Executive pay in Japan: The role of bank-appointed monitors and the main bank relationship

Japan and the World Economy

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 371-394

  Abe, Naohito ^a   Gaston, Noel ^b   Kubo, Katsuyuki ^c  

^a HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b BOND UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^c WASEDA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Agency; Executive pay; Main Bank relationship; Monitoring; Tournaments

Indexed keywords

EID: 13844271158     PISSN: 09221425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2004.03.003     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. Aoki, M., 1994. Monitoring characteristics of the Main Bank System: an analytical and developmental view. In: Aoki, M., Patrick, H. (Eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 109-141
2. Ariga K. Brunello G. Ohkusa Y. Nishiyama Y. Corporate hierarchy, promotion, and firm growth: Japanese internal labor market in transition Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 6 1992 440-471
3. Benston G.J. The self-serving management hypothesis: Some evidence Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 1985 67-84
4. Brander J.A. Poitevin M. Managerial compensation and the agency costs of debt finance Managerial and Decision Economics 13 1992 55-64
5. Coughlan A.T. Schmidt R.M. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 1985 43-66
6. Dye R.A. The trouble with tournaments Economic Inquiry 22 1984 147-149
7. Fershtman C. Judd K.L. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly American Economic Review 77 1987 927-940
8. Freeman R.B. Weitzman M.L. Bonus and employment in Japan Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 1 1987 168-194
9. Garen J.E. Executive compensation and principal-agent theory Journal of Political Economy 102 1994 1175-1199
10. Garvey G.T. Gaston N. A theory of the optimal cost barrier to corporate takeovers International Economic Review 38 1997 657-676
11. Gaston N. Efficiency wages, managerial discretion, and the fear of bankruptcy Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 33 1997 41-59
12. Gibbons, R., Waldman, M., 1999. Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence. In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3b. Elsevier/North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 2373-2437
13. Gorton G., Schmid, F., 2000. Class struggle inside the firm: a study of German codetermination. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2000-025, http://www.stls.frb.org/research/wp /2000-025.html
14. Green J.R. Stokey N.L. A comparison of tournaments and contracts Journal of Political Economy 91 1983 349-364
15. Hanazaki, M., Hachisuka, K., 1997. Kaigin yushi to kigyo no setsubi toshi (Japan Development Bank, loans and firm's investment). In: Asako, K., Otaki, M. (Eds.), Gendai makuro keizaigaku (Contemporary Macroeconomics). University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo
16. Hanazaki M. Horiuchi A. Is Japan's financial system efficient? Oxford Review of Economic Policy 16 2000 61-73
17. Hart, R.A., Kawasaki S., 1999. Work and Pay in Japan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
18. Hashimoto M. Bonus payments, on-the-job training, and lifetime employment in Japan Journal of Political Economy 87 1979 1086-1104
19. Holmström B.R. Moral hazard and observability Bell Journal of Economics 10 1979 74-91
20. Holmström, B.R., Tirole, J., 1989. The theory of the firm. In: Schmalensee, R., Willig, R. (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 61-133
21. Jensen M.C. Meckling W.H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure Journal of Financial Economics 3 1976 305-360
22. Kaplan S.N. Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and the United States Journal of Political Economy 102 1994 510-546
23. Kaplan S.N. Minton B. Appointments of outsiders to Japanese Boards: determinants and implications for managers Journal of Financial Economics 36 1994 225-258
24. Kato T. Chief executive compensation and corporate groups in Japan: New evidence from micro data International Journal of Industrial Organization 15 1997 455-467
25. Ke B. Petroni K. Safieddine A. Ownership concentration and sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures: Evidence from publicly and privately held insurance companies Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 1999 185-209
26. Kubo K. Directors' incentives in Japan and the UK Quarterly Journal of Economic Research 70 2001 228-232
27. Lazear E.P. Pay equality and industrial politics Journal of Political Economy 97 1989 561-580
28. Lazear E.P. Rosen S. Rank-order tournaments as optimal labor contracts Journal of Political Economy 89 1981 841-864
29. Malcomson J.M. Work incentives, hierarchy, and internal labor markets Journal of Political Economy 92 1984 486-507
30. Marcus A.J. Risk sharing and the theory of the firm Bell Journal of Economics 13 1982 369-378
31. Masson R.T. Executive motivations, earnings, and consequent equity performance Journal of Political Economy 79 1971 1278-1292
32. Morck R. Nakamura M. Banks and corporate control in Japan Journal of Finance 54 1999 319-339
33. Morck R. Shleifer A. Vishny R.W. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis Journal of Financial Economics 20 1988 293-315
34. Murphy K.J. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 1985 11-42
35. Murphy, K.J., 1999. Executive compensation. In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3b. Elsevier /North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 2485-2561
36. Nakamura M. Hübler O. The bonus share of flexible pay in Germany, Japan and the US: Some empirical regularities Japan and the World Economy 10 1998 221-232
37. Nakamura M. Nakamura A. Risk behavior and the determinants of bonus versus regular pay in Japan Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 5 1991 140-159
38. Nakatani, I., 1984. The economic role of financial corporate grouping. In: Aoki, M. (Ed.), The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm. Elsevier/North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 227-258
39. O'Flaherty B. Siow A. On the job screening, up or out rules, and firm growth Canadian Journal of Economics 25 1992 346-368
40. O'Flaherty B. Siow A. Up-or-out rules in the market for lawyers Journal of Labor Economics 13 1995 709-733
41. Oi, W.Y., Idson, T.L., 1999. Firm size and wages. In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3b. Elsevier /North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 2165-2214
42. Ono, A., 1989. Nihonteki koyokanko to rodo sijo (Japanese Employment Practices and the Labor Market). Toyo Keizai Inc., Tokyo
43. Rosen S. Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments American Economic Review 76 1986 701-715
44. Sheard P. The Main Bank System and corporate monitoring and control in Japan Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 11 1989 399-422
45. Shleifer A. Vishny R.W. Value maximization and the acquisition process Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 1988 7-20
46. Vancil, R.F., 1987. Passing the Baton: Managing the Process of CEO Succession. Harvard Business Press, Cambridge, MA
47. Weinstein D.E. Yafeh Y.P. Japan's corporate groups: Collusive or competitive Journal of Industrial Economics 43 1995 359-376
48. Weinstein D.E. Yafeh Y.P. On the costs of a bank-centered financial system: Evidence from the changing Main Bank relationship in Japan Journal of Finance 53 1998 635-672
49. Weizman, M., 1984. The Share Economy: Conquering Stagflation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
50. Xu P. Executive salaries as tournament prizes and executive bonuses as managerial incentives in Japan Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 11 1997 319-346