Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare

International Security

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 84-122

  Koblentz, Gregory ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642633929     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228803773100084     Document Type: Review

References (290)

1. The arguments made in this article are developed further in Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming.
2. Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Random House, 1999); and Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" in Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 137-158.
3. Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Random House, 1999); and Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" in Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 137-158.
4. The letters, containing spores of B. anthracis (the organism that causes anthrax), killed five and infected another seventeen. Elin Gursky, Thomas V. Inglesby, and Tara O'Toole, "Anthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response," Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2003), pp. 97-110.
5. Matthew Meselson, "Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 48 (June 2000), pp. 16-19; and Claire M. Fraser and Malcolm R. Dando, "Genomics and Future Biological Weapons: The Need for Preventive Action by the Biomedical Community," Nature Genetics, No. 29 (November 2001), pp. 253-256.
6. Matthew Meselson, "Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 48 (June 2000), pp. 16-19; and Claire M. Fraser and Malcolm R. Dando, "Genomics and Future Biological Weapons: The Need for Preventive Action by the Biomedical Community," Nature Genetics, No. 29 (November 2001), pp. 253-256.
7. United Nations Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (Geneva: United Nations, 1969); World Health Organization (WHO), Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Geneva: WHO, 1970); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vols. 1-6 (New York: Humanities, 1971-75); and Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development, and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Study No. 18 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
8. United Nations Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (Geneva: United Nations, 1969); World Health Organization (WHO), Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Geneva: WHO, 1970); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vols. 1-6 (New York: Humanities, 1971-75); and Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development, and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Study No. 18 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
9. United Nations Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (Geneva: United Nations, 1969); World Health Organization (WHO), Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Geneva: WHO, 1970); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vols. 1-6 (New York: Humanities, 1971-75); and Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development, and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Study No. 18 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
10. United Nations Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (Geneva: United Nations, 1969); World Health Organization (WHO), Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Geneva: WHO, 1970); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vols. 1-6 (New York: Humanities, 1971-75); and Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development, and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Study No. 18 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
11. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
12. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
13. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
14. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
15. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
16. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
17. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
18. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
19. Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Marie I. Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1993), pp. 395-417; Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (New York: Brassey's, 1994); Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences," in Oliver Thranert, ed., Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention (Bonn, Germany: Dietz, 1996), pp. 57-70; John D. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses," Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 85-96; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41; Christopher F. Chyba, "Toward Biological Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2000), pp. 122-136; Lederberg, Biological Weapons; and Raymond Zilinskas, ed., Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
20. George H. Quester, "Chemical and Biological Warfare," American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (September 1974), pp. 1285-1291; Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation? Analysing the Biological Weapons Convention," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (August 1995), pp. 72-102; Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Susan Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics: The Real Military Revolution," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 63-98.
21. George H. Quester, "Chemical and Biological Warfare," American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (September 1974), pp. 1285-1291; Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation? Analysing the Biological Weapons Convention," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (August 1995), pp. 72-102; Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Susan Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics: The Real Military Revolution," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 63-98.
22. George H. Quester, "Chemical and Biological Warfare," American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (September 1974), pp. 1285-1291; Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation? Analysing the Biological Weapons Convention," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (August 1995), pp. 72-102; Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Susan Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics: The Real Military Revolution," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 63-98.
23. George H. Quester, "Chemical and Biological Warfare," American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (September 1974), pp. 1285-1291; Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation? Analysing the Biological Weapons Convention," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (August 1995), pp. 72-102; Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Susan Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics: The Real Military Revolution," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 63-98.
24. Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Biological Warfare and the Third World, " Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 71-72; Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 22-26; Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics," p. 76; and Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons," pp. 85-86.
25. Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Biological Warfare and the Third World, " Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 71-72; Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 22-26; Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics," p. 76; and Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons," pp. 85-86.
26. Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Biological Warfare and the Third World, " Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 71-72; Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 22-26; Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics," p. 76; and Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons," pp. 85-86.
27. Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Biological Warfare and the Third World, " Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 71-72; Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 22-26; Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics," p. 76; and Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons," pp. 85-86.
28. On the broader security implications of secrecy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 140-141.
29. Disease-causing microorganisms such as bacteria, rickettsiae, viruses, and fungi are called pathogens. Another class of biological warfare agents are toxins, which are nonliving molecules that do no replicate in the body. For technical background on biological weapons, see Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993), pp. 71-117; Richard O. Spertzel, Robert W. Wannemacher, and Carol D. Linden, Global Proliferation: Dynamics, Acquisition Strategies, and Response, Vol. 4: Biological Weapons Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, September 1994); and William C. Patrick III, "Biological Warfare: An Overview," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1994), pp. 1-7.
30. Disease-causing microorganisms such as bacteria, rickettsiae, viruses, and fungi are called pathogens. Another class of biological warfare agents are toxins, which are nonliving molecules that do no replicate in the body. For technical background on biological weapons, see Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993), pp. 71-117; Richard O. Spertzel, Robert W. Wannemacher, and Carol D. Linden, Global Proliferation: Dynamics, Acquisition Strategies, and Response, Vol. 4: Biological Weapons Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, September 1994); and William C. Patrick III, "Biological Warfare: An Overview," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1994), pp. 1-7.
31. Disease-causing microorganisms such as bacteria, rickettsiae, viruses, and fungi are called pathogens. Another class of biological warfare agents are toxins, which are nonliving molecules that do no replicate in the body. For technical background on biological weapons, see Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993), pp. 71-117; Richard O. Spertzel, Robert W. Wannemacher, and Carol D. Linden, Global Proliferation: Dynamics, Acquisition Strategies, and Response, Vol. 4: Biological Weapons Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, September 1994); and William C. Patrick III, "Biological Warfare: An Overview," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1994), pp. 1-7.
32. Leroy Fothergill, "The Biological Warfare Threat," in American Chemical Society, Nonmilitary Defense: Chemical and Biological Defenses in Perspective, Advances in Chemistry Series No. 26 (July 1960), p. 26.
33. Spertzel, Wannemacher, and Linden, Global Proliferation, Vol. 4, pp. 28-30.
34. Patrick, "Biological Warfare," p. 5.
35. Graham S. Pearson, "Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of Deterrence," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 147-148; and Patrick, "Biological Warfare."
36. Graham S. Pearson, "Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of Deterrence," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 147-148; and Patrick, "Biological Warfare."
37. This feature of biological warfare has been recognized for more than fifty years. Theodor Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence: Biological Warfare and How to Avoid It (New York: Whittlesey, 1946), p. 135; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 2: CB Weapons Today (New York: Humanities, 1973), p. 90; and Joshua Lederberg and George Whitesides, Biological Defense: Report of the Defense Science Board/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, June 2001), p. 2, released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
38. This feature of biological warfare has been recognized for more than fifty years. Theodor Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence: Biological Warfare and How to Avoid It (New York: Whittlesey, 1946), p. 135; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 2: CB Weapons Today (New York: Humanities, 1973), p. 90; and Joshua Lederberg and George Whitesides, Biological Defense: Report of the Defense Science Board/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, June 2001), p. 2, released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
39. This feature of biological warfare has been recognized for more than fifty years. Theodor Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence: Biological Warfare and How to Avoid It (New York: Whittlesey, 1946), p. 135; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 2: CB Weapons Today (New York: Humanities, 1973), p. 90; and Joshua Lederberg and George Whitesides, Biological Defense: Report of the Defense Science Board/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, June 2001), p. 2, released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
40. Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Conclusion," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 247-254; and Lederberg and Whitesides, Biological Defense.
41. Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Conclusion," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 247-254; and Lederberg and Whitesides, Biological Defense.
42. Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance arid Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 50-51.
43. United Nations Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use, p. 40. The methodology used to determine these figures is not known.
44. World Health Organization, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 99.
45. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 53-54.
46. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1993), p. 86. In contrast, nerve agent plants cost tens of millions of dollars, and fissile material production facilities cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Total program costs for these weapons are also significantly higher. Ibid., pp. 27, 156-158.
47. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1993), p. 86. In contrast, nerve agent plants cost tens of millions of dollars, and fissile material production facilities cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Total program costs for these weapons are also significantly higher. Ibid., pp. 27, 156-158.
48. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), pp. 297-298.
49. The agency also estimated that a significant capability without the redundancy of the prewar program could be attained for less than $100 million. Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities: Surviving Assets and Lack of Use during the War, Defense Intelligence Memorandum 88-91, March 1991, p. 3, declassified under FOIA.
50. As of January 2003, only 83,000 of 2.4 million service members had completed the six-shot series. Department of Defense, Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Vol. 1: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 2003), p. 59, http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/vol1-2003cbdpannualreport.pdf.
51. Department of Defense, Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research and Development Programs (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Defense Technical Information Center, July 2001), p. 2, http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/bwdvrdp-july01.pdf; William Broad and Judith Miller, "Once He Devised Germ Weapons; Now He Defends against Them," New York Times, November 3, 1998, p. D1; and Kenneth Alibek, "Research Considerations for Better Understanding of Biological Threats," in Institute of Medicine, Biological Threats and Terrorism: Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002), p. 64.
52. Department of Defense, Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research and Development Programs (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Defense Technical Information Center, July 2001), p. 2, http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/bwdvrdp-july01.pdf; William Broad and Judith Miller, "Once He Devised Germ Weapons; Now He Defends against Them," New York Times, November 3, 1998, p. D1; and Kenneth Alibek, "Research Considerations for Better Understanding of Biological Threats," in Institute of Medicine, Biological Threats and Terrorism: Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002), p. 64.
53. Department of Defense, Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research and Development Programs (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Defense Technical Information Center, July 2001), p. 2, http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/bwdvrdp-july01.pdf; William Broad and Judith Miller, "Once He Devised Germ Weapons; Now He Defends against Them," New York Times, November 3, 1998, p. D1; and Kenneth Alibek, "Research Considerations for Better Understanding of Biological Threats," in Institute of Medicine, Biological Threats and Terrorism: Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002), p. 64.
54. Spertzel, Wannemacher, and Linden, Global Proliferation, Vol. 4, p. 11; and David R. Franz, "Medical Countermeasures to Biological Warfare Agents," in Alexander Kelle, Malcolm Dando, and Kathryn Nixdorff, eds., The Role of Biotechnology in Countering BTW Agents (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 2001), p. 228.
55. Spertzel, Wannemacher, and Linden, Global Proliferation, Vol. 4, p. 11; and David R. Franz, "Medical Countermeasures to Biological Warfare Agents," in Alexander Kelle, Malcolm Dando, and Kathryn Nixdorff, eds., The Role of Biotechnology in Countering BTW Agents (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 2001), p. 228.
56. Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Responding to the Biological Weapons Challenge: Developing an Integrated Strategy (Alexandria, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), p. 43.
57. This wider range of agents, however, may not be well suited to large-scale, outdoor aerosolization and would thus be limited to aerosol dissemination inside buildings or the contamination of food and water supplies
58. Lederberg and Whitesides, Biological Defense, p. 12. This assessment is apparently based on information regarding the former Soviet biological weapons program. It is not known, however, to what extent Russia has continued the work initiated during the Soviet era or what other nations have accomplished in this field.
59. Edward Eitzen and Ernest Takafuji, "Historical Overview of Biological Warfare," in Frederick Sidell, Ernest Takafuji, and David Franz, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, 1997), pp. 443-444.
60. Field tests by the U.S. Army in the 1950s and 1960s demonstrated the ease of conducting covert attacks with biological weapons against buildings, subway systems, air bases, and cities. William C. Patrick III, "Biological Warfare Scenarios," in Scott P. Layne, Tony J. Beugelsdijk, and C. Kumar N. Patel, eds., Firepower in the Lab: Automation in the Fight against Infectious Diseases and Bioterrorism (Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 2001), pp. 215-223.
61. Judith Miller, "Exercise Finds U.S. Unable to Handle Germ War Threat," New York Times, April 26, 1998, p. A1; Thomas V. Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF," Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 32, No. 3 (February 2001), pp. 436-445; and Tara O'Toole, Michael Mair, and Thomas V. Inglesby, "Shining Light on Dark Winter: Lessons Learned," Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 34, No. 7 (April 2002), pp. 972-983.
62. Judith Miller, "Exercise Finds U.S. Unable to Handle Germ War Threat," New York Times, April 26, 1998, p. A1; Thomas V. Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF," Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 32, No. 3 (February 2001), pp. 436-445; and Tara O'Toole, Michael Mair, and Thomas V. Inglesby, "Shining Light on Dark Winter: Lessons Learned," Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 34, No. 7 (April 2002), pp. 972-983.
63. Judith Miller, "Exercise Finds U.S. Unable to Handle Germ War Threat," New York Times, April 26, 1998, p. A1; Thomas V. Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF," Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 32, No. 3 (February 2001), pp. 436-445; and Tara O'Toole, Michael Mair, and Thomas V. Inglesby, "Shining Light on Dark Winter: Lessons Learned," Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 34, No. 7 (April 2002), pp. 972-983.
64. For vaccines to be effective, defenders must be able to meet the following conditions: identification of the target population, knowledge of the specific threat agent, availability of the appropriate vaccine, and time for the vaccine to be administered to the target population before an attack. David R. Franz, "Physical and Medical Countermeasures to Biological Weapons," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1994), pp. 59-60.
65. Department of Defense, Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Vol. 1, p. 62; and Tara Palmore, Greg Folkers, Carole Heilman, John R. La Montagne, and Anthony S. Fauci, "The NIAID Research Agenda on Biodefense," ASM. News, Vol. 68, No. 8 (August 2002), pp. 376-377.
66. Department of Defense, Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Vol. 1, p. 62; and Tara Palmore, Greg Folkers, Carole Heilman, John R. La Montagne, and Anthony S. Fauci, "The NIAID Research Agenda on Biodefense," ASM. News, Vol. 68, No. 8 (August 2002), pp. 376-377.
67. Arnold Kaufmann, Martin I. Meltzer, and George Schmid, "The Economic Impact of a Bioterrorist Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention Programs Justifiable?" Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April-June 1997), pp. 83-94.
68. Gregory Koblentz, "Biological Terrorism: Understanding the Threat and the Response," in Arnold Howitt and Robyn Pangi, eds., Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 123-143.
69. Martin I. Meltzer, Inger Damon, James W. LeDuc, and J. Donald Millar, "Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorism Weapon," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 7, No. 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 959-969.
70. Karl Lowe, Graham S. Pearson, and Victor Utgoff, "Potential Values of a Simple Biological Warfare Protective Mask," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 263-281; and Stanley L. Weiner, "Strategies for the Prevention of a Successful Biological Warfare Aerosol Attack," Military Medicine, Vol. 161, No. 5 (May 1996), pp. 251-256.
71. Karl Lowe, Graham S. Pearson, and Victor Utgoff, "Potential Values of a Simple Biological Warfare Protective Mask," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 263-281; and Stanley L. Weiner, "Strategies for the Prevention of a Successful Biological Warfare Aerosol Attack," Military Medicine, Vol. 161, No. 5 (May 1996), pp. 251-256.
72. See John Martyny, Craig S. Glazer, and Lee S. Newman, "Respiratory Protection," New England Journal of Medicine, September 12, 2002, p. 827.
73. Lester L. Yuan, "Sheltering Effects of Buildings from Biological Weapons," Science and Global Society, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2000), pp. 287-313; and Richard L. Garwin, Ralph E. Gomory, and Matthew S. Meselson, "How to Fight Bioterrorism," Washington Post, May 14, 2002, p. A21.
74. Lester L. Yuan, "Sheltering Effects of Buildings from Biological Weapons," Science and Global Society, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2000), pp. 287-313; and Richard L. Garwin, Ralph E. Gomory, and Matthew S. Meselson, "How to Fight Bioterrorism," Washington Post, May 14, 2002, p. A21.
75. The BWC does not prohibit research on biological and toxin agents, and it allows their development and production for protective, prophylactic, or other peaceful purposes. The convention, however, does not define activities that constitute research or are considered protective, prophylactic, or peaceful. Barend ter Haar, The Future of Biological Weapons (New York: Praeger, 1991), p. 16.
76. Ambassador Donald Mahley, "Statement by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," Geneva, Switzerland, July 25, 2001, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/5497.htm.
77. See Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease," pp. 395-417; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Motivations For and Against Proliferation: The Case of the Middle East," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 27-52; and W. Seth Carus, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons," in Brad Roberts, ed., Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), pp. 19-27.
78. See Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease," pp. 395-417; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Motivations For and Against Proliferation: The Case of the Middle East," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 27-52; and W. Seth Carus, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons," in Brad Roberts, ed., Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), pp. 19-27.
79. See Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease," pp. 395-417; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Motivations For and Against Proliferation: The Case of the Middle East," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 27-52; and W. Seth Carus, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons," in Brad Roberts, ed., Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), pp. 19-27.
80. States also have an incentive to misrepresent their programs as being provoked by others or for the purpose of deterrence. In 1995, Iraq claimed that it developed strategic chemical and biological weapons as part of a deterrent strategy, but the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) uncovered evidence that Iraq also planned on using these weapons for surprise attacks. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Special Commission's Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iran's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/864 (New York: United Nations, October 11, 1995), p. 11.
81. Brad Roberts, "Rethinking Export Controls on Dual-Use Materials and Technologies: From Trade Restraints to Trade Enablers," Arena, No. 2 (June 1995).
82. David A. Kay, "Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 85-105; and Gordon Vachon, "The Australia Group and Proliferation Concerns," UNIDIR Newsletter, No. 33 (1996), pp. 59-61.
83. David A. Kay, "Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 85-105; and Gordon Vachon, "The Australia Group and Proliferation Concerns," UNIDIR Newsletter, No. 33 (1996), pp. 59-61.
84. Michael Barletta, Amy Sands, and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax: The Case for a Biosecurity Convention," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58, No. 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 58-59.
85. Barry Kellman, "Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe," Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 457-462.
86. On the difficulties of developing biological weapons outside of a state-run program, see General Accounting Office, Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO-NSIAD-99-163 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 1999).
87. For optimistic views on this issue, see Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable: Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 93-105; Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons and Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-79; Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 195-218; and Malcolm Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (London: Palgrave, 2002). For pessimistic views, see Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with Verifying a Ban on Biological Weapons," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 3 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 1994), pp. 59-63; Michael Moodie, "Arms Control Programs and Biological Weapons," in Roberts, Biological Weapons, pp. 47-57; and Robert P. Kadlec, Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis, "Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 95-111.
88. For optimistic views on this issue, see Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable: Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 93-105; Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons and Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-79; Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 195-218; and Malcolm Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (London: Palgrave, 2002). For pessimistic views, see Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with Verifying a Ban on Biological Weapons," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 3 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 1994), pp. 59-63; Michael Moodie, "Arms Control Programs and Biological Weapons," in Roberts, Biological Weapons, pp. 47-57; and Robert P. Kadlec, Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis, "Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 95-111.
89. For optimistic views on this issue, see Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable: Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 93-105; Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons and Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-79; Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 195-218; and Malcolm Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (London: Palgrave, 2002). For pessimistic views, see Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with Verifying a Ban on Biological Weapons," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 3 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 1994), pp. 59-63; Michael Moodie, "Arms Control Programs and Biological Weapons," in Roberts, Biological Weapons, pp. 47-57; and Robert P. Kadlec, Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis, "Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 95-111.
90. For optimistic views on this issue, see Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable: Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 93-105; Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons and Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-79; Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 195-218; and Malcolm Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (London: Palgrave, 2002). For pessimistic views, see Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with Verifying a Ban on Biological Weapons," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 3 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 1994), pp. 59-63; Michael Moodie, "Arms Control Programs and Biological Weapons," in Roberts, Biological Weapons, pp. 47-57; and Robert P. Kadlec, Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis, "Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 95-111.
91. For optimistic views on this issue, see Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable: Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 93-105; Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons and Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-79; Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 195-218; and Malcolm Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (London: Palgrave, 2002). For pessimistic views, see Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with Verifying a Ban on Biological Weapons," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 3 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 1994), pp. 59-63; Michael Moodie, "Arms Control Programs and Biological Weapons," in Roberts, Biological Weapons, pp. 47-57; and Robert P. Kadlec, Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis, "Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 95-111.
92. For optimistic views on this issue, see Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable: Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 93-105; Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons and Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-79; Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 195-218; and Malcolm Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (London: Palgrave, 2002). For pessimistic views, see Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with Verifying a Ban on Biological Weapons," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 3 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 1994), pp. 59-63; Michael Moodie, "Arms Control Programs and Biological Weapons," in Roberts, Biological Weapons, pp. 47-57; and Robert P. Kadlec, Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis, "Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 95-111.
93. For optimistic views on this issue, see Marie Isabelle Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable: Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), pp. 93-105; Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons and Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-79; Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 195-218; and Malcolm Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (London: Palgrave, 2002). For pessimistic views, see Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with Verifying a Ban on Biological Weapons," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 3 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 1994), pp. 59-63; Michael Moodie, "Arms Control Programs and Biological Weapons," in Roberts, Biological Weapons, pp. 47-57; and Robert P. Kadlec, Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis, "Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 95-111.
94. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Verification: The Critical Element of Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1976); and Allan S. Krass, Verification: How Much Is Enough? (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985).
95. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Verification: The Critical Element of Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1976); and Allan S. Krass, Verification: How Much Is Enough? (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985).
96. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 84-87; Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," pp. 198-199; Susan Berger, "The Challenges of Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Treaty Verification," in Elizabeth J. Kirk, W. Thomas Wander, and Brian D. Smith, eds., Trends and Implications for Arms Control, Proliferation, and International Security in the Changing Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993), pp. 175-189.
97. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 84-87; Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," pp. 198-199; Susan Berger, "The Challenges of Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Treaty Verification," in Elizabeth J. Kirk, W. Thomas Wander, and Brian D. Smith, eds., Trends and Implications for Arms Control, Proliferation, and International Security in the Changing Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993), pp. 175-189.
98. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 84-87; Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," pp. 198-199; Susan Berger, "The Challenges of Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Treaty Verification," in Elizabeth J. Kirk, W. Thomas Wander, and Brian D. Smith, eds., Trends and Implications for Arms Control, Proliferation, and International Security in the Changing Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993), pp. 175-189.
99. As a result of the ambiguities between prohibited and legitimate activities, making definitive judgments regarding the compliance of a state believed to be cheating could be difficult. Jonathan B. Tucker, "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention," Arms Control Today, April 1995, p. 11; and Berger, "The Challenges of Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Treaty Verification," p. 185.
100. As a result of the ambiguities between prohibited and legitimate activities, making definitive judgments regarding the compliance of a state believed to be cheating could be difficult. Jonathan B. Tucker, "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention," Arms Control Today, April 1995, p. 11; and Berger, "The Challenges of Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Treaty Verification," p. 185.
101. The New York Times highlighted this ambiguity in September 2001 when it
102. The New York Times highlighted this ambiguity in September 2001 when it revealed the existence of biodefense projects sponsored by the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency that involved the construction of a small biological agent production facility, the testing of Soviet-designed biological bomblets, and the creation of a genetically engineered strain of B. anthracis. The agencies claimed that the purpose of these research projects was defensive and legal under the BWC, but the combination of capabilities under development and the secrecy of the work raised questions at home and abroad about the commitment of the United States to enforcing the treaty. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William J. Broad, "U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits," New York Times, September 4, 2001, p. A1; Judith Miller, "When Is a Bomb Not a Bomb? Germ Experts Confront U.S.," New York Times, September 5,2001, p. A5; Elisa Harris, "Research Not to Be Hidden," New York Times, September 6, 20001, p. A27; and Barbara Hatch Rosenberg and Milton Leitenberg, "Who's Afraid of a Germ Warfare Treaty?" Los Angeles Times, September 6, 2001, p. B15.
103. The New York Times highlighted this ambiguity in September 2001 when it revealed the existence of biodefense projects sponsored by the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency that involved the construction of a small biological agent production facility, the testing of Soviet-designed biological bomblets, and the creation of a genetically engineered strain of B. anthracis. The agencies claimed that the purpose of these research projects was defensive and legal under the BWC, but the combination of capabilities under development and the secrecy of the work raised questions at home and abroad about the commitment of the United States to enforcing the treaty. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William J. Broad, "U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits," New York Times, September 4, 2001, p. A1; Judith Miller, "When Is a Bomb Not a Bomb? Germ Experts Confront U.S.," New York Times, September 5,2001, p. A5; Elisa Harris, "Research Not to Be Hidden," New York Times, September 6, 20001, p. A27; and Barbara Hatch Rosenberg and Milton Leitenberg, "Who's Afraid of a Germ Warfare Treaty?" Los Angeles Times, September 6, 2001, p. B15.
104. The New York Times highlighted this ambiguity in September 2001 when it revealed the existence of biodefense projects sponsored by the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency that involved the construction of a small biological agent production facility, the testing of Soviet-designed biological bomblets, and the creation of a genetically engineered strain of B. anthracis. The agencies claimed that the purpose of these research projects was defensive and legal under the BWC, but the combination of capabilities under development and the secrecy of the work raised questions at home and abroad about the commitment of the United States to enforcing the treaty. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William J. Broad, "U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits," New York Times, September 4, 2001, p. A1; Judith Miller, "When Is a Bomb Not a Bomb? Germ Experts Confront U.S.," New York Times, September 5,2001, p. A5; Elisa Harris, "Research Not to Be Hidden," New York Times, September 6, 20001, p. A27; and Barbara Hatch Rosenberg and Milton Leitenberg, "Who's Afraid of a Germ Warfare Treaty?" Los Angeles Times, September 6, 2001, p. B15.
105. In 1970, the U.S. government committed itself to conducting its defensive program as openly as possible, but determined that the performance of detection systems, threat assessments, and vulnerability studies may require classification. Interdepartmental Political Military Working Group, Annual Review of United States Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs as of 1 November 1970, December 5, 1970, pp. 23-24, http://foia.state.gov/documents/FOIADocs/000050DB.pdf. On industry concerns regarding the protection of intellectual property, see Al Homberg, "Industry Concerns Regarding Disclosure of Proprietary Information," Director's Series on Proliferation, No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 23, 1994), pp. 91-100.
106. In 1970, the U.S. government committed itself to conducting its defensive program as openly as possible, but determined that the performance of detection systems, threat assessments, and vulnerability studies may require classification. Interdepartmental Political Military Working Group, Annual Review of United States Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs as of 1 November 1970, December 5, 1970, pp. 23-24, http://foia.state.gov/documents/FOIADocs/000050DB.pdf. On industry concerns regarding the protection of intellectual property, see Al Homberg, "Industry Concerns Regarding Disclosure of Proprietary Information," Director's Series on Proliferation, No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 23, 1994), pp. 91-100.
107. Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable," p. 99; Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, " p. 211; and Barbara Rosenberg, "U.S. Policy and the BWC Protocol," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 52 (June 2001), p. 2.
108. Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable," p. 99; Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, " p. 211; and Barbara Rosenberg, "U.S. Policy and the BWC Protocol," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 52 (June 2001), p. 2.
109. Chevrier, "Verifying the Unverifiable," p. 99; Zilinskas, "Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, " p. 211; and Barbara Rosenberg, "U.S. Policy and the BWC Protocol," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 52 (June 2001), p. 2.
110. Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation?" pp. 72-102; and Elisa Harris, "Bioweapons Treaty Still a Good Idea," Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0824/p11s3-coop.html.
111. Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation?" pp. 72-102; and Elisa Harris, "Bioweapons Treaty Still a Good Idea," Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0824/p11s3-coop.html.
112. Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation?" p. 95; Elisa Harris, "The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," in Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass, eds., Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 205.
113. Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation?" p. 95; Elisa Harris, "The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," in Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass, eds., Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 205.
114. For a discussion of the role of revisionist states in international politics, see Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; and Alastair lain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 8-11.
115. For a discussion of the role of revisionist states in international politics, see Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 8-11.
116. For the decisionmaking process leading to the 1969 decision, see Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare, 1969-70," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 107-148.
117. "Remarks of the President on Announcing the Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs," Office of the White House Press Secretary, The White House, November 25, 1969, Folder 5: Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. 1, Box 310, National Security Council Subject Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives, College Park, Maryland [hereafter Nixon papers]; and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons," 93d Cong., 2d sess., December 10, 1974, p. 10; and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Verification, pp. 17-18.
118. "Remarks of the President on Announcing the Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs," Office of the White House Press Secretary, The White House, November 25, 1969, Folder 5: Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. 1, Box 310, National Security Council Subject Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives, College Park, Maryland [hereafter Nixon papers]; and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons," 93d Cong., 2d sess., December 10, 1974, p. 10; and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Verification, pp. 17-18.
119. "Remarks of the President on Announcing the Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs," Office of the White House Press Secretary, The White House, November 25, 1969, Folder 5: Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. 1, Box 310, National Security Council Subject Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives, College Park, Maryland [hereafter Nixon papers]; and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons," 93d Cong., 2d sess., December 10, 1974, p. 10; and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Verification, pp. 17-18.
120. Matthew Meselson, "The Problem of Biological Weapons," undated, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/cbw5.htm; Julian P. Perry Robinson, "Some Political Aspects of the Control of Biological Weapons," Science in Parliament, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May/June 1996), pp. 6-11; Graham S. Pearson, "Biological Weapons: A Priority Concern," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1994), p. 42; and Gradon Carter, "Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United Kingdom, 1940-1979," RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 6 (December 1992), p. 72.
121. Matthew Meselson, "The Problem of Biological Weapons," undated, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/cbw5.htm; Julian P. Perry Robinson, "Some Political Aspects of the Control of Biological Weapons," Science in Parliament, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May/June 1996), pp. 6-11; Graham S. Pearson, "Biological Weapons: A Priority Concern," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1994), p. 42; and Gradon Carter, "Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United Kingdom, 1940-1979," RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 6 (December 1992), p. 72.
122. Matthew Meselson, "The Problem of Biological Weapons," undated, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/cbw5.htm; Julian P. Perry Robinson, "Some Political Aspects of the Control of Biological Weapons," Science in Parliament, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May/June 1996), pp. 6-11; Graham S. Pearson, "Biological Weapons: A Priority Concern," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1994), p. 42; and Gradon Carter, "Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United Kingdom, 1940-1979," RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 6 (December 1992), p. 72.
123. Matthew Meselson, "The Problem of Biological Weapons," undated, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/cbw5.htm; Julian P. Perry Robinson, "Some Political Aspects of the Control of Biological Weapons," Science in Parliament, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May/June 1996), pp. 6-11; Graham S. Pearson, "Biological Weapons: A Priority Concern," Director's Series on Proliferation No. 4 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1994), p. 42; and Gradon Carter, "Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United Kingdom, 1940-1979," RUSI Journal, Vol. 137, No. 6 (December 1992), p. 72.
124. Han Swyter, "Political Considerations and Analysis of Military Requirements for Chemical and Biological Weapons," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 65, No. 1 (January 15, 1970), pp. 261-270.
125. Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 253, as cited in Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation?" p. 84.
126. Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 253, as cited in Chevrier, "Impediment to Proliferation?" p. 84.
127. Alibek, Biohazard; and Anthony Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program: The Implications for Contemporary Arms Control," in Susan Wright, ed., Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 103-150.
128. General Accounting Office, Arms Control: Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, GAO-02-1038 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 2002), pp. 10-11.
129. Brad Roberts, "Between Panic and Complacency: Calibrating the Chemical and Biological Warfare Problem," in Stuart E. Johnson, ed., The Niche Threat: Deterring the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 9-41
130. U.S. Army, Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents, Army Field Manual No. 3-10 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, March 31, 1966), p. 47.
131. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 1996/1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 38.
132. This potential, however, has been ignored in many analyses of these weapons. Zilinskas, "Biological Warfare and the Third World"; and Richard Novick and Seth Shulman, "New Forms of Biological Warfare?" in Wright, Preventing a Biological Arms Race, pp. 105-106. An exception to this view is W. Seth Carus, The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb? Biological Weapons in the Middle East, Policy Paper No. 23 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), pp. 36-37.
133. This potential, however, has been ignored in many analyses of these weapons. Zilinskas, "Biological Warfare and the Third World"; and Richard Novick and Seth Shulman, "New Forms of Biological Warfare?" in Wright, Preventing a Biological Arms Race, pp. 105-106. An exception to this view is W. Seth Carus, The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb? Biological Weapons in the Middle East, Policy Paper No. 23 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), pp. 36-37.
134. This potential, however, has been ignored in many analyses of these weapons. Zilinskas, "Biological Warfare and the Third World"; and Richard Novick and Seth Shulman, "New Forms of Biological Warfare?" in Wright, Preventing a Biological Arms Race, pp. 105-106. An exception to this view is W. Seth Carus, The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb? Biological Weapons in the Middle East, Policy Paper No. 23 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), pp. 36-37.
135. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 72.
136. See, respectively, U.S. Army, Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1999), p. 2; and Timothy McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, p. 62.
137. See, respectively, U.S. Army, Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1999), p. 2; and Timothy McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, p. 62.
138. See, respectively, U.S. Army, Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1999), p. 2; and Timothy McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, p. 62.
139. The use of incapacitating agents instead of lethal ones would have the additional benefit of burdening the target with large numbers of wounded soldiers, who typically absorb more resources than fatalities.
140. Robert J. Larsen and Robert P. Kadlec, Biological Warfare: A Post-Cold War Threat to America's Strategic Mobility Forces, Ridgway Viewpoint 95-3 (Pittsburgh, Penn.: Matthew B. Ridgway Center for Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 12-15.
141. Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010: A Summary Report (McLean, Va.: Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, November 1997).
142. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, May 1997), p. 13; and George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002), pp. 13-16.
143. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, May 1997), p. 13; and George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002), pp. 13-16.
144. Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 42-47.
145. There are also a number of viral agents and fungal agents that can cause epidemics among livestock and crops, respectively. See Simon M. Whitby, Biological Warfare against Crops (New York: Palgrave, 2002); and Terrance M. Wilson, Linda Logan-Henfrey, Richard Weller, and Barry Kellman, "Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture," in Corrie Brown and Carole Bolin, eds., Emerging Diseases of Animals (Washington, D.C.: ASM Press, 2000), pp. 23-57.
146. There are also a number of viral agents and fungal agents that can cause epidemics among livestock and crops, respectively. See Simon M. Whitby, Biological Warfare against Crops (New York: Palgrave, 2002); and Terrance M. Wilson, Linda Logan-Henfrey, Richard Weller, and Barry Kellman, "Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture," in Corrie Brown and Carole Bolin, eds., Emerging Diseases of Animals (Washington, D.C.: ASM Press, 2000), pp. 23-57.
147. Jessica Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 102-106.
148. See Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America's Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), pp. 138-157; Christopher Davis, "Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 509-512; Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons," p. 141; Whitby, Biological Warfare against Crops, pp. 10-21, 94-117; and Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program," pp. 113-115.
149. See Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America's Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), pp. 138-157; Christopher Davis, "Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 509-512; Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons," p. 141; Whitby, Biological Warfare against Crops, pp. 10-21, 94-117; and Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program," pp. 113-115.
150. See Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America's Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), pp. 138-157; Christopher Davis, "Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 509-512; Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons," p. 141; Whitby, Biological Warfare against Crops, pp. 10-21, 94-117; and Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program," pp. 113-115.
151. See Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America's Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), pp. 138-157; Christopher Davis, "Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 509-512; Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons," p. 141; Whitby, Biological Warfare against Crops, pp. 10-21, 94-117; and Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program," pp. 113-115.
152. See Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America's Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), pp. 138-157; Christopher Davis, "Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 509-512; Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons," p. 141; Whitby, Biological Warfare against Crops, pp. 10-21, 94-117; and Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program," pp. 113-115.
153. Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons," p. 90.
154. John Ellis van Courtland Moon, "Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapons through World War II," in Richard Burns, ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp. 657-674.
155. Ironically, the development of biological weapons by revisionist states such as the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan may have been partly inspired by these agreements. On Japanese interest in chemical and biological weapons due to the Geneva Protocol, see Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 7-8. The Soviet Union launched new efforts to develop biological weapons in the 1920s and 1970s following the creation of both the Geneva Protocol and the BWC. See Valentin Bojtzov and Erhard Geissler, "Military Biology in the USSR, 1920-1945," in Geissler and Moon, Biological and Toxin Weapons, pp. 156-157; and Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program," pp. 105-106.
156. Ironically, the development of biological weapons by revisionist states such as the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan may have been partly inspired by these agreements. On Japanese interest in chemical and biological weapons due to the Geneva Protocol, see Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 7-8. The Soviet Union launched new efforts to develop biological weapons in the 1920s and 1970s following the creation of both the Geneva Protocol and the BWC. See Valentin Bojtzov and Erhard Geissler, "Military Biology in the USSR, 1920-1945," in Geissler and Moon, Biological and Toxin Weapons, pp. 156-157; and Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program," pp. 105-106.
157. Ironically, the development of biological weapons by revisionist states such as the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan may have been partly inspired by these agreements. On Japanese interest in chemical and biological weapons due to the Geneva Protocol, see Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 7-8. The Soviet Union launched new efforts to develop biological weapons in the 1920s and 1970s following the creation of both the Geneva Protocol and the BWC. See Valentin Bojtzov and Erhard Geissler, "Military Biology in the USSR, 1920-1945," in Geissler and Moon, Biological and Toxin Weapons, pp. 156-157; and Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program," pp. 105-106.
158. States that do not expect external support in the event of an attack may not feel limited in their means of self-defense.
159. Confirmed cases of the use of chemical weapons initiated by the aggressor include Germany during World War I, the Allies during their intervention into the Russian civil war from 1919 to 1921, Italy against Ethiopia from 1935 to 1936, Japan against China between 1937 and 1945, Egypt against Royalist forces in Yemen between 1963 and 1967, and Iraq against Iran during the 1980s. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 1: The Rise of CB Weapons (New York: Humanities, 1971), pp. 125-161.
160. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 26.
161. Concepts for Employment of Antipersonnel Biological Warfare, Information Report No. 1 (Edgewood, Md.: Chemical Corps Board, April 1, 1958), p. 12.
162. Pape, Bombing to Win, p. 14 (emphasis in original).
163. Quoted in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 205-206.
164. On the limited risk of serious contamination, see Patrick, "Biological Warfare," p. 6; and Graham S. Pearson, "The Essentials of Biological Threat Assessment," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, p. 71.
165. On the limited risk of serious contamination, see Patrick, "Biological Warfare," p. 6; and Graham S. Pearson, "The Essentials of Biological Threat Assessment," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, p. 71.
166. Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorists and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 45-53; Jessica Stern, "Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 202-229; and Jerrold M. Post, "Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism," in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 271-289.
167. Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorists and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 45-53; Jessica Stern, "Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 202-229; and Jerrold M. Post, "Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism," in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 271-289.
168. Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorists and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 45-53; Jessica Stern, "Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 202-229; and Jerrold M. Post, "Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism," in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 271-289.
169. Stern, "Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons," pp. 214-216.
170. Case studies of terrorist groups interested in biological weapons can be found in Tucker, Toxic Terror; and W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, April 2001).
171. Case studies of terrorist groups interested in biological weapons can be found in Tucker, Toxic Terror; and W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, April 2001).
172. Al-Qaeda is known to be interested in biological weapons and causing mass casualties, but it is not yet believed to have acquired the capability for conducting such an attack. Barton Gellman, "Al Qaeda Near Biological, Chemical Arms Production," Washington Post, March 23, 2003, p. A1.
173. Carus, The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb?; Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass Jr., CBW: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984); H. Lee Buchanan, "Poor Man's A-Bomb?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 123, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 83-86; and Al J. Venter, "Biological Warfare: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (March 1999), pp. 42-47.
174. Carus, The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb?; Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass Jr., CBW: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984); H. Lee Buchanan, "Poor Man's A-Bomb?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 123, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 83-86; and Al J. Venter, "Biological Warfare: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (March 1999), pp. 42-47.
175. Carus, The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb?; Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass Jr., CBW: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984); H. Lee Buchanan, "Poor Man's A-Bomb?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 123, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 83-86; and Al J. Venter, "Biological Warfare: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (March 1999), pp. 42-47.
176. Carus, The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb?; Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass Jr., CBW: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984); H. Lee Buchanan, "Poor Man's A-Bomb?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 123, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 83-86; and Al J. Venter, "Biological Warfare: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (March 1999), pp. 42-47.
177. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 53-54.
178. Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction," pp. 22-26; and Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics," p. 77.
179. Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction," pp. 22-26; and Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics," p. 77.
180. Martin, "The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics," pp. 81-82, 86-87.
181. For additional analyses of the utility of biological weapons as deterrents, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 2, pp. 155-159; and Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease," pp. 406-408.
182. For additional analyses of the utility of biological weapons as deterrents, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 2, pp. 155-159; and Chevrier, "Deliberate Disease," pp. 406-408.
183. Robert Jervis
184. Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (New York: Harcourt, 1946), pp. 76-77, 89-91; and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
185. These characteristics are derived from Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution; Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 32-33; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 240-254.
186. These characteristics are derived from Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution; Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 32-33; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 240-254.
187. These characteristics are derived from Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution; Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 32-33; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 240-254.
188. Samuel Gladstone and Dolan J. Philip, eds., Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1977).
189. In contrast, a state contemplating a first strike or surprise attack with biological weapons would have more flexibility in determining when, where, and how to employ these weapons.
190. As of late 2003, fewer than 40,000 civilians had been vaccinated against smallpox, far short of the goal of 440,000. The military immunization campaign, however, was successful in vaccinating more than 500,000 soldiers and military health personnel. David Ruppe, "U.S. Military Official Praises Army Smallpox Vaccination Program," Global Security Newswire, October 23, 2003, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003_10_23.html#lAA0288D.
191. Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Proliferation," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 31-32; and Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, p. 19.
192. Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Proliferation," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 31-32; and Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, p. 19.
193. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq maintained a secret strategic reserve of mobile missiles armed with chemical and biological warheads. Launch authority for these weapons was predelegated in the event that a nuclear weapon struck Baghdad or that missile commanders lost contact with the leadership in the capital. This policy and the capabilities supporting it, however, were not known to Israel or the United States until revealed by Iraqi officials in 1995. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," pp. 72-75; and Amatzia Baram, "An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 34-36. North Korea's aggressive behavior in the late 1960s was reportedly undertaken in the mistaken belief that the nation's new chemical and biological warfare capabilities would deter a strong U.S. response. The United States was not aware of these capabilities, however, and its forceful reaction led the North Korean leadership to moderate its behavior and reassess the deterrent value of their unconventional weapons. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 186-187.
194. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq maintained a secret strategic reserve of mobile missiles armed with chemical and biological warheads. Launch authority for these weapons was predelegated in the event that a nuclear weapon struck Baghdad or that missile commanders lost contact with the leadership in the capital. This policy and the capabilities supporting it, however, were not known to Israel or the United States until revealed by Iraqi officials in 1995. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," pp. 72-75; and Amatzia Baram, "An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 34-36. North Korea's aggressive behavior in the late 1960s was reportedly undertaken in the mistaken belief that the nation's new chemical and biological warfare capabilities would deter a strong U.S. response. The United States was not aware of these capabilities, however, and its forceful reaction led the North Korean leadership to moderate its behavior and reassess the deterrent value of their unconventional weapons. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 186-187.
195. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq maintained a secret strategic reserve of mobile missiles armed with chemical and biological warheads. Launch authority for these weapons was predelegated in the event that a nuclear weapon struck Baghdad or that missile commanders lost contact with the leadership in the capital. This policy and the capabilities supporting it, however, were not known to Israel or the United States until revealed by Iraqi officials in 1995. McCarthy and Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal," pp. 72-75; and Amatzia Baram, "An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 34-36. North Korea's aggressive behavior in the late 1960s was reportedly undertaken in the mistaken belief that the nation's new chemical and biological warfare capabilities would deter a strong U.S. response. The United States was not aware of these capabilities, however, and its forceful reaction led the North Korean leadership to moderate its behavior and reassess the deterrent value of their unconventional weapons. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons," in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 186-187.
196. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Pergamon, 1985), p. 37.
197. In 1989 Vladimir Pasechnik, the director of a major Soviet biological weapons research institute, defected to the United Kingdom. In 1992 Kenneth Alibek, a former deputy director of Biopreparat, the Soviet Union's biological weapons research and development agency, defected to the United States. In 1995 Hussein Kamel, the head of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, defected to Jordan. Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 91-105, 177-195, 293-294.
198. On the ten-year rule for nuclear weapon's development, see Leonard S. Spector, "Strategic Warning and New Nuclear States," Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 33-52. In contrast, Iraq went from biological weapons research to production in five years. See Mitchell B. Wallerstein, "Responding to Proliferation Threats," Strategic Forum, No. 138 (May 1998), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF138/forum138.html.
199. On the ten-year rule for nuclear weapon's development, see Leonard S. Spector, "Strategic Warning and New Nuclear States," Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 33-52. In contrast, Iraq went from biological weapons research to production in five years. See Mitchell B. Wallerstein, "Responding to Proliferation Threats," Strategic Forum, No. 138 (May 1998), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF138/forum138.html.
200. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 85.
201. Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 242.
202. On the difficulty of deterring terrorists, see Paul K. Davis and Brian M. Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), pp. 3-8.
203. Gavin Cameron, "Multi-Track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 22, No. 4 (November 1999), pp. 277-309.
204. The best illustration of this is Japan in December 1941. See Scott D. Sagan, "Origins of the Pacific War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 893-922.
205. None of these attacks was successful because the group inadvertently used harmless versions of B. anthracis and botulinum toxin. Sheryl Wu Dunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, "How Japan Germ Terror Alerted the World," New York Times, May 26, 1998, p. A1.
206. Martin Enserink, "Useful Data but No Smoking Gun," Science, May 10, 2002, pp. 1002-1003; and Laura Meckler, "Genetics Not Helping Anthrax Probe," Associated Press, June 19, 2002, http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/geneticsnothelpanthrax.html.
207. Martin Enserink, "Useful Data but No Smoking Gun," Science, May 10, 2002, pp. 1002-1003; and Laura Meckler, "Genetics Not Helping Anthrax Probe," Associated Press, June 19, 2002, http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/geneticsnothelpanthrax.html.
208. Henry S. Rowen, "Catalytic Nuclear War," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye Jr., eds., Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), pp. 148-163.
209. The goal of a preventive attack is to thwart a state or terrorist group from developing a threatening capability. Preemptive strikes are conducted when an enemy attack appears imminent. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982), p. 145.
210. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 15-16.
211. Memorandum for the Vice President, Subject: "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," June 21, 1995, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.
212. Gregory Koblentz, "Countering Dual-Use Facilities: Lessons from Iraq and Sudan," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (March 1999), pp. 48-53.
213. Quoted in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror. Radical Islam's War against America (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 260.
214. "Remarks of the President on Announcing the Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs," p. 1, Nixon papers.
215. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov, quoted in John Barry, "Planning a Plague," Newsweek, February 1, 1993, p. 40.
216. Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, p. 182.
217. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 5: The Prevention of CBW (New York: Humanities, 1974), p. 138.
218. United Kingdom Foreign Office, Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, "The Arms Control Implications of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Analysis and Proposals," ACDRU 66(2), 2d draft, July 4, 1966, p. 25, FO 371/187448, Public Records Office, London, United Kingdom.
219. Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 137.
220. Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Proliferation," pp. 22, 34; and Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 175-178.
221. Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Proliferation," pp. 22, 34; and Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 175-178.
222. Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 68-71.
223. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Hearings, Vol. 1: Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1976).
224. Summary Report on CIA Investigation of MKNAOMI, undated (declassified September 15, 1975), p. 4, in Senate Committee on Human Resources, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, "Biological Testing Involving Human Subjects by the Department of Defense," 95th Cong., 1st sess., March 8 and May 23, 1977, p. 247.
225. Summary Report on CIA Investigation of MKNAOMI, undated (declassified September 15, 1975), p. 4, in Senate Committee on Human Resources, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, "Biological Testing Involving Human Subjects by the Department of Defense," 95th Cong., 1st sess., March 8 and May 23, 1977, p. 247.
226. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," pp. 145-148.
227. Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, pp. 109-110, 417, n. 20; and Alibek, Biohazard, pp. 190-191
228. Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, pp. 109-110, 417, n. 20; and Alibek, Biohazard, pp. 190-191
229. Quoted in Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, p. 109.
230. See ibid., pp. 158-169.
231. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2 (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan Reference Limited, March 1999), p. 522.
232. Ibid., p. 520.
233. Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations, 2002), p. 118; and Marléne Burger, and Chandré Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town, South Africa: Zebra, 2002), pp. 9, 26.
234. Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations, 2002), p. 118; and Marléne Burger, and Chandré Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town, South Africa: Zebra, 2002), pp. 9, 26.
235. Joby Warrick and John Mintz, "Lethal Legacy: Bioweapons for Sale," Washington Post, April 20, 2003, p. A1; and Joby Warrick, "Biotoxins Fall Into Private Hands," Washington Post, April 21, 2003, p. A1.
236. Joby Warrick and John Mintz, "Lethal Legacy: Bioweapons for Sale," Washington Post, April 20, 2003, p. A1; and Joby Warrick, "Biotoxins Fall Into Private Hands," Washington Post, April 21, 2003, p. A1.
237. "Statement by the President," Office of the White House Press Secretary, November 25, 1969, p. 2, Nixon papers.
238. Statement by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat, March 3, 1999, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1999/ lauder_speech_030399.html.
239. Prominent examples include Vladimir Pasechnik, Kenneth Alibek, and Hussein Kamel.
240. Intelligence from human sources can be difficult to verify. Moreover, such sources may purposefully or inadvertently transmit false information, thus contributing to flawed assessments, as may have been the case prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Bob Drogin, "U.S. Suspects It Received False Iraq Arms Tips," Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2003, p. A1; and Douglas Jehl, "Agency Belittles Information Given by Iraqi Defectors," New York Times, September 29, 2003, p. A1.
241. Intelligence from human sources can be difficult to verify. Moreover, such sources may purposefully or inadvertently transmit false information, thus contributing to flawed assessments, as may have been the case prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Bob Drogin, "U.S. Suspects It Received False Iraq Arms Tips," Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2003, p. A1; and Douglas Jehl, "Agency Belittles Information Given by Iraqi Defectors," New York Times, September 29, 2003, p. A1.
242. Neither the United States nor Japan identified Aum Shinrikyo as posing a biological threat prior to the cult's March 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system. Pearson, "The Essentials of Biological Threat Assessment," pp. 79-81.
243. Erhard Geissler, John Ellis van Courtland Moon, and Graham S. Pearson, "Lessons from the History of Biological and Toxin Warfare," in Geissler and Moon, Biological and Toxin Weapons, pp. 260-263.
244. Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover Up (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 160-204.
245. Adolf Hitler had forbidden the development of biological weapons and, as a result, Germany conducted very little offensive biological research during the war. Erhard Geissler, "Biological Warfare Activities in Germany, 1923-1945," in Geissler and Moon, Biological and Toxin Weapons, pp. 99-102.
246. Geissler, Moon, and Pearson, "Lessons from the History of Biological and Toxin Warfare," in Geissler and Moon, Biological and Toxin Weapons, pp. 259-260.
247. Interdepartmental Political Military Working Group, Annual Review of United States Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs as of 1 November 1970, p. 19.
248. Bill Gertz, "Defecting Russian Scientist Revealed Biological Arms Efforts," Washington Times, July 4, 1992, p. A4; and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Russia Fails to Detail Germ Arms," Washington Post, August 31, 1992, p. A1.
249. Bill Gertz, "Defecting Russian Scientist Revealed Biological Arms Efforts," Washington Times, July 4, 1992, p. A4; and R. Jeffrey Smith,
250. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1992), p. 640.
251. Albert J. Mauroni, Chemical-Biological Defense: U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), pp. 27, 86.
252. Quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," Washington Post, November 21, 1997, p. A1.
253. Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (Langley, Va.: Central Intelligence Agency, October 2002), pp. 2, 13-17.
254. Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants, May 28, 2003, p. 1, http://cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/index.html.
255. The leading alternative explanation is that the trailers were used to produce hydrogen for weather balloons employed by artillery units. Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "Some Analysts of Iraqi Trailers Reject Germ Use," New York Times, June 7, 2003, p. A1; Peter Beaumont, "Iraqi Mobile Labs Nothing to Do with Germ Warfare, Report Finds," Observer, June 15, 2003, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,977853,00.html; Douglas Jehl, "Agency Disputes C.I.A. View on Trailers as Weapons Labs," New York Times, June 26,2003, p. A1; and Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms," New York Times, August 9, 2003, p. A1.
256. The leading alternative explanation is that the trailers were used to produce hydrogen for weather balloons employed by artillery units. Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "Some Analysts of Iraqi Trailers Reject Germ Use," New York Times, June 7, 2003, p. A1; Peter Beaumont, "Iraqi Mobile Labs Nothing to Do with Germ Warfare, Report Finds," Observer, June 15, 2003, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,977853,00.html; Douglas Jehl, "Agency Disputes C.I.A. View on Trailers as Weapons Labs," New York Times, June 26,2003, p. A1; and Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms," New York Times, August 9, 2003, p. A1.
257. The leading alternative explanation is that the trailers were used to produce hydrogen for weather balloons employed by artillery units. Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "Some Analysts of Iraqi Trailers Reject Germ Use," New York Times, June 7, 2003, p. A1; Peter Beaumont, "Iraqi Mobile Labs Nothing to Do with Germ Warfare, Report Finds," Observer, June 15, 2003, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,977853,00.html; Douglas Jehl, "Agency Disputes C.I.A. View on Trailers as Weapons Labs," New York Times, June 26,2003, p. A1; and Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms," New York Times, August 9, 2003, p. A1.
258. The leading alternative explanation is that the trailers were used to produce hydrogen for weather balloons employed by artillery units. Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "Some Analysts of Iraqi Trailers Reject Germ Use," New York Times, June 7, 2003, p. A1; Peter Beaumont, "Iraqi Mobile Labs Nothing to Do with Germ Warfare, Report Finds," Observer, June 15, 2003, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,977853,00.html; Douglas Jehl, "Agency Disputes C.I.A. View on Trailers as Weapons Labs," New York Times, June 26,2003, p. A1; and Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms," New York Times, August 9, 2003, p. A1.
259. Thomas Dashiell, "The Need for a Defensive Biological Research Program," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1 (August 1990), p. 89
260. Paradoxically, the reluctance to share sensitive information may limit the utility of the most useful types of intelligence on foreign biological warfare programs, such as that provided by spies and defectors. According to a participant in the debate on how to confront the Soviet Union with the information provided by Pasechnik in 1989, "We were worried about not being able to convince people because our evidence was secret." Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, p. 103.
261. David C. Kelly, "The Trilateral Agreement: Lessons for Biological Weapons Verification," in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., Verification Yearbook, 2002 (London: VERTIC, 2002), p. 104; and Tim Trevan, "Exploiting Intelligence in International Organizations," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 207-224.
262. David C. Kelly, "The Trilateral Agreement: Lessons for Biological Weapons Verification," in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., Verification Yearbook, 2002 (London: VERTIC, 2002), p. 104; and Tim Trevan, "Exploiting Intelligence in International Organizations," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 207-224.
263. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 64-66.
264. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 169-170.
265. On the threat of biological terrorism, see Brad Roberts, ed., Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); and Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
266. On the threat of biological terrorism, see Brad Roberts, ed., Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); and Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
267. On the threat of biological terrorism, see Brad Roberts, ed., Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); and Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
268. Japan and South Africa employed biological agents for sabotage and counterinsurgency operations. The white-ruled government of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, has also been implicated in similar activities. On Japan, see Harris, Factories of Death. On Rhodesia and South Africa, see Gould and Folb, Project Coast, pp. 24-30, 159-167; and Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies, pp. 15-16, 32-39. In addition, nonstate actors have used biological weapons at least twice in the past twenty years. In 1984 the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon sickened 750 with Salmonella typhimurium, and in 2001 an unidentified perpetrator caused twenty-two casualties and disrupted the operations of the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. Senate with five letters containing spores of B. anthracis. Ronald Atlas, "Bioterrorism before and after September 11," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 359-361.
269. Japan and South Africa employed biological agents for sabotage and counterinsurgency operations. The white-ruled government of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, has also been implicated in similar activities. On Japan, see Harris, Factories of Death. On Rhodesia and South Africa, see Gould and Folb, Project Coast, pp. 24-30, 159-167; and Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies, pp. 15-16, 32-39. In addition, nonstate actors have used biological weapons at least twice in the past twenty years. In 1984 the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon sickened 750 with Salmonella typhimurium, and in 2001 an unidentified perpetrator caused twenty-two casualties and disrupted the operations of the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. Senate with five letters containing spores of B. anthracis. Ronald Atlas, "Bioterrorism before and after September 11," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 359-361.
270. Japan and South Africa employed biological agents for sabotage and counterinsurgency operations. The white-ruled government of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, has also been implicated in similar activities. On Japan, see Harris, Factories of Death. On Rhodesia and South Africa, see Gould and Folb, Project Coast, pp. 24-30, 159-167; and Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies, pp. 15-16, 32-39. In addition, nonstate actors have used biological weapons at least twice in the past twenty years. In 1984 the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon sickened 750 with Salmonella typhimurium, and in 2001 an unidentified perpetrator caused twenty-two casualties and disrupted the operations of the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. Senate with five letters containing spores of B. anthracis. Ronald Atlas, "Bioterrorism before and after September 11," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 359-361.
271. Japan and South Africa employed biological agents for sabotage and counterinsurgency operations. The white-ruled government of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, has also been implicated in similar activities. On Japan, see Harris, Factories of Death. On Rhodesia and South Africa, see Gould and Folb, Project Coast, pp. 24-30, 159-167; and Burger and Gould, Secrets and Lies, pp. 15-16, 32-39. In addition, nonstate actors have used biological weapons at least twice in the past twenty years. In 1984 the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon sickened 750 with Salmonella typhimurium, and in 2001 an unidentified perpetrator caused twenty-two casualties and disrupted the operations of the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. Senate with five letters containing spores of B. anthracis. Ronald Atlas, "Bioterrorism before and after September 11," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 359-361.
272. The State Department lists eight states as not being in compliance with the BWC: China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22466.pdf.
273. Department of Defense, Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: Implications for the Development of New Warfare Agents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996); Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Future of Biological Warfare," in W. Thomas Wander and Eric H. Arnett, eds., The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992), pp. 61-71; Steven M. Block, "Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology," in Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), pp. 39-75; and Robert P. Kadlec and Alan P. Zelicoff, "Implications of the Biotechnology Revolution for Weapons Development and Arms Control," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 11-26.
274. Department of Defense, Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: Implications for the Development of New Warfare Agents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996); Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Future of Biological Warfare," in W. Thomas Wander and Eric H. Arnett, eds., The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992), pp. 61-71; Steven M. Block, "Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology," in Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), pp. 39-75; and Robert P. Kadlec and Alan P. Zelicoff, "Implications of the Biotechnology Revolution for Weapons Development and Arms Control," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 11-26.
275. Department of Defense, Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: Implications for the Development of New Warfare Agents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996); Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Future of Biological Warfare," in W. Thomas Wander and Eric H. Arnett, eds., The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992), pp. 61-71; Steven M. Block, "Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology," in Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), pp. 39-75; and Robert P. Kadlec and Alan P. Zelicoff, "Implications of the Biotechnology Revolution for Weapons Development and Arms Control," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 11-26.
276. Department of Defense, Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: Implications for the Development of New Warfare Agents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996); Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Future of Biological Warfare," in W. Thomas Wander and Eric H. Arnett, eds., The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992), pp. 61-71; Steven M. Block, "Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology," in Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), pp. 39-75; and Robert P. Kadlec and Alan P. Zelicoff, "Implications of the Biotechnology Revolution for Weapons Development and Arms Control," in Zilinskas, Biological Warfare, pp. 11-26.
277. Brad Roberts, Biological Weapons in Major Theater War (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, November 1998); and United States Commission on National Security/21st Century [Hart-Rudman Commission], New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Supporting Research and Analysis (Washington, D.C.: United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 1999), p. 50.
278. Brad Roberts, Biological Weapons in Major Theater War (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, November 1998); and United States Commission on National Security/21st Century [Hart-Rudman Commission], New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Supporting Research and Analysis (Washington, D.C.: United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 1999), p. 50.
279. For a biodefense research agenda, see National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002), pp. 65-106.
280. For an overview of U.S. bioterrorism preparedness efforts, see Koblentz, "Biological Terrorism," pp. 97-173.
281. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, "Defending against Biodefence: The Need for Limits," Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 69 (February-March 2003), http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd69/69op03.htm.
282. I thank Paul Schulte for this point.
283. See Barletta, Sands, and Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax," pp. 57-62; Gerald L. Epstein, "Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 321-354; and National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the "Dual Use" Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003). On the potential drawbacks of these types of proposals, see Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 89-123; and Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, "A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 123-148.
284. See Barletta, Sands, and Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax," pp. 57-62; Gerald L. Epstein, "Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 321-354; and National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the "Dual Use" Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003). On the potential drawbacks of these types of proposals, see Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 89-123; and Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, "A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 123-148.
285. See Barletta, Sands, and Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax," pp. 57-62; Gerald L. Epstein, "Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 321-354; and National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the "Dual Use" Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003). On the potential drawbacks of these types of proposals, see Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 89-123; and Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, "A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 123-148.
286. See Barletta, Sands, and Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax," pp. 57-62; Gerald L. Epstein, "Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 321-354; and National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the "Dual Use" Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003). On the potential drawbacks of these types of proposals, see Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 89-123; and Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, "A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 123-148.
287. See Barletta, Sands, and Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax," pp. 57-62; Gerald L. Epstein, "Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 321-354; and National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the "Dual Use" Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003). On the potential drawbacks of these types of proposals, see Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 89-123; and Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, "A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 123-148.
288. See Amy E. Smithson, Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, December 1999).
289. For proposals along these lines, see Matthew Meselson and Julian Robinson, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 2003), http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/hsp/IntroConvRev1.pdf; and Jonathan Moreno, Undue Risk: Secret State Experiments on Humans (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 294-297.
290. For proposals along these lines, see Matthew Meselson and Julian Robinson, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 2003), http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/hsp/IntroConvRev1.pdf; and Jonathan Moreno, Undue Risk: Secret State Experiments on Humans (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 294-297.