-socialist countries. Some Latin American countries did not even have transitions at all (long-enduring democracies or authoritarian regimes). Nonetheless, dropping those countries out of the dataset would cause selection bias. Accordingly, I include all the Latin American countries for which the data are available. A post-estimation diagnosis - country-by-country jackknife analysis - was conducted to ensure that a certain country did not drive the estimation results.
53. Data were downloaded from the Freedom House URL, http://www.freedomhouse. org/ratings.pdf (accessed 21 February 2002).
54. The formula is [14 - (political rights + civil liberties)]/12. See Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth'. In the estimation below, as a robustness check, I used Polity IV data as the measure of democracy. I used the formula [(democracy - autocracy) + 10]/20 to yield [0,1] range of the scores, where 0 denotes lowest and 1 highest democracy score. See Landman, 'Economic Development and Democracy', The estimation using Polity IV data did not produce qualitatively different results.
55. The formula is [14 - (political rights + civil liberties)]/12. See Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth'. In the estimation below, as a robustness check, I used Polity IV data as the measure of democracy. I used the formula [(democracy - autocracy) + 10]/20 to yield [0,1] range of the scores, where 0 denotes lowest and 1 highest democracy score. See Landman, 'Economic Development and Democracy', The estimation using Polity IV data did not produce qualitatively different results.
56. Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr, Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick, 2000 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, 2000).
57. Different forms of data transformations, e.g., first-order difference in Economic Reform, the logarithm of External Debt per capita, etc., did not change the results presented below. It is reasonable to consider the prospect of European Union (EU) membership to be a critical external influence for the post-socialist countries. Two problems preclude the inclusion of the indicator, however. First, it is time-invariant for the period under analysis. Secondly, and more importantly, no comparable indicator can be found for Latin America.
58. Chow, 'Test of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions', Econometrica, 28 (1960), 591-605.
59. See James A. Stimson, 'Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 914-47.
60. Estimation using Beck and Katz's panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) did not report qualitatively different results.
61. Stephen Nickell, 'Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects', Econometrica, 49 (1981), 1417-26; G. S. Maddala, 'Recent Developments in Dynamic Econometric Modelling: A Personal Viewpoint', Political Analysis, 1 (1998), 59-87. The Arellano-Bond generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator addresses this issue by purging unit-specific fixed effects by first-differencing the data and then by using instrumental variables to address the correlation between the disturbance term and lagged dependent variable generated by the first-differencing. See Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, 'Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations', Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1991), 277-97. The two-stage least squares estimator used in this analysis produces qualitatively identical results.
62. Stephen Nickell, 'Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects', Econometrica, 49 (1981), 1417-26; G. S. Maddala, 'Recent Developments in Dynamic Econometric Modelling: A Personal Viewpoint', Political Analysis, 1 (1998), 59-87. The Arellano-Bond generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator addresses this issue by purging unit-specific fixed effects by first-differencing the data and then by using instrumental variables to address the correlation between the disturbance term and lagged dependent variable generated by the first-differencing. See Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, 'Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations', Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1991), 277-97. The two-stage least squares estimator used in this analysis produces qualitatively identical results.
63. Stephen Nickell, 'Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects', Econometrica, 49 (1981), 1417-26; G. S. Maddala, 'Recent Developments in Dynamic Econometric Modelling: A Personal Viewpoint', Political Analysis, 1 (1998), 59-87. The Arellano-Bond generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator addresses this issue by purging unit-specific fixed effects by first-differencing the data and then by using instrumental variables to address the correlation between the disturbance term and lagged dependent variable generated by the first-differencing. See Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, 'Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations', Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1991), 277-97. The two-stage least squares estimator used in this analysis produces qualitatively identical results.
64. i,t - 1 is the estimates of the lagged dependent variable from the first stage of estimation. I use the previous year's (two-year lagged) level of democracy as an instrument and its predicted value, which is included in the second stage, is estimated by regressors including one-year lag of all independent variables and country dummy variables.
65. Chow, 'Test of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions'; Larry Bartels, 'Pooling Discrete Observations', American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 905-42; William H. Green, Econometric Analysis, 3rd edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997).
66. Chow, 'Test of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions'; Larry Bartels, 'Pooling Discrete Observations', American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 905-42; William H. Green, Econometric Analysis, 3rd edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997).
67. Chow, 'Test of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions'; Larry Bartels, 'Pooling Discrete Observations', American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 905-42; William H. Green, Econometric Analysis, 3rd edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997).
68. Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.
69. I estimated the equation excluding the Economic Reform variable. The results were almost the same except that the coefficient for Economic Growth was negative and statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level in the South. This surprising result can in part be explained by a positive correlation between Economic Growth and Economic Reform (r = 0.466; significant at the p < 0.001 level).
70. The sign of coefficients for country fixed-effects were not counterintuitive. In the East, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia produced a positive coefficient for country dummy variables. Among the Latin American countries, Peru and Nicaragua showed negative and significant coefficients.
71. Following Green, to allow for the disturbance structures to differ between the two regressions, I computed a Wald test statistic using parameter
72. Valerie Bunce, 'Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations', Comparative Political Studies, 33 (2000), 703-34.
73. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transitions Report 1999 (London: EBRD, 2000).
74. Due to a small number of observations for the early liberalizers (twenty-two country-year data points), I did not conduct the 2SLS estimation, which has asymptotic properties.
75. The difference in the effect of economic reform across the early and late liberalizers is statistically significant (p < 0.01). The effect of external debt is also significant in the early liberalizer countries and the coefficient is not equal between the two groups of countries.
76. Barbara Geddes, 'What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?' Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999), 115-44, p. 117.