Independence before conservatism: Transparency, politics and central bank design

German Economic Review

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-21

  Hughes Hallet, Andrew ^a   Weymark, Diana N ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank conservatism; Central bank independence; Monetary policy delegation; Policy coherence; Transparency

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; FISCAL POLICY;

EID: 14844322140     PISSN: 14656485     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-6485.2005.00119.x     Document Type: Article

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