Distributional coalitions and the politics of economic reform in Latin America

World Politics

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 236-268

  Schamis, Hector E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC REFORM; LIBERALIZATION; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

CENTRAL AMERICA; SOUTH AMERICA;

EID: 0032927804     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100008182     Document Type: Article

References (139)

1. For a summary of this field, see David Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984); and T. N. Srinivasan, "Neoclassical Political Economy, the State, and Economic Development," Asian Development Review 3, no. 2 (1985).
2. For a summary of this field, see David Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984); and T. N. Srinivasan, "Neoclassical Political Economy, the State, and Economic Development," Asian Development Review 3, no. 2 (1985).
3. Arnold Harberger, "Secrets of Success: A Handful of Heroes," American Economic Review 83 (May 1993). For a similar view, see Mario Blejer and Fabrizio Coricelli, The Making of Economic Reform in Eastern Europe: Conversations with Leading Reformers in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar, 1995).
4. Arnold Harberger, "Secrets of Success: A Handful of Heroes," American Economic Review 83 (May 1993). For a similar view, see Mario Blejer and Fabrizio Coricelli, The Making of Economic Reform in Eastern Europe: Conversations with Leading Reformers in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar, 1995).
5. By "the politics of economic adjustment," I refer to works such as Joan Nelson, ed., Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Joan Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
6. By "the politics of economic adjustment," I refer to works such as Joan Nelson, ed., Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Joan Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
7. By "the politics of economic adjustment," I refer to works such as Joan Nelson, ed., Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Joan Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
8. By "the politics of economic adjustment," I refer to works such as Joan Nelson, ed., Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Joan Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
9. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 73; and idem, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).
10. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 73; and idem, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).
11. The theories of the rent-seeking society share the viewpoint. The original contribution is Anne Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64 (June 1974). See also Robert Tollison, "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35 (1982).
12. The theories of the rent-seeking society share the viewpoint. The original contribution is Anne Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64 (June 1974). See also Robert Tollison, "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35 (1982).
13. For earl contributions, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); and William Norhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies 42 (April 1975).
14. For earl contributions, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); and William Norhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies 42 (April 1975).
15. Significant contributions on this problem are Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
16. Significant contributions on this problem are Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
17. Significant contributions on this problem are Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
18. Jagdish Bhagwati, "Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy 90 (October 1982).
19. Buchanan, "Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking," in James Buchanan, Robert Tollison, Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A and M University Press, 1980), 9.
20. David Colander, "Introduction," in Colander (fn. 1), 5.
21. See, for example, John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990); and Anne Krueger, Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).
22. See, for example, John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990); and Anne Krueger, Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).
23. See, for instance, Barbara Stallings, "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 3, 1992); and Miles Kahler, "International Financial Institutions and the Politics of Adjustment," in Nelson (fn. 3, 1989).
24. See, for instance, Barbara Stallings, "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 3, 1992); and Miles Kahler, "International Financial Institutions and the Politics of Adjustment," in Nelson (fn. 3, 1989).
25. Thus leading to compensation programs. For a recent review of compensation literature and policies during liberalization, see Béla Greskovits, The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared (Budapest: CEU Press, 1998), chap. 8.
26. Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 3, 1992), 27. Even if in The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, Haggard and Kaufman consider other variables to explain economic reform - regime type, party systems, corporatist frameworks, and electoral rules, among others - they insist that "the costs of reform tend to be concentrated, while benefits are diffused, producing perverse organizational incentives; losers are well organized, while prospective winners face daunting collective action problems and are not" (p. 157). Because of this, the explanatory power of insulated policy elites remains higher in the hierarchy than the other variables.
27. Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 3, 1992), 27. Even if in The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, Haggard and Kaufman consider other variables to explain economic reform - regime type, party systems, corporatist frameworks, and electoral rules, among others - they insist that "the costs of reform tend to be concentrated, while benefits are diffused, producing perverse organizational incentives; losers are well organized, while prospective winners face daunting collective action problems and are not" (p. 157). Because of this, the explanatory power of insulated policy elites remains higher in the hierarchy than the other variables.
28. Waterbury, "The Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 3, 1992), 183.
29. Nelson (fn. 3, 1990), 359.
30. Olson (fn. 4, 1982), 44. The end of the paragraph reads: "(or organizations that engage in what, in one valuable line of literature, is called 'rent seeking')."
31. See Buchanan (fn. 9). In the same volume, Gordon Tullock, in "Rent Seeking as a Negative Sum Game," states that "an individual who invests in something that will not actually improve productivity or will actually lower it, but that does raise his income because it gives him some special position or monopoly power, is 'rent seeking,' and the 'rent' is the income derived" (p. 17).
32. See Buchanan (fn. 9). In the same volume, Gordon Tullock, in "Rent Seeking as a Negative Sum Game," states that "an individual who invests in something that will not actually improve productivity or will actually lower it, but that does raise his income because it gives him some special position or monopoly power, is 'rent seeking,' and the 'rent' is the income derived" (p. 17).
33. See Sebastian Edwards, Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and Adjustment: Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). For the seminal contributions on the real exchange rate during liberalization, see Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries: A Comparative Study (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Béla Balassa et al., The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
34. See Sebastian Edwards, Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and Adjustment: Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). For the seminal contributions on the real exchange rate during liberalization, see Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries: A Comparative Study (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Béla Balassa et al., The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
35. See Sebastian Edwards, Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and Adjustment: Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). For the seminal contributions on the real exchange rate during liberalization, see Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries: A Comparative Study (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Béla Balassa et al., The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
36. For example, Ronald McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Sebastian Edwards, "The Order of Liberalization of the External Sector in Developing Countries," Princeton Essays in International Finance 156 (1984); and Dani Rodrik, "How Should Structural Adjustment Programs Be Designed," World Development 18 (July 1990).
37. For example, Ronald McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Sebastian Edwards, "The Order of Liberalization of the External Sector in Developing Countries," Princeton Essays in International Finance 156 (1984); and Dani Rodrik, "How Should Structural Adjustment Programs Be Designed," World Development 18 (July 1990).
38. For example, Ronald McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Sebastian Edwards, "The Order of Liberalization of the External Sector in Developing Countries," Princeton Essays in International Finance 156 (1984); and Dani Rodrik, "How Should Structural Adjustment Programs Be Designed," World Development 18 (July 1990).
39. For the original theoretical contribution, see Paul Krugman "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 11 (August 1979). Krugman's model has been extensively applied to Latin American currency crises. See, for example, Guillermo Calvo, "Balance of Payments Crises in a Cash-in-Advance Economy," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 19 (February 1987); and papers in Journal of International Economics, Symposium on Mexico, 41 (November 1996).
40. For the original theoretical contribution, see Paul Krugman "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 11 (August 1979). Krugman's model has been extensively applied to Latin American currency crises. See, for example, Guillermo Calvo, "Balance of Payments Crises in a Cash-in-Advance Economy," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 19 (February 1987); and papers in Journal of International Economics, Symposium on Mexico, 41 (November 1996).
41. For the original theoretical contribution, see Paul Krugman "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 11 (August 1979). Krugman's model has been extensively applied to Latin American currency crises. See, for example, Guillermo Calvo, "Balance of Payments Crises in a Cash-in-Advance Economy," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 19 (February 1987); and papers in Journal of International Economics, Symposium on Mexico, 41 (November 1996).
42. For this intertemporal dynamic, see Raúl Labán and Federico Sturzenegger, "Distributional Conflict, Financial Adaptation, and Delayed Stabilizations," Economics and Politics 6 (November 1994); and idem, "Fiscal Conservatism as a Response to the Debt Crisis," Journal of Development Economics 45 (December 1994).
43. For this intertemporal dynamic, see Raúl Labán and Federico Sturzenegger, "Distributional Conflict, Financial Adaptation, and Delayed Stabilizations," Economics and Politics 6 (November 1994); and idem, "Fiscal Conservatism as a Response to the Debt Crisis," Journal of Development Economics 45 (December 1994).
44. This parallels Jeffry Frieden's proposition that holders of liquid assets are better shielded from unfavorable government policy. This does not mean, as Frieden suggests, that because of this they are "indifferent to policy." See Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
45. For a series of essays on this problem, see Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller, eds., Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
46. See Eduardo Silva, The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), esp. chap. 4.
47. Several of the contributors to the so-called "El Ladrillo," the economic policy document commissioned by the Navy and written during 1972-73 that served as the basis for the Pinochet economic model, were linked to three economic groups: Edwards, Matte, and BHC (later split in two, Cruzat-Larraín and Vial). For detailed accounts of these links by insiders, which document the company affiliations of the main actors involved, see Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, Los Economistas y el Presidente Pinochet (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1988); and Arturo Fontaine Talavera, "Sobre el Pecado Original de la Transformación Capitalista Chilena," in Barry Levine, ed., El Desafío Neoliberal (Bogota: Editorial Norma, 1992).
48. Several of the contributors to the so-called "El Ladrillo," the economic policy document commissioned by the Navy and written during 1972-73 that served as the basis for the Pinochet economic model, were linked to three economic groups: Edwards, Matte, and BHC (later split in two, Cruzat- Larraín and Vial). For detailed accounts of these links by insiders, which document the company affiliations of the main actors involved, see Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, Los Economistas y el Presidente Pinochet (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1988); and Arturo Fontaine Talavera, "Sobre el Pecado Original de la Transformación Capitalista Chilena," in Barry Levine, ed., El Desafío Neoliberal (Bogota: Editorial Norma, 1992).
49. For a review of these policies, see Nicolas Arditto Barletta, Mario Blejer, and Luis Landau, Economic Liberalization and Stabilization Policies in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay: Application of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Symposium, 1983).
50. See Roberto Zahler, "The Monetary and Real Effects of the Financial Opening Up of National Economies to the Exterior: The Case of Chile, 1975-78," CEPAL Review 10 (April 1980); and Julio Galvez and James Tybout, "Microeconomic Adjustment in Chile during 1977-81: The Importance of Being a 'Grupo,'" World Development 13 (August 1985).
51. See Roberto Zahler, "The Monetary and Real Effects of the Financial Opening Up of National Economies to the Exterior: The Case of Chile, 1975-78," CEPAL Review 10 (April 1980); and Julio Galvez and James Tybout, "Microeconomic Adjustment in Chile during 1977-81: The Importance of Being a 'Grupo,'" World Development 13 (August 1985).
52. For a detailed study, see Jaime Gatica, Deindustrialization in Chile (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989).
53. See Alejandro Foxley, Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 66; and data in "Así Arruinaron la CORFO," Análisis (January 14, 1991).
54. See Alejandro Foxley, Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 66; and data in "Así Arruinaron la CORFO," Análisis (January 14, 1991).
55. For the first privatization phase, see Fernando Dahse, El Mapa de la Extrema Riqueza (Santiago: Aconcagua, 1979). For a general overview, see Dominique Hachette and Rolf Lüders, La Privatización en Chile (San Francisco: CINDE, 1992).
56. For the first privatization phase, see Fernando Dahse, El Mapa de la Extrema Riqueza (Santiago: Aconcagua, 1979). For a general overview, see Dominique Hachette and Rolf Lüders, La Privatización en Chile (San Francisco: CINDE, 1992).
57. For Lüders's assessment, see "La Razón de ser de la Intervención del 13 de Enero," Economía y Sociedad 35 (March 1985). It should be noted that at the time Pablo Baraona, Jorge Cauas, and José Luis Zabala - contributors to "El Ladrillo" (see fn. 26) and key policymakers of the government in the 1970s - were presidents of the Unido de Fomento, Santiago, and Concepción Banks, respectively; these group-related institutions were liquidated or placed in receivership.
58. Fiscal resources used for the bailouts equaled 5 percent of GDP for five consecutive years. See Andrés Velasco, Liberalization, Crisis, Intervention: The Chilean Financial System, 1975-1985, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 88/66 (July 1988); and José P. Arellano, "De la Liberalización a la Intervención: El Mercado de Capitales en Chile, 1974-83," Colección Estudios CIEPLAN (December 1983).
59. Fiscal resources used for the bailouts equaled 5 percent of GDP for five consecutive years. See Andrés Velasco, Liberalization, Crisis, Intervention: The Chilean Financial System, 1975-1985, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 88/66 (July 1988); and José P. Arellano, "De la Liberalización a la Intervención: El Mercado de Capitales en Chile, 1974-83," Colección Estudios CIEPLAN (December 1983).
60. For a detailed analysis of this phase, see Guillermo Campero, Los Gremios Empresariales en el Período, 1970-1983 (Santiago: ILET, 1984), chap. 5; and idem, "Entrepreneurs under the Military Regime," in Paul Drake and Iván Jaksic, eds., The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1991).
61. For a detailed analysis of this phase, see Guillermo Campero, Los Gremios Empresariales en el Período, 1970-1983 (Santiago: ILET, 1984), chap. 5; and idem, "Entrepreneurs under the Military Regime," in Paul Drake and Iván Jaksic, eds., The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1991).
62. Oscar Muñoz, "Crisis and Industrial Reorganization in Chile," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 31 (Spring-Summer 1989).
63. Information is drawn from the annual reports of those companies between 1985 and 1991. Note the similarities between these attributes of privatization and the East European process, where well-positioned former communists have become wealthy entrepreneurs by taking over state assets. See, for example, David Stark, "Privatization in Hungary: From Plan to Market or From Plan to Clan?" East European Politics and Society 4 (Fall 1990); idem, "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 101 (January 1996); and Jacek Tarkowski, "Endowment of Nomenklatura, or Apparatchiks Turned into Entrepreneurchiks, or from Communist Ranks to Capitalist Riches," Innovation 1 (1990).
64. Information is drawn from the annual reports of those companies between 1985 and 1991. Note the similarities between these attributes of privatization and the East European process, where well- positioned former communists have become wealthy entrepreneurs by taking over state assets. See, for example, David Stark, "Privatization in Hungary: From Plan to Market or From Plan to Clan?" East European Politics and Society 4 (Fall 1990); idem, "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 101 (January 1996); and Jacek Tarkowski, "Endowment of Nomenklatura, or Apparatchiks Turned into Entrepreneurchiks, or from Communist Ranks to Capitalist Riches," Innovation 1 (1990).
65. Information is drawn from the annual reports of those companies between 1985 and 1991. Note the similarities between these attributes of privatization and the East European process, where well- positioned former communists have become wealthy entrepreneurs by taking over state assets. See, for example, David Stark, "Privatization in Hungary: From Plan to Market or From Plan to Clan?" East European Politics and Society 4 (Fall 1990); idem, "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," American Journal of Sociology 101 (January 1996); and Jacek Tarkowski, "Endowment of Nomenklatura, or Apparatchiks Turned into Entrepreneurchiks, or from Communist Ranks to Capitalist Riches," Innovation 1 (1990).
66. This is the general tone of a revealing article in the conservative weekly Qué Pasa, which provides detailed information on the participation of former policymakers on the boards of these firms, many of them privatized during their tenure in office. See "El Olimpo Empresarial," Qué Pasa (May 4, 1992).
67. See Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
68. By the main architect, which includes an analysis of the main problems of stabilizing development, see Antonio Ortiz Mena, "Desarrollo Estabilizador: Una Década de Estrategia Económica en México," El Trimestre Económico 146 (April-June 1970).
69. See Carlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levi, "Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico, 1970-1982," in Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds., The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
70. See, for example, Ricardo Tirado and Matilde Luna, "La Politización de los Empresarios Mexicanos (1970-1982)," in Julio Labastida, ed., Grupos Económicos y Organizaciones Empresariales en México (Mexico D. F.: Alianza/UNAM, 1986); Cristina Puga and Ricardo Tirado, "El Consejo Coordinador Empresarial: Una Radiografía," in Cuadernos del Proyecto Organizaciones Empresariales en México 1 (Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales-Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1992); Cristina Puga, México: Empresarios y Poder (Mexico D.F.: UNAM- Porrua, 1993).
71. See, for example, Ricardo Tirado and Matilde Luna, "La Politización de los Empresarios Mexicanos (1970-1982)," in Julio Labastida, ed., Grupos Económicos y Organizaciones Empresariales en México (Mexico D. F.: Alianza/UNAM, 1986); Cristina Puga and Ricardo Tirado, "El Consejo Coordinador Empresarial: Una Radiografía," in Cuadernos del Proyecto Organizaciones Empresariales en México 1 (Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales-Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1992); Cristina Puga, México: Empresarios y Poder (Mexico D.F.: UNAM- Porrua, 1993).
72. See, for example, Ricardo Tirado and Matilde Luna, "La Politización de los Empresarios Mexicanos (1970-1982)," in Julio Labastida, ed., Grupos Económicos y Organizaciones Empresariales en México (Mexico D. F.: Alianza/UNAM, 1986); Cristina Puga and Ricardo Tirado, "El Consejo Coordinador Empresarial: Una Radiografía," in Cuadernos del Proyecto Organizaciones Empresariales en México 1 (Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales-Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1992); Cristina Puga, México: Empresarios y Poder (Mexico D.F.: UNAM-Porrua, 1993).
73. See Jorge Basave, Los Grupos de Capital Financiero en México (1974-1995) (Mexico D.F.: UNAM/EI Caballito, 1994); esp. chap. 3.
74. For this interpretation, see Carlos Tello, central bank director at the time, La Nacionalización de la Banca en Mexico (Mexico D. F.: Siglo XXI, 1984).
75. For a journalistic investigation, see Sucesión Pactada: La Ingeniería Político del Salinismo (Mexico D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 1993). For academic references of this process, see Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite," Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (February 1992); and Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1994).
76. For a journalistic investigation, see Sucesión Pactada: La Ingeniería Político del Salinismo (Mexico D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 1993). For academic references of this process, see Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite," Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (February 1992); and Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1994).
77. For a journalistic investigation, see Sucesión Pactada: La Ingeniería Político del Salinismo (Mexico D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 1993). For academic references of this process, see Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite," Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (February 1992); and Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1994).
78. Ernesto Zedillo, the head of FICORCA between 1983 and 1987, was elected president in 1994.
79. See the following chapters in Esthela Gutiérrez Garza, ed., Testimonios de la Crisis IV: Los Saldos del Sexenio (1982-1988) (Mexico D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1990): Cristina Puga and Constanzo de la Vega, "Modernización Capitalista y Política Empresarial"; and Alejandro Dávila Flores, "La Bolsa Mexicana de Valores: Alternativa Para el Financiamiento de la Inversión Productiva?"
80. See the following chapters in Esthela Gutiérrez Garza, ed., Testimonios de la Crisis IV: Los Saldos del Sexenio (1982-1988) (Mexico D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1990): Cristina Puga and Constanzo de la Vega, "Modernización Capitalista y Política Empresarial"; and Alejandro Dávila Flores, "La Bolsa Mexicana de Valores: Alternativa Para el Financiamiento de la Inversión Productiva?"
81. See the following chapters in Esthela Gutiérrez Garza, ed., Testimonios de la Crisis IV: Los Saldos del Sexenio (1982-1988) (Mexico D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1990): Cristina Puga and Constanzo de la Vega, "Modernización Capitalista y Política Empresarial"; and Alejandro Dávila Flores, "La Bolsa Mexicana de Valores: Alternativa Para el Financiamiento de la Inversión Productiva?"
82. For an overview, see Blanca Heredia, "Contested State: The Politics of Trade Reform in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1995); and Jaime Ros, "La Reforma Comercial en México Durante los Años Ochenta: Sus Efectos Económicos y Dimensiones Políticas," UN-ECLA Series Reformas de Político Pública 4 (April 1993).
83. For an overview, see Blanca Heredia, "Contested State: The Politics of Trade Reform in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1995); and Jaime Ros, "La Reforma Comercial en México Durante los Años Ochenta: Sus Efectos Económicos y Dimensiones Políticas," UN-ECLA Series Reformas de Político Pública 4 (April 1993).
84. For the PASE, see Robert Kaufman, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia, "Mexico: Radical Reform in a Dominant Party System," in Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb, eds., Voting for Reform (New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1994); and by the pact's architect, Pedro Aspe, El Camino Mexicano de la Transformación Económica (Mexico D.F.: FCE, 1993).
85. For the PASE, see Robert Kaufman, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia, "Mexico: Radical Reform in a Dominant Party System," in Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb, eds., Voting for Reform (New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1994); and by the pact's architect, Pedro Aspe, El Camino Mexicano de la Transformación Económica (Mexico D.F.: FCE, 1993).
86. See Heredia (fn. 47).
87. On paper the pact was a typical tripartite concertation, but the most important accords were made with big business. Agustín Legorreta, former banker and then president of the CCE, confirmed that "the pact was an agreement between the president and a very comfortable little group of three hundred people who make the economically important decisions in Mexico. We gave the government a deadline to fix its finances. It has met that goal earlier. The government has even fulfilled the verbal promises which were not part of the pact's text, such as the liquidation and dissolution of nationally significant firms like Aeroméxico and Cananea." See Unomásuno (May 18, 1988), 1, 14. In a follow-up to this statement the weekly Proceso reports increasing pressures for privatization on the part of the CCE. See, especially, "Legorreta usa toda su capacidad de presión para que se privatice la economia," Proceso 607 (June 20, 1988), 10-19. Reportedly, the other organized influence over policy-making came from the Monterrey-based industrial elite who had regular meetings with President De la Madrid and his economic cabinet. See María de Lourdes Melgar Palacios, "Economic Development in Monterrey: Competing Ideas and Strategies in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 1992).
88. On paper the pact was a typical tripartite concertation, but the most important accords were made with big business. Agustín Legorreta, former banker and then president of the CCE, confirmed that "the pact was an agreement between the president and a very comfortable little group of three hundred people who make the economically important decisions in Mexico. We gave the government a deadline to fix its finances. It has met that goal earlier. The government has even fulfilled the verbal promises which were not part of the pact's text, such as the liquidation and dissolution of nationally significant firms like Aeroméxico and Cananea." See Unomásuno (May 18, 1988), 1, 14. In a follow-up to this statement the weekly Proceso reports increasing pressures for privatization on the part of the CCE. See, especially, "Legorreta usa toda su capacidad de presión para que se privatice la economia," Proceso 607 (June 20, 1988), 10-19. Reportedly, the other organized influence over policy-making came from the Monterrey-based industrial elite who had regular meetings with President De la Madrid and his economic cabinet. See María de Lourdes Melgar Palacios, "Economic Development in Monterrey: Competing Ideas and Strategies in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 1992).
89. On paper the pact was a typical tripartite concertation, but the most important accords were made with big business. Agustín Legorreta, former banker and then president of the CCE, confirmed that "the pact was an agreement between the president and a very comfortable little group of three hundred people who make the economically important decisions in Mexico. We gave the government a deadline to fix its finances. It has met that goal earlier. The government has even fulfilled the verbal promises which were not part of the pact's text, such as the liquidation and dissolution of nationally significant firms like Aeroméxico and Cananea." See Unomásuno (May 18, 1988), 1, 14. In a follow-up to this statement the weekly Proceso reports increasing pressures for privatization on the part of the CCE. See, especially, "Legorreta usa toda su capacidad de presión para que se privatice la economia," Proceso 607 (June 20, 1988), 10-19. Reportedly, the other organized influence over policy-making came from the Monterrey-based industrial elite who had regular meetings with President De la Madrid and his economic cabinet. See María de Lourdes Melgar Palacios, "Economic Development in Monterrey: Competing Ideas and Strategies in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 1992).
90. Until 1988 currency devaluations were used to partially offset the effects of trade opening. With the PASE, the adoption of a fixed exchange rate led to a decline in effective protection in the manufacturing sector, from an average 34.8 percent in 1988 to 13.8 percent in 1991. Data from Fernando Sanchez Ugarte et al., La Política Industrial ante la Apertura (Mexico D.F.: SECOFI/FCE, 1994), 127. For exchange-rate management, see AdriaanTen Kate, "Trade Liberalization and Economic Stabilization in Mexico: Lessons of Experience," World Development 20 (May 1992).
91. Until 1988 currency devaluations were used to partially offset the effects of trade opening. With the PASE, the adoption of a fixed exchange rate led to a decline in effective protection in the manufacturing sector, from an average 34.8 percent in 1988 to 13.8 percent in 1991. Data from Fernando Sanchez Ugarte et al., La Política Industrial ante la Apertura (Mexico D.F.: SECOFI/FCE, 1994), 127. For exchange-rate management, see AdriaanTen Kate, "Trade Liberalization and Economic Stabilization in Mexico: Lessons of Experience," World Development 20 (May 1992).
92. For this interpretation, see Francisco Valdés Ugalde, Autonomía y Legitimidad: los Empresarios, la Política, y el Estado en México (Mexico D.F.: Siglo XXI/UNAM, 1997), 219-21.
93. Carlos Elizondo, "Privatizing the PRI? Shifts in the Business-PRI Relationship" (Manuscript, CIDE, Mexico D.F., March 1994).
94. See Puga (fn. 41), 181-204.
95. See Jacques Rogozinski, head of the government "disincorporation unit," La Privatización de Empresas Paraestatales (Mexico D.F.: FCE, 1993).
96. Under NAFTA, Mexican bankers managed to negotiate a gradual opening that restricts the operation of foreign banks to no more than 15 percent of the market in the first six years of the agreement (a process accelerated by the currency crisis of December 1994). See Carlos Elizondo, "The Making of a New Alliance: The Privatization of the Banks in Mexico," CIDE Documenta de Trabajo 5 (1993).
97. See Rebecca Hovey, "The Mexican Commercial Bank Privatizations: Market Reform, Economic Power, and the Transformation of Public and Private Interests" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1996); and by the head of the Bank Disincorporation Unit, Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, La Reforma Financiera y la Desincorporación Bancaria (Mexico D.F.: FCE, 1994).
98. See Rebecca Hovey, "The Mexican Commercial Bank Privatizations: Market Reform, Economic Power, and the Transformation of Public and Private Interests" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1996); and by the head of the Bank Disincorporation Unit, Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, La Reforma Financiera y la Desincorporación Bancaria (Mexico D.F.: FCE, 1994).
99. See Basave (fn. 42), chap. 5; and Celso Garrido, "National Private Groups in Mexico," CEPAL Review 53 (August 1994).
100. See Basave (fn. 42), chap. 5; and Celso Garrido, "National Private Groups in Mexico," CEPAL Review 53 (August 1994).
101. Lucy Conger, "Power to the Plutocrats," Institutional Investor (International Edition) 20 (February 1995). For the dinner, see Proceso 853 (March 8, 1993). Reportedly, business groups were involved in the PRI campaign since 1988, through the so-called "Comisión de Financiamiento y Consolidación Patrimonial del PRI." See Carlos Alba Vega, "Los Empresarios y el Estado Durante el Salinismo," Foro Internacional 36 (January-June 1996). More on these links was revealed during the Fobaproa scandal, a $65 billion bailout of several of the privatized banks. Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, for instance, revealed the existence of political favoritism in the privatization and bailouts of the banks. See El Financiero, "Fórmense, vamos a repartir los bancos, dijo Salinas" (July 20, 1998).
102. Lucy Conger, "Power to the Plutocrats," Institutional Investor (International Edition) 20 (February 1995). For the dinner, see Proceso 853 (March 8, 1993). Reportedly, business groups were involved in the PRI campaign since 1988, through the so-called "Comisión de Financiamiento y Consolidación Patrimonial del PRI." See Carlos Alba Vega, "Los Empresarios y el Estado Durante el Salinismo," Foro Internacional 36 (January-June 1996). More on these links was revealed during the Fobaproa scandal, a $65 billion bailout of several of the privatized banks. Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, for instance, revealed the existence of political favoritism in the privatization and bailouts of the banks. See El Financiero, "Fórmense, vamos a repartir los bancos, dijo Salinas" (July 20, 1998).
103. Lucy Conger, "Power to the Plutocrats," Institutional Investor (International Edition) 20 (February 1995). For the dinner, see Proceso 853 (March 8, 1993). Reportedly, business groups were involved in the PRI campaign since 1988, through the so-called "Comisión de Financiamiento y Consolidación Patrimonial del PRI." See Carlos Alba Vega, "Los Empresarios y el Estado Durante el Salinismo," Foro Internacional 36 (January-June 1996). More on these links was revealed during the Fobaproa scandal, a $65 billion bailout of several of the privatized banks. Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, for instance, revealed the existence of political favoritism in the privatization and bailouts of the banks. See El Financiero, "Fórmense, vamos a repartir los bancos, dijo Salinas" (July 20, 1998).
104. Lucy Conger, "Power to the Plutocrats," Institutional Investor (International Edition) 20 (February 1995). For the dinner, see Proceso 853 (March 8, 1993). Reportedly, business groups were involved in the PRI campaign since 1988, through the so-called "Comisión de Financiamiento y Consolidación Patrimonial del PRI." See Carlos Alba Vega, "Los Empresarios y el Estado Durante el Salinismo," Foro Internacional 36 (January-June 1996). More on these links was revealed during the Fobaproa scandal, a $65 billion bailout of several of the privatized banks. Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, for instance, revealed the existence of political favoritism in the privatization and bailouts of the banks. See El Financiero, "Fórmense, vamos a repartir los bancos, dijo Salinas" (July 20, 1998).
105. At the time Martínez de Hoz was the president of the Argentine Economic Council (CEA), an elite organization that grouped the most traditional firms in extractive, manufacturing, and financial activities, renowned for their free-market stance. His economic team included a group of orthodox economists highly reputed in financial circles.
106. Adolfo Canitrot, "La Disciplina como Objetivo de la Política Económica: Un ensayo sobre el Programa Económico del Gobierno Argentino desde 1976," Estudios CEDES 2, no. 6 (1979).
107. Carlos Rodríguez, "El Plan Argentino de Estabilización del 20 de Diciembre," CEMA Documento de Trabajo 5 (1979).
108. For comparisons, see Arditto Barletta et al. (fn. 27).
109. A. Humberto Petrei and James Tybout, "Microeconomic Adjustments in Argentina during 1976-1981: The Importance of Changing Levels of Financial Subsidies," World Development 13 (August 1985).
110. In the early 1970s disputes within the Peronist movement developed between factions advocating either a patria socialista or a patria peronista. Later on, and as a consequence of the influence accumulated by labor leaders during the 1973-76 Peronist government, the public made references to the patria sindical. In the late 1970s and early 1980s allusions to the patria financiera conveyed that power was now located in the financial sector.
111. The ensuing banking crisis prompted the government to take over fifty-nine financial institutions between March 1980 and December 1981 alone. See Luis Giorgio and Silvia Sagari, "Argentina's Financial Crises and Restructuring in the 1980s," in Andrew Sheng, ed., Bank Restructuring: Lessons from the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996).
112. There is a full treatment of this in Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla and Hector E. Schamis, "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policies in Argentina, 1950-1998" (Paper presented to the IDB project "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policies in Latin America," Washington D.C., August 1998).
113. Data from Jorge Schvarzer, "Estrategia Industrial y Grandes Empresas: El Caso Argentino," Desarrollo Económico 18 (October-December 1978); idem, "Cambios en el liderazgo Industrial Argentino en el período de Martínez de Hoz," Desarrollo Económico 23 (October-December 1983); Mario Damill and José María Fanelli, "Decisiones de Cartera y Transferencias de Riqueza en un Periodo de Inestabilidad Macroeconomica," Documento CEDES 12 (1988); Daniel Aspiazu, Eduardo Basualdo, and Miguel Khavisse, EI Nuevo Poder Económico en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Nueva América, 1987); Eduardo Basualdo and Daniel Aspiazu, Cara y Contracara de los Grupos Económicos: Estado y Promoción Industrial en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cántaro, 1991).
114. Data from Jorge Schvarzer, "Estrategia Industrial y Grandes Empresas: El Caso Argentino," Desarrollo Económico 18 (October-December 1978); idem, "Cambios en el liderazgo Industrial Argentino en el período de Martínez de Hoz," Desarrollo Económico 23 (October-December 1983); Mario Damill and José María Fanelli, "Decisiones de Cartera y Transferencias de Riqueza en un Periodo de Inestabilidad Macroeconomica," Documento CEDES 12 (1988); Daniel Aspiazu, Eduardo Basualdo, and Miguel Khavisse, EI Nuevo Poder Económico en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Nueva América, 1987); Eduardo Basualdo and Daniel Aspiazu, Cara y Contracara de los Grupos Económicos: Estado y Promoción Industrial en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cántaro, 1991).
115. Data from Jorge Schvarzer, "Estrategia Industrial y Grandes Empresas: El Caso Argentino," Desarrollo Económico 18 (October-December 1978); idem, "Cambios en el liderazgo Industrial Argentino en el período de Martínez de Hoz," Desarrollo Económico 23 (October-December 1983); Mario Damill and José María Fanelli, "Decisiones de Cartera y Transferencias de Riqueza en un Periodo de Inestabilidad Macroeconomica," Documento CEDES 12 (1988); Daniel Aspiazu, Eduardo Basualdo, and Miguel Khavisse, EI Nuevo Poder Económico en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Nueva América, 1987); Eduardo Basualdo and Daniel Aspiazu, Cara y Contracara de los Grupos Económicos: Estado y Promoción Industrial en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cántaro, 1991).
116. Data from Jorge Schvarzer, "Estrategia Industrial y Grandes Empresas: El Caso Argentino," Desarrollo Económico 18 (October-December 1978); idem, "Cambios en el liderazgo Industrial Argentino en el período de Martínez de Hoz," Desarrollo Económico 23 (October-December 1983); Mario Damill and José María Fanelli, "Decisiones de Cartera y Transferencias de Riqueza en un Periodo de Inestabilidad Macroeconomica," Documento CEDES 12 (1988); Daniel Aspiazu, Eduardo Basualdo, and Miguel Khavisse, EI Nuevo Poder Económico en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Nueva América, 1987); Eduardo Basualdo and Daniel Aspiazu, Cara y Contracara de los Grupos Económicos: Estado y Promoción Industrial en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cántaro, 1991).
117. Data from Jorge Schvarzer, "Estrategia Industrial y Grandes Empresas: El Caso Argentino," Desarrollo Económico 18 (October-December 1978); idem, "Cambios en el liderazgo Industrial Argentino en el período de Martínez de Hoz," Desarrollo Económico 23 (October-December 1983); Mario Damill and José María Fanelli, "Decisiones de Cartera y Transferencias de Riqueza en un Periodo de Inestabilidad Macroeconomica," Documento CEDES 12 (1988); Daniel Aspiazu, Eduardo Basualdo, and Miguel Khavisse, EI Nuevo Poder Económico en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Nueva América, 1987); Eduardo Basualdo and Daniel Aspiazu, Cara y Contracara de los Grupos Económicos: Estado y Promoción Industrial en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cántaro, 1991).
118. For detailed investigations, see Pierre Ostiguy, Los Capitanes de la Industria: Grandes Empresarios, Política y Economía en la Argentina de los Años 80 (Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1990); and Luis Majul, Los Dueños de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1992).
119. For detailed investigations, see Pierre Ostiguy, Los Capitanes de la Industria: Grandes Empresarios, Política y Economía en la Argentina de los Años 80 (Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1990); and Luis Majul, Los Dueños de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1992).
120. See Luis Aznar et al., Alfonsín: Discursos sobre el Discurso (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA/FUCADE, 1986).
121. See Ostiguy (fn. 69), 328-38; and William Smith, "Democracy, Distributional Conflict, and Macroeconomic Policymaking in Argentina, 1983-89," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 32 (Summer 1990).
122. See Ostiguy (fn. 69), 328-38; and William Smith, "Democracy, Distributional Conflict, and Macroeconomic Policymaking in Argentina, 1983-89," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 32 (Summer 1990).
123. World Bank, "Argentina: Public Finance Review, from Insolvency to Growth" (February 11, 1993), report 10827-Ar.
124. See José Luis Machinea, central bank president during most of this period, "Stabilization under Alfonsin's Government: A Frutrated Attempt," Documento CEDES 42 (1990).
125. Ambito Financiero (December 15, 1989), 1, 2.
126. In author interviews with members of the Bank Association (ADEBA) and representatives of large industrial conglomerates held between May and August 1989, several of them admitted that by February 1989 there was a widespread feeling that "something drastic had to be done" in order to make politicians understand, "once and for all," that the business class would no longer tolerate unpredictability.
127. Author interviews with top economists of the Justicialista Party, later officials in the economy and foreign ministries, Buenos Aires, June 1989, and Washington, D.C., December 1989.
128. For this unprecedented alliance, see Edward Gibson, Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), chap. 6.
129. See Claudia Herrera, "The Privatization of the Argentine Telephone System," CEPAL Review 47 (August 1992).
130. See Pablo Gerchunoff and Guillermo Cánovas, "Privatización en un Contexto de Emergencia Económica," Desarrollo Económico 34 (January-March 1995); and idem, "Privatization: The Argentine Experience," in William Glade, ed., Bigger Economies, Smaller Governments (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996).
131. See Pablo Gerchunoff and Guillermo Cánovas, "Privatización en un Contexto de Emergencia Económica," Desarrollo Económico 34 (January-March 1995); and idem, "Privatization: The Argentine Experience," in William Glade, ed., Bigger Economies, Smaller Governments (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996).
132. Data from INDEC, Anuario Estadístico de la República Argentina (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Economía y Obras y Servicios Públicos, 1997), 480-98.
133. The landmark contributions are Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) (yet more open to the role of societal groups); Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For a criticism, sec Adam Przeworski, The State and the Economy under Capitalism (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990); and Jonas Pontusson, "From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in Their Place, and Taking Interests Seriously," Comparative Political Studies 28 (April 1995).
134. The landmark contributions are Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) (yet more open to the role of societal groups); Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For a criticism, sec Adam Przeworski, The State and the Economy under Capitalism (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990); and Jonas Pontusson, "From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in Their Place, and Taking Interests Seriously," Comparative Political Studies 28 (April 1995).
135. The landmark contributions are Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) (yet more open to the role of societal groups); Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For a criticism, sec Adam Przeworski, The State and the Economy under Capitalism (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990); and Jonas Pontusson, "From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in Their Place, and Taking Interests Seriously," Comparative Political Studies 28 (April 1995).
136. The landmark contributions are Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) (yet more open to the role of societal groups); Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For a criticism, sec Adam Przeworski, The State and the Economy under Capitalism (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990); and Jonas Pontusson, "From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in Their Place, and Taking Interests Seriously," Comparative Political Studies 28 (April 1995).
137. The landmark contributions are Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) (yet more open to the role of societal groups); Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For a criticism, sec Adam Przeworski, The State and the Economy under Capitalism (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990); and Jonas Pontusson, "From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in Their Place, and Taking Interests Seriously," Comparative Political Studies 28 (April 1995).
138. For discussions along these lines, see Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. chap. 2; and George Tsebelis, Nested Games (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), esp. chap. 4.
139. For discussions along these lines, see Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. chap. 2; and George Tsebelis, Nested Games (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), esp. chap. 4.