A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity

International Security

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 123-148

  Hoyt, Kendall ^a   Brooks, Stephen G ^b,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Government Department   (Guyana)

^c DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642587101     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228803773100093     Document Type: Review

References (113)

1. Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), p. 30.
2. Ibid., p. 51.
3. Kurt Campbell, "Globalization at War," Washington Post, October 22, 2001, p. A19; see also Kurt Campbell, "Globalization's First War?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 10.
4. Kurt Campbell, "Globalization at War," Washington Post, October 22, 2001, p. A19; see also Kurt Campbell, "Globalization's First War?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 10.
5. Stanley Hoffman, "The Clash of Globalizations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002), p. 112.
6. See Stephen E. Flynn, "America the Vulnerable," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 60-75; and Stephen E. Flynn, "Beyond Border Control," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December 2000), pp. 57-68.
7. See Stephen E. Flynn, "America the Vulnerable," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 60-75; and Stephen E. Flynn, "Beyond Border Control," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December 2000), pp. 57-68.
8. See, for example, Richard Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 30.
9. See, for example, David F. Gordon, Lt. Col. Don Noah, and George Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D (January 2000); William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Andrew T. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 2001); Jessica Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 94-99; and Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming.
10. See, for example, David F. Gordon, Lt. Col. Don Noah, and George Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D (January 2000); William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Andrew T. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 2001); Jessica Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 94-99; and Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming.
11. See, for example, David F. Gordon, Lt. Col. Don Noah, and George Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D (January 2000); William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Andrew T. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 2001); Jessica Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 94-99; and Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming.
12. See, for example, David F. Gordon, Lt. Col. Don Noah, and George Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D (January 2000); William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Andrew T. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 2001); Jessica Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 94-99; and Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming.
13. See, for example, David F. Gordon, Lt. Col. Don Noah, and George Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D (January 2000); William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Andrew T. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 2001); Jessica Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 94-99; and Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming.
14. See, for example, David F. Gordon, Lt. Col. Don Noah, and George Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D (January 2000); William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Andrew T. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 2001); Jessica Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 94-99; and Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming.
15. See, for example, Gordon, Noah, and Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States"; Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress; Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel; and Price-Smith, The Health of Nations.
16. See, for example, Gordon, Noah, and Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States"; Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress; Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel; and Price-Smith, The Health of Nations.
17. See, for example, Gordon, Noah, and Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States"; Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress; Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel; and Price-Smith, The Health of Nations.
18. See, for example, Gordon, Noah, and Fidas, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States"; Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress; Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel; and Price-Smith, The Health of Nations.
19. According to one study, 100 kilograms of aerosolized anthrax is sufficient to cause 3 million deaths in a densely populated area. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 53.
20. John Steinbruner, Elisa Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy Gunther, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System, CISSM Working Paper (College Park, Md.: Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, February 5, 2003), http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Publications/AMCS/finalmonograph.pdf.
21. See, for example, Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons"; Eugene Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security: Can Traditional Values Survive?" in Albert H. Teich, Stephen D. Nelson, and Stephen J. Lita, eds., Science and Technology in a Vulnerable World: Supplement to AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook 2003 (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2002); and Vincent Chan, Jerome Friedman, Stephen Graves, Harvey Sapolsky, and Sheila Widnall, In the Public Interest: Report of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 12, 2002).
22. See, for example, Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons"; Eugene Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security: Can Traditional Values Survive?" in Albert H. Teich, Stephen D. Nelson, and Stephen J. Lita, eds., Science and Technology in a Vulnerable World: Supplement to AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook 2003 (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2002); and Vincent Chan, Jerome Friedman, Stephen Graves, Harvey Sapolsky, and Sheila Widnall, In the Public Interest: Report of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 12, 2002).
23. See, for example, Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons"; Eugene Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security: Can Traditional Values Survive?" in Albert H. Teich, Stephen D. Nelson, and Stephen J. Lita, eds., Science and Technology in a Vulnerable World: Supplement to AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook 2003 (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2002); and Vincent Chan, Jerome Friedman, Stephen Graves, Harvey Sapolsky, and Sheila Widnall, In the Public Interest: Report of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 12, 2002).
24. White House, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf.
25. Mark Wheelis and Malcom Dando, "On the Brink: Biodefence, Biotechnology, and the Future of Weapons Control," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 58 (December 2002), p. 3; statement by Jonathan B. Tucker before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to State and Sub-State Actors," 107th Cong., 1st sess., November 7, 2001.
26. Mark Wheelis and Malcom Dando, "On the Brink: Biodefence, Biotechnology, and the Future of Weapons Control," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 58 (December 2002), p. 3; statement by Jonathan B. Tucker before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to State and Sub-State Actors," 107th Cong., 1st sess., November 7, 2001.
27. For a description of the agreement, see http://www.australiagroup.net.
28. Tucker, "The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to State and Sub-State Actors"; and Steinbruner et al., "Controlling Dangerous Pathogens."
29. Tucker, "The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to State and Sub-State Actors"; and Steinbruner et al., "Controlling Dangerous Pathogens."
30. Matthew Meselson, "Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology," CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 48 (June 2000), pp. 16-19.
31. White House, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.
32. See the discussion in Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons."
33. Other medical countermeasures, such as antivirals and broad-spectrum antibiotics, would also be useful in efforts to deter or mitigate biological attacks. We focus our discussion on vaccines, however, because, relative to antivirals, their development is more feasible within a ten-year time frame. National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 87. Although it may be more feasible to develop broad-spectrum antibiotics in the near term, their usefulness is limited to bacterial pathogens, which account for only 29 percent of the Department of Health and Human Services' select agent list. See http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/salist.pdf.
34. Other medical countermeasures, such as antivirals and broad-spectrum antibiotics, would also be useful in efforts to deter or mitigate biological attacks. We focus our discussion on vaccines, however, because, relative to antivirals, their development is more feasible within a ten-year time frame. National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 87. Although it may be more feasible to develop broad-spectrum antibiotics in the near term, their usefulness is limited to bacterial pathogens, which account for only 29 percent of the Department of Health and Human Services' select agent list. See http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/salist.pdf.
35. For a related discussion, see Paul Schulte, "The Uncertainly Horrifying Prospect of Biological Weapons: International Risks, Responses, and Dilemmas," Harvard University, March 20, 2003.
36. National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer, p. 68.
37. Philip K. Russell, "Vaccines in Civilian Defense against Bioterrorism," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July/August 1999), p. 532.
38. For a list of biological threat agents, see http://www.cdc.gov.od/sap/resource.html.
39. A 1970s' version of the smallpox vaccine has recently been relicensed, but supplies are limited because the pharmaceutical industry no longer manufactures this version, which contains vaccinia virus cultured on calf bellies. Acambis, a U.K.-based firm, is developing a "cleaner" version of the smallpox vaccine containing cell-cultured vaccinia virus, which the FDA is expected to approve in 2004.
40. Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, deputy assistant to the U.S. defense secretary for chemical and biological defense, expects that the Department of Defense will have an improved smallpox vaccine by 2006 and a tularemia vaccine by 2012. One exception is the new cell-cultured smallpox vaccine under development at Acambis.
41. Amy Smithson and Leslie Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the U.S. Response, Report No. 35 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2001), p. 317.
42. "President Details Project Bioshield," White House press release, February 3, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203.html.
43. Marilyn Chase, "Project Bioshield Is a Big Incentive to Vaccine Makers," Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2003, p. D2. In addition to ensuring funds, Project Bioshield will give the National Institutes of Health authority to fast-track biodefense grants, and it will give the FDA authority to approve the use of investigational vaccines and drugs in an emergency.
44. See Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security"; Chan et al., In the Public Interest; and Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons."
45. See Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security"; Chan et al., In the Public Interest; and Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons."
46. See Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security"; Chan et al., In the Public Interest; and Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons."
47. Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy (New York: Guilford, 1998), p. 233 (emphasis in original).
48. Stephen Kobrin, "The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global Economy," in John H. Dunning, ed., Governments, Globalization, and International Business (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 150.
49. See, for example, ibid., pp. 149-150; and Lynn Krieger Mytelka, "Crisis, Technological Change, and the Strategic Alliance," in Mytelka, ed., Strategic Partnerships: States, Firms, and International Competition (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1991), pp. 16-21, and the sources cited therein.
50. See, for example, ibid., pp. 149-150; and Lynn Krieger Mytelka, "Crisis, Technological Change, and the Strategic Alliance," in Mytelka, ed., Strategic Partnerships: States, Firms, and International Competition (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1991), pp. 16-21, and the sources cited therein.
51. See, for example, Geoffrey Jones, The Evolution of International Business: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 142.
52. François Chesnais, "Preface," in Mytelka, Strategic Partnerships, p. x.
53. Sarah C. Stellings, Robert H. Rubin, Thomas J. Allen, Charles M. Cooney, Anthony J. Sinskey, and Stan N. Finkelstein, "Technological Innovation in Pharmaceuticals," Working Paper No. 59-01 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Program on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2001), p. 2.
54. For this statistic, see Biotechnology Industry Organization, "No. of Biotech Companies, 1999-2000, http://www.bio.org/investor/signs/200210num.asp.
55. Henry G. Grabowski and John Vernon, The Search for New Vaccines: The Effects of the Vaccines for Children Program (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1997), p. 10.
56. When associated facility cost investments are excluded, the estimated cost of bringing a vaccine to market is $300 to $500 million. Changes in FDA licensing requirements for biodefense vaccines and manufacturing process improvements may also reduce development times. Department of Defense, Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research and Development Programs (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001); and Institute of Medicine, The Children's Vaccine Initiative: Achieving the Vision (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993).
57. When associated facility cost investments are excluded, the estimated cost of bringing a vaccine to market is $300 to $500 million. Changes in FDA licensing requirements for biodefense vaccines and manufacturing process improvements may also reduce development times. Department of Defense, Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research and Development Programs (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001); and Institute of Medicine, The Children's Vaccine Initiative: Achieving the Vision (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993).
58. Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella, "Complementarity and External Linkage: The Strategies of Large Firms in Biotechnology," Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 38, No. 4 (June 1990), p. 361; and Gary P. Pisano, "The Governance of Innovation: Vertical Integration and Collaborative Arrangements in the Biotechnology Industry," Research Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3 (June 1991), p. 237.
59. Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella, "Complementarity and External Linkage: The Strategies of Large Firms in Biotechnology," Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 38, No. 4 (June 1990), p. 361; and Gary P. Pisano, "The Governance of Innovation: Vertical Integration and Collaborative Arrangements in the Biotechnology Industry," Research Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3 (June 1991), p. 237.
60. Luigi Orsenigo, Fabio Pammoli, and Massimo Riccaboni, "Technological Change and Network Dynamics: Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Industry," Research Policy, Vol. 30, No. 3 (March 2001), pp. 485-508.
61. Ibid., pp. 485-486.
62. Companies such as Bioport, the beleaguered manufacturer of the DoD's anthrax vaccine, have struggled to obtain FDA approval for the manufacture of this vaccine partly because of their reliance on older and less precise manufacturing techniques.
63. Alfonso Gambardella, Science and Innovation: The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry in the 1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 147.
64. "President Discusses Measures to Protect the Homeland from Bioterrorism," remarks by President George W. Bush on the Bioshield Initiative, National Institutes of Health, February 3, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203-13.html.
65. See the discussion in Thomas Malone and John Rockhart, "How Will Information Technology Reshape Organizations?" in Stephen P. Bradley, Jerry A. Hausman, and Richard L. Nolan, eds., Globalization, Technology, and Competition: The Fusion of Computers and Telecommunications in the 1990s (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1993).
66. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases has applied to NIAID to develop a pentavalent vaccine (covering types A, E, and F) using recombinant DNA technology being developed for the DoD under a grant from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
67. Andrew Pollack and Melody Petersen, "Untested Companies Enlist in U.S. Biodefense," New York Times, March 23, 2003, sec. 3, p. 1.
68. The NIAID, a division of the National Institutes of Health, contracts for and conducts the majority of federally funded biodefense vaccine research.
69. Jon Cohen, "Looking for Vaccines That Pack a Wallop without the Side Effects," Science, December' 20, 2002, p. 2314.
70. Israel21c staff, "Israelis Win U.S. Grant to Develop Anti-smallpox First Aid Treatment," Israel21c, August 17, 2003, http://www.israel21c.org.
71. The civilian vaccine will require fewer doses than the DoD-licensed vaccine and, because it will be produced with recombinant DNA technology, it is expected to produce fewer side effects.
72. Douglas Steinberg, "Antiterror Agenda Promotes Ebola Vaccine and Immunotherapy," Scientist, July 8, 2002, p. 32.
73. Mary Beth Nierengarten and Larry Lutwick, "Vaccine Development for Plague," Medscape Infectious Diseases, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2002).
74. Mary Beth Nierengarten and Larry Lutwick, "Developing New Tularemia Vaccines," Medscape Infectious Diseases, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2002).
75. Regulations affecting the first two categories are already in effect, and individual scientific journal editors administer prepublication review at their own discretion.
76. These seven countries are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. This regulation also applies to non-U.S. citizens who have become permanent U.S. residents. In addition, student and researcher visa applications from twenty-six primarily Muslim countries have been held up for special review by the U.S. government through the Visas Condor program, initiated in November 2001. This review is conducted by the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, which is led by Attorney General John Ashcroft and comprises experts from a variety of U.S. federal agencies, including the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Secret Service, and Customs.
77. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56, 107th Cong., 1st sess.; and Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Public Law 107-173, 107th Cong., 2d sess.
78. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56, 107th Cong., 1st sess.; and Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Public Law 107-173, 107th Cong., 2d sess.
79. Lisa Chedekel, Kim Martineau, and Janice D'Arcy, "Stalling Science: New Visa Rules Are Stranding Foreign Scientists Abroad and Leaving Their U.S. Research to Languish or Die," Hartford Courant, March 23, 2003, p. A1.
80. Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security," p. 67.
81. This policy is outlined in National Security Decision Directive 189, 1985.
82. White House memorandum from Chief of Staff Andrew Card to the heads of executive departments, March 19, 2002.
83. "Statement on Science and Security in an Age of Terrorism from Bruce Alberts, Wm. A. Wulf, and Harvey Fineberg," presidents of the National Academies, October 18, 2002, http://www4.nas.edu/news.nsf/isbn/s10182002b?OpenDocument; and Journal Editors and Authors Group, "PNAS Policy on Publication of Sensitive Material in the Life Sciences," Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences, Vol. 100 (February 2003), p. 1464.
84. "Statement on Science and Security in an Age of Terrorism from Bruce Alberts, Wm. A. Wulf, and Harvey Fineberg," presidents of the National Academies, October 18, 2002, http://www4.nas.edu/news.nsf/isbn/s10182002b?OpenDocument; and Journal Editors and Authors Group, "PNAS Policy on Publication of Sensitive Material in the Life Sciences," Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences, Vol. 100 (February 2003), p. 1464.
85. The Institute of Medicine noted that the current biodefense effort suffers from a shrinking talent base for vaccine development. Institute of Medicine, Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine Acquisition and Availability in the U.S. Military (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002). See also statement by Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, before the House Committee on Science, "Conducting Research during the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security," 107th Cong., 2d sess, October 10, 2002; Ronald M. Atlas, "National Security and the Biological Research Community," Science, October 25, 2002, pp. 753-754; Nils Hasselmo, C. Peter Magrath, and Katharina Phillips, "Association of American Universities, Council on Governmental Relations, and National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges Letter to the Office of Science and Technology Policy Director on Scientific Openness," January 31, 2003, http://www.aau.edu/research/Ltr1.31.03.html; Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 114-118; and Anne Marie Borrego, "Regulatory Overkill?" Chronicle of Higher Education, January 31, 2003, pp. A25-A26.
86. The Institute of Medicine noted that the current biodefense effort suffers from a shrinking talent base for vaccine development. Institute of Medicine, Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine Acquisition and Availability in the U.S. Military (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002). See also statement by Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, before the House Committee on Science, "Conducting Research during the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security," 107th Cong., 2d sess, October 10, 2002; Ronald M. Atlas, "National Security and the Biological Research Community," Science, October 25, 2002, pp. 753-754; Nils Hasselmo, C. Peter Magrath, and Katharina Phillips, "Association of American Universities, Council on Governmental Relations, and National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges Letter to the Office of Science and Technology Policy Director on Scientific Openness," January 31, 2003, http://www.aau.edu/research/Ltr1.31.03.html; Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 114-118; and Anne Marie Borrego, "Regulatory Overkill?" Chronicle of Higher Education, January 31, 2003, pp. A25-A26.
87. The Institute of Medicine noted that the current biodefense effort suffers from a shrinking talent base for vaccine development. Institute of Medicine, Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine Acquisition and Availability in the U.S. Military (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002). See also statement by Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, before the House Committee on Science, "Conducting Research during the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security," 107th Cong., 2d sess, October 10, 2002; Ronald M. Atlas, "National Security and the Biological Research Community," Science, October 25, 2002, pp. 753-754; Nils Hasselmo, C. Peter Magrath, and Katharina Phillips, "Association of American Universities, Council on Governmental Relations, and National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges Letter to the Office of Science and Technology Policy Director on Scientific Openness," January 31, 2003, http://www.aau.edu/research/Ltr1.31.03.html; Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 114-118; and Anne Marie Borrego, "Regulatory Overkill?" Chronicle of Higher Education, January 31, 2003, pp. A25-A26.
88. The Institute of Medicine noted that the current biodefense effort suffers from a shrinking talent base for vaccine development. Institute of Medicine, Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine Acquisition and Availability in the U.S. Military (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002). See also statement by Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, before the House Committee on Science, "Conducting Research during the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security," 107th Cong., 2d sess, October 10, 2002; Ronald M. Atlas, "National Security and the Biological Research Community," Science, October 25, 2002, pp. 753-754; Nils Hasselmo, C. Peter Magrath, and Katharina Phillips, "Association of American Universities, Council on Governmental Relations, and National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges Letter to the Office of Science and Technology Policy Director on Scientific Openness," January 31, 2003, http://www.aau.edu/research/Ltr1.31.03.html; Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 114-118; and Anne Marie Borrego, "Regulatory Overkill?" Chronicle of Higher Education, January 31, 2003, pp. A25-A26.
89. The Institute of Medicine noted that the current biodefense effort suffers from a shrinking talent base for vaccine development. Institute of Medicine, Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine Acquisition and Availability in the U.S. Military (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002). See also statement by Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, before the House Committee on Science, "Conducting Research during the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security," 107th Cong., 2d sess, October 10, 2002; Ronald M. Atlas, "National Security and the Biological Research Community," Science, October 25, 2002, pp. 753-754; Nils Hasselmo, C. Peter Magrath, and Katharina Phillips, "Association of American Universities, Council on Governmental Relations, and National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges Letter to the Office of Science and Technology Policy Director on Scientific Openness," January 31, 2003, http://www.aau.edu/research/Ltr1.31.03.html; Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 114-118; and Anne Marie Borrego, "Regulatory Overkill?" Chronicle of Higher Education, January 31, 2003, pp. A25-A26.
90. The Institute of Medicine noted that the current biodefense effort suffers from a shrinking talent base for vaccine development. Institute of Medicine, Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine Acquisition and Availability in the U.S. Military (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002). See also statement by Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, before the House Committee on Science, "Conducting Research during the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security," 107th Cong., 2d sess, October 10, 2002; Ronald M. Atlas, "National Security and the Biological Research Community," Science, October 25, 2002, pp. 753-754; Nils Hasselmo, C. Peter Magrath, and Katharina Phillips, "Association of American Universities, Council on Governmental Relations, and National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges Letter to the Office of Science and Technology Policy Director on Scientific Openness," January 31, 2003, http://www.aau.edu/research/Ltr1.31.03.html; Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 114-118; and Anne Marie Borrego, "Regulatory Overkill?" Chronicle of Higher Education, January 31, 2003, pp. A25-A26.
91. Quoted in Scott Shane, "Terror Threat Casts Chill over World of Biological Research," Baltimore Sun, January 26, 2003.
92. Interview with Rick Smith, director of regulatory affairs, Aventis Pasteur, Swiftwater, Pennsylvania, March 6, 2003.
93. Referring to the new personnel restrictions on foreign researchers, Kevin Casey, director of federal and state relations for Harvard University, declared, "I'm anticipating we're going to experience more, rather than fewer, problems . . . . It's a situation where the Homeland Security agencies are feeling on the hot seat. Nobody wants to be the one who makes the wrong call." Quoted in Chedekel, Martineau, and D'Arcy, "Stalling Science," p. A1.
94. Quoted in David Ruppe, "New Regulations on Biological Materials Get Mixed Reviews," Global Security Newswire, December 12, 2002, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_12_12.html.
95. Russell Gold, "Research Questions: With Plague Fears on Rise, an Expert Ends Up on Trial," Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2003, p. A1.
96. For a discussion of the concerns in the 1980s about the globalization of U.S. defense production and the numerous calls to restrict the extent of globalization that were voiced at this time, see Theodore H. Moran, "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 57-99.
97. See U.S. Department of Defense, The Impact of Buy-American Restrictions Affecting Defense Procurement, report to the U.S. Congress by the secretary of defense, July 1989, pp. 15-22.
98. See John Blackwell, "The Defense Industrial Base," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Autumn 1992), p. 197.
99. Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and International Security," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2001, chap. 5; see also Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 34-37.
100. Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and International Security," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2001, chap. 5; see also Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 34-37.
101. See Gerald Epstein, "Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2001), pp. 321-354; Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security," p. 72; and Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 95, 119-120.
102. See Gerald Epstein, "Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2001), pp. 321-354; Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security," p. 72; and Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 95, 119-120.
103. See Gerald Epstein, "Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 (January 2001), pp. 321-354; Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security," p. 72; and Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," pp. 95, 119-120.
104. Gold, "Research Questions: With Plague Fears on Rise, an Expert Ends Up on Trial."
105. Quoted in David Malakoff, "Researchers See Progress in Finding the Right Balance" Science, October 18, 2002, p. 529.
106. John Steinbruner and his group at CISSM are working to define "highly dangerous" activities. Examples include research efforts to increase the virulence, stability, or communicability of pathogens and the indiscriminate transfer of category A agents to unknown parties. Steinbruner et al., Controlling Dangerous Pathogens.
107. In addition to these proposals, a smaller-scale international effort is also under way. To create industrywide standards that will eliminate the competitive disadvantages of biosecurity compliance, Interpharma (a consortium of Swiss pharmaceutical companies) has devised a collection of best practices for preventing the hostile use of biotechnology. See Interpharma, "Biosafety and Biosecurity - Industry Best Practices to Prevent Misuse of Biohazardous Material," Basel, Switzerland, May 2002.
108. Michael Barletta, Amy Sands, and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax: The Case for a Biosecurity Convention," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58, No. 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 57-62; and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Preventing Terrorist Access to Dangerous Pathogens: The Need for International Standards," Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 66 (September 2002), http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66op2.htm.
109. Michael Barletta, Amy Sands, and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax: The Case for a Biosecurity Convention," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58, No. 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 57-62; and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Preventing Terrorist Access to Dangerous Pathogens: The Need for International Standards," Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 66 (September 2002), http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66op2.htm.
110. Steinbruner et al., Controlling Dangerous Pathogens.
111. "Extremely dangerous" research is currently defined as projects that may create pathogens significantly more dangerous (i.e., lethal, infective, or transmissible) than existing pathogens. Ibid.
112. Tucker, "Preventing Terrorist Access to Dangerous Pathogens." A recent Stimson Center study also found that pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry leaders agreed to the need for an international biosafety standard for biosecurity. See Compliance through Science: U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Experts on a Strengthened Bioweapons Nonproliferation Regime - A Collaborative Research Report of Experts from the U.S. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, Report No. 48 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2002), p. 49.
113. Tucker, "Preventing Terrorist Access to Dangerous Pathogens." A recent Stimson Center study also found that pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry leaders agreed to the need for an international biosafety standard for biosecurity. See Compliance through Science: U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Experts on a Strengthened Bioweapons Nonproliferation Regime - A Collaborative Research Report of Experts from the U.S. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, Report No. 48 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2002), p. 49.