Health of electronic communities: An evolutionary game approach

Journal of Management Information Systems

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 83-110

  Geng, Xianjun ^a   Whinston, Andrew B ^b,c   Zhang, Han ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c IC2 Institute   (United States)

^d GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic process; Electronic community; Evolutionary game theory; Trust in e commerce; Trust status

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

DYNAMIC PROCESS; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; TRUST STATUS;

ELECTRONIC COMMUNITIES;

EID: 13944252901     PISSN: 07421222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07421222.2004.11045818     Document Type: Article

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