The Dynamics of the Electronic Market: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Information Systems Frontiers

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 31-40

  Ba, Sulin ^a   Whinston, Andrew B ^b   Zhang, Han ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Electronic market; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Evolutionary game theory; Market evolution; Trusted third party

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034362899     PISSN: 13873326     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010041819361     Document Type: Article

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