The landscape of electronic market design

Management Science

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 316-327

  Anandalingam, G ^a   Day, Robert W ^b   Raghavan, S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Economics; Electronic markets; Information systems; Management science

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; ECONOMIC STANDPOINTS; ELECTRONIC MARKETS; INFORMATION SYSTEMS;

COMPETITION; COSTS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; ECONOMICS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; MARKETING; OPTIMIZATION; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT;

EID: 18144413942     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0345     Document Type: Article

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