Russia's "ethnic revival": The separatist activism of regional leaders in a postcommunist order

World Politics

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 212-249

  Treisman, Daniel S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ETHNIC REVIVAL; NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE; POST-COMMUNISM; SEPARATISM;

USSR;

EID: 0031421411     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/wp.1997.0006     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
2. The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
3. The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
4. The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
5. The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
6. The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
7. The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
8. The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
9. For instance, Geertz (fn. 1); Michael Banton, "Modelling Ethnic and National Relations," Ethnic and Racial Studies 17 (January 1994).
10. Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter, "A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties," in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., New Nationalisms of the Developed West (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), esp. 134-36. Much work on this subject draws on Tilly's theory of resource mobilization; see Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Englewood Hills, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1978).
11. Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter, "A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties," in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., New Nationalisms of the Developed West (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), esp. 134-36. Much work on this subject draws on Tilly's theory of resource mobilization; see Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Englewood Hills, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1978).
12. For example, V. P. Gagnon Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95); Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
13. For example, V. P. Gagnon Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95); Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
14. I use the term "separatist" in this article to refer to leaders who make demands along this spectrum - not necessarily to those who overtly desire complete independence for their ethnic region.
15. See, for instance, Steven L. Solnick, "Federal Bargaining in Russia," East European Constitutional Review 4 (Fall 1995).
16. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42 (Summer 1988).
17. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42 (Summer 1988).
18. Gellner, "Nationalism in a Vacuum," in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).
19. Geertz (fn. 1); Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
20. Geertz (fn. 1), 109-10.
21. See Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern (New York: Random House, 1990), 142; Jacques Rupnik, "Europe's New Frontiers: Remapping Europe," Daedalus 123 (Summer 1994), 95.
22. See Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern (New York: Random House, 1990), 142; Jacques Rupnik, "Europe's New Frontiers: Remapping Europe," Daedalus 123 (Summer 1994), 95.
23. On "pressure cooker" theories, see Branko Milanovic, "Why Have Communist Federations Collapsed?" Challenge 37 (March-April 1994).
24. Nathan Gardels, "Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin," New York Review of Books, November 21, 1991.
25. George Schöpflin, "Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction," Daedalus 123 (Summer 1994), 137.
26. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," Journal of International Affairs 27 (January 1973).
27. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," Journal of International Affairs 27 (January 1973).
28. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," Problems of Communism 23 (May-June 1974).
29. For an example of the first type of argument, see Deutsch (fn. 1).
30. Douglass North has argued that increasing returns to scale and sunk capital lead to a retention of organizations even after their original purposes are superseded; North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). This seems to lie behind many discussions of "competitive" ethnonationalism in developing African states; see, e.g., Bates (fn. 1), who notes that, "in contemporary Africa, the levels of ethnic competition and modernization covary" (p. 152). See also Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
31. Douglass North has argued that increasing returns to scale and sunk capital lead to a retention of organizations even after their original purposes are superseded; North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). This seems to lie behind many discussions of "competitive" ethnonationalism in developing African states; see, e.g., Bates (fn. 1), who notes that, "in contemporary Africa, the levels of ethnic competition and modernization covary" (p. 152). See also Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
32. Charles C. Ragin, "Ethnic Political Mobilization: The Welsh Case," American Sociological Review 44 (August 1979). Rogowski terms this "reactive" nationalism; see the helpful discussion in Ronald Rogowski, "Conclusion," inTiryakian and Rogowski (fn. 3).
33. Hechter (fn. 1).
34. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970), 1116.
35. Rothschild (fn. 18), 2.
36. Horowitz (fn. 1), 233.
37. Gurr (fn. 4), 82.
38. Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World Politics 43 (January 1991), 197; see also Kisangani N. Emizet and Vicki L. Hesli, "The Disposition to Secede: An Analysis of the Soviet Case," Comparative Political Studies 27, no. 4 (1995).
39. Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World Politics 43 (January 1991), 197; see also Kisangani N. Emizet and Vicki L. Hesli, "The Disposition to Secede: An Analysis of the Soviet Case," Comparative Political Studies 27, no. 4 (1995).
40. Horowitz (fn. 1). The use of the adjectives "advanced" and "backward" here is not intended to imply any favorable or pejorative evaluation; they are chosen simply to address a literature that uses these specific terms.
41. Donald L. Horowitz, "How to Begin Thinking Comparatively about Soviet Ethnic Problems," in Motyl (fn. 8), 9-22, esp. 16-17.
42. Banton (fn. 2), 14.
43. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993).
44. Richard Jay, "Nationalism, Federalism and Ireland," in Murray Forsyth, ed., federalism and Nationalism (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1989).
45. In Russia, for instance, the Muslim and Buddhist nationalities and those with higher rates of retention of the native language might be expected to mobilize more quickly for autonomy than Orthodox Christian and more linguistically assimilated nationalities.
46. Cf. Horowitz (fn. 1), 267: "The strength of a secessionist movement and the heterogeneity of its region are inversely related." Emizet and Hesli find that this was true of Soviet republics in the late 1980s: the concentration of a nationality in its own republic was "a powerful indicator of the disposition to secede"; Emizet and Hesli (fn. 26), 530.
47. I do not mean to imply too sharp a division between consciousness of cultural identities and organization for collective action. Often the cultural markers around which organizations form are themselves created by those who seek to mobilize groups for collective action; see Paul Brass, Religion and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 27; and E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). However, various scholars have drawn a similar distinction between markers and mobilization. Subrata Mitra, for instance, distinguishes between the "social anchors" necessary to define a cultural nationalist movement and the mobilization of such a movement around them; see Mitra, "The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science 25 (January 1995), 64. And Rothschild argues that political entrepreneurs mobilize ethnicity from "a psychological or cultural or social datum" into "political leverage for the purpose of altering or reinforcing ... systems of structured inequality between and among ethnic categories"; see Rothschild (fn. 18), 2.
48. I do not mean to imply too sharp a division between consciousness of cultural identities and organization for collective action. Often the cultural markers around which organizations form are themselves created by those who seek to mobilize groups for collective action; see Paul Brass, Religion and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 27; and E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). However, various scholars have drawn a similar distinction between markers and mobilization. Subrata Mitra, for instance, distinguishes between the "social anchors" necessary to define a cultural nationalist movement and the mobilization of such a movement around them; see Mitra, "The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science 25 (January 1995), 64. And Rothschild argues that political entrepreneurs mobilize ethnicity from "a psychological or cultural or social datum" into "political leverage for the purpose of altering or reinforcing ... systems of structured inequality between and among ethnic categories"; see Rothschild (fn. 18), 2.
49. I do not mean to imply too sharp a division between consciousness of cultural identities and organization for collective action. Often the cultural markers around which organizations form are themselves created by those who seek to mobilize groups for collective action; see Paul Brass, Religion and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 27; and E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). However, various scholars have drawn a similar distinction between markers and mobilization. Subrata Mitra, for instance, distinguishes between the "social anchors" necessary to define a cultural nationalist movement and the mobilization of such a movement around them; see Mitra, "The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science 25 (January 1995), 64. And Rothschild argues that political entrepreneurs mobilize ethnicity from "a psychological or cultural or social datum" into "political leverage for the purpose of altering or reinforcing ... systems of structured inequality between and among ethnic categories"; see Rothschild (fn. 18), 2.
50. Roeder (fn. 25), 228.
51. The center's "inside option" must be less attractive than that of the region; see Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 76.
52. There is a temporal assymetry that enables regions which in fact do not wish to secede and who cannot therefore credibly threaten actually to implement such an action to force concessions from the center by merely making the announcement - since it is the announcement that, if unrepealed or unpunished, will lower the perceived risk for imitators.
53. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993).
54. See Hudson Meadwell, "Transitions to Independence and Ethnic Nationalist Mobilization," in William J. Booth, Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell, eds., Politics and Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 191-92; Michael Hechter, "The Dynamics of Secession," Acta Sociologica 35 (Winter 1992), 267.
55. See Hudson Meadwell, "Transitions to Independence and Ethnic Nationalist Mobilization," in William J. Booth, Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell, eds., Politics and Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 191-92; Michael Hechter, "The Dynamics of Secession," Acta Sociologica 35 (Winter 1992), 267.
56. Horowitz suggests the example of the Iraqi Kurds, who pressed for autonomy rather than full independence in part so as not to antagonize the Iranian regime, from which they had received support in the 1970s; see Horowitz (fn. 1), 231-32.
57. Donald Rothchild, "Collective Demands for Improved Distributions," in Rothchild and Olorunsola (fn. 1), 174.
58. Horowitz (fn. 1), 232.
59. Another study that classifies peripheral movements on a continuum of declared aims is Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin, Economy, Territory, Identity (London: Sage Publications, 1983), 140-41.
60. Emizet and Hesli (fn. 25), 505-8; Mark Whitehouse, "Ethnic Competition and the Development of Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Three Russian Republics" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995).
61. Either the region's supreme soviet, supreme soviet chairman, or president.
62. Included here are only those ethnic regions for which a report existed of a unilateral assertion of higher status by the ethnic region's authorities. In July 1991 the Russian supreme soviet ratified the increase in status of Adygeia, Gorno-Altai, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Khakassia from autonomous oblasts to republics. But each of these had already demanded such a change unilaterally. In June 1992 the supreme soviet also declared Ingushetia to be a republic; since I could find no record of a prior assertion of republic status by authorities in Ingushetia, it was coded zero.
63. This conclusion might be weakened if an ethnic region's administrative status were itself determined by primordial ethnic factors. Available secondary sources reveal few specifics about how such administrative status distinctions emerged. But it is known that most of the distinctions that existed in 1990, at the onset of the "ethnic revival," were essentially fixed in the early postrevolutionary years of the 1920s and the early 1930s. As of 1936 fifteen ethnic regions were ASSRs, five were autonomous oblasts, and others were autonomous okrugs; see Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 33. In 1990 the same fifteen were republics and the same five autonomus oblasts. The only change among these categories was that Tyva, which had been an independent state under Moscow's tutelage until 1944, had been incorporated into Russia as an ASSR (after a period as an autonomous oblast). Thus, whether it was primordial or other factors that accounted for administrative status, it was primordial factors as of the 1920s or 1930s. Many primordial factors had, however, changed in the intervening years. For instance, while the number of Ossetians in the RSFSR more than doubled between 1937 and 1989, the number of Karelians dropped by 46 percent; see Chauncy D. Harris, "A Geographic Analysis of Non-Russian Minorities in Russia and Its Ethnic Homelands," Post-Soviet Geography 34, no. 9 (1993). In-migration has drastically changed the concentration of various nationalities in their homelands. While some ethnic populations have in large part retained their national language (98 or 99 percent of Tyvans, Karachai, Kabards, Chechens, Ingush, and many of the nationalities of Dagestan reported the ethnic language to be their mother tongue in 1989), others have assimilated linguistically to Russian (only 49 percent of Karels in 1989 considered Karelian their mother tongue, less than the percentage among many nationalities of the autonomous okrugs). Decisions on administrative status in the early postrevolution years were highly centralized. Thus, "Autonomy was granted in each case by a unilateral decision of the central authority"; see E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 329. Some of the new ASSRs appeared to have strong primordial claims to such status; but others did not. About Siberia, Carr writes of "primitive native tribes . . . scattered over vast, thinly populated areas" with "no effective nationalist or separatist movements" (p. 350). Still, Buryat-Mongolia became an autonomous republic in 1923, and the vast Yakut territory was recognized as an autonomous republic in 1922. Second, statistical attempts to isolate the influence of administrative status from the possible influence of other factors correlated with such status suggest that it is administrative status per se that best explains the variation in activism. Republics might in theory be more prone to separatism because they have larger or more dense populations, higher concentrations of the titular - or more broadly of non-Russian-nationalities, more extensive schooling in native languages, more industrialized economies, or more organized separatist movements. One way to test whether the administrative status variable is picking up such spurious correlations is to run regressions of the separatist activism index on administrative status, adding these other potential explanatory factors and observing whether the estimated coefficient on the administrative status variable changes. When I did this, the administrative status variable remained significant in all cases, and the estimated coefficient (3.9 when no control variables are included) changed little in most cases, and in the most extreme case (controlling for regional population) fell only to 2.4. Viewing the evidence in light of these considerations, the most plausible conclusion is that administrative status itself, independent of primordial or other factors, played a significant role in determining the separatist activism of an ethnic region's leadership.
64. This conclusion might be weakened if an ethnic region's administrative status were itself determined by primordial ethnic factors. Available secondary sources reveal few specifics about how such administrative status distinctions emerged. But it is known that most of the distinctions that existed in 1990, at the onset of the "ethnic revival," were essentially fixed in the early postrevolutionary years of the 1920s and the early 1930s. As of 1936 fifteen ethnic regions were ASSRs, five were autonomous oblasts, and others were autonomous okrugs; see Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 33. In 1990 the same fifteen were republics and the same five autonomus oblasts. The only change among these categories was that Tyva, which had been an independent state under Moscow's tutelage until 1944, had been incorporated into Russia as an ASSR (after a period as an autonomous oblast). Thus, whether it was primordial or other factors that accounted for administrative status, it was primordial factors as of the 1920s or 1930s. Many primordial factors had, however, changed in the intervening years. For instance, while the number of Ossetians in the RSFSR more than doubled between 1937 and 1989, the number of Karelians dropped by 46 percent; see Chauncy D. Harris, "A Geographic Analysis of Non-Russian Minorities in Russia and Its Ethnic Homelands," Post-Soviet Geography 34, no. 9 (1993). In-migration has drastically changed the concentration of various nationalities in their homelands. While some ethnic populations have in large part retained their national language (98 or 99 percent of Tyvans, Karachai, Kabards, Chechens, Ingush, and many of the nationalities of Dagestan reported the ethnic language to be their mother tongue in 1989), others have assimilated linguistically to Russian (only 49 percent of Karels in 1989 considered Karelian their mother tongue, less than the percentage among many nationalities of the autonomous okrugs). Decisions on administrative status in the early postrevolution years were highly centralized. Thus, "Autonomy was granted in each case by a unilateral decision of the central authority"; see E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 329. Some of the new ASSRs appeared to have strong primordial claims to such status; but others did not. About Siberia, Carr writes of "primitive native tribes . . . scattered over vast, thinly populated areas" with "no effective nationalist or separatist movements" (p. 350). Still, Buryat-Mongolia became an autonomous republic in 1923, and the vast Yakut territory was recognized as an autonomous republic in 1922. Second, statistical attempts to isolate the influence of administrative status from the possible influence of other factors correlated with such status suggest that it is administrative status per se that best explains the variation in activism. Republics might in theory be more prone to separatism because they have larger or more dense populations, higher concentrations of the titular - or more broadly of non-Russian-nationalities, more extensive schooling in native languages, more industrialized economies, or more organized separatist movements. One way to test whether the administrative status variable is picking up such spurious correlations is to run regressions of the separatist activism index on administrative status, adding these other potential explanatory factors and observing whether the estimated coefficient on the administrative status variable changes. When I did this, the administrative status variable remained significant in all cases, and the estimated coefficient (3.9 when no control variables are included) changed little in most cases, and in the most extreme case (controlling for regional population) fell only to 2.4. Viewing the evidence in light of these considerations, the most plausible conclusion is that administrative status itself, independent of primordial or other factors, played a significant role in determining the separatist activism of an ethnic region's leadership.
65. This conclusion might be weakened if an ethnic region's administrative status were itself determined by primordial ethnic factors. Available secondary sources reveal few specifics about how such administrative status distinctions emerged. But it is known that most of the distinctions that existed in 1990, at the onset of the "ethnic revival," were essentially fixed in the early postrevolutionary years of the 1920s and the early 1930s. As of 1936 fifteen ethnic regions were ASSRs, five were autonomous oblasts, and others were autonomous okrugs; see Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 33. In 1990 the same fifteen were republics and the same five autonomus oblasts. The only change among these categories was that Tyva, which had been an independent state under Moscow's tutelage until 1944, had been incorporated into Russia as an ASSR (after a period as an autonomous oblast). Thus, whether it was primordial or other factors that accounted for administrative status, it was primordial factors as of the 1920s or 1930s. Many primordial factors had, however, changed in the intervening years. For instance, while the number of Ossetians in the RSFSR more than doubled between 1937 and 1989, the number of Karelians dropped by 46 percent; see Chauncy D. Harris, "A Geographic Analysis of Non-Russian Minorities in Russia and Its Ethnic Homelands," Post-Soviet Geography 34, no. 9 (1993). In-migration has drastically changed the concentration of various nationalities in their homelands. While some ethnic populations have in large part retained their national language (98 or 99 percent of Tyvans, Karachai, Kabards, Chechens, Ingush, and many of the nationalities of Dagestan reported the ethnic language to be their mother tongue in 1989), others have assimilated linguistically to Russian (only 49 percent of Karels in 1989 considered Karelian their mother tongue, less than the percentage among many nationalities of the autonomous okrugs). Decisions on administrative status in the early postrevolution years were highly centralized. Thus, "Autonomy was granted in each case by a unilateral decision of the central authority"; see E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 329. Some of the new ASSRs appeared to have strong primordial claims to such status; but others did not. About Siberia, Carr writes of "primitive native tribes . . . scattered over vast, thinly populated areas" with "no effective nationalist or separatist movements" (p. 350). Still, Buryat-Mongolia became an autonomous republic in 1923, and the vast Yakut territory was recognized as an autonomous republic in 1922. Second, statistical attempts to isolate the influence of administrative status from the possible influence of other factors correlated with such status suggest that it is administrative status per se that best explains the variation in activism. Republics might in theory be more prone to separatism because they have larger or more dense populations, higher concentrations of the titular - or more broadly of non-Russian-nationalities, more extensive schooling in native languages, more industrialized economies, or more organized separatist movements. One way to test whether the administrative status variable is picking up such spurious correlations is to run regressions of the separatist activism index on administrative status, adding these other potential explanatory factors and observing whether the estimated coefficient on the administrative status variable changes. When I did this, the administrative status variable remained significant in all cases, and the estimated coefficient (3.9 when no control variables are included) changed little in most cases, and in the most extreme case (controlling for regional population) fell only to 2.4. Viewing the evidence in light of these considerations, the most plausible conclusion is that administrative status itself, independent of primordial or other factors, played a significant role in determining the separatist activism of an ethnic region's leadership.
66. The difference was significant at the .01 level.
67. This difference was, however, only significant at the .06 level.
68. Because of data limitations, figures used here were for the 1989 urbanization rate of the particular nationality within the USSR, not just Russia.
69. For instance, despite a population more than twice as rural as the Russians, Buryats had a 50 percent higher rate of completion of higher education, according to the 1989 census.
70. The mean score for "advanced" populations in "backward" regions was also significantly higher than that for "backward" nationalities in "advanced" regions.
71. This was the case whether all ethnic regions or just 1990 republics were included. Note, however, the multivariate results presented in Table 10.
72. The mean separatism score for ethnic regions with a nationalist militia was significantly higher than for others in both cases.
73. A region's leader is taken to be the president or head of executive in republics and the head of administration in the AOs. This, of course, simplifies the more complicated balance of power in most regions.
74. The one exception is Ingushetia's General Aushev, who was first appointed by Yeltsin and then elected president.
75. This was true whether one considered all thirty-two ethnic regions or only the sixteen 1990 republics.
76. This was not significant, though, when the 1990 republics were considered separately.
77. This may, of course, be due to the sharp drop in available cases when these factors are added.
78. One interesting explanation suggested by an anonymous referee was that regional leaders might have felt more secure playing chicken with the center if they had a sizable Russian population that could be held hostage.
79. Toomas Alatalu, "Tuva - a State Reawakens," Soviet Studies 44, no. 5 (1992), 890.
80. Harris (fn. 46), 584.
81. Alatalu (fn. 60), 892.
82. Stefan Sullivan, "Interethnic Relations in Post-Soviet Tuva," Ethnic and Racial Studies 18, no. 1 (1995).
83. Segondnya, June 17, 1994, p. 2, trans. in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 46, no. 24 (1994), 18.
84. Segondnya, June 17, 1994, p. 2, trans. in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 46, no. 24 (1994), 18.
85. For a more detailed analysis of Russian center-region relations, in which strategies of both ethnic and nonethnic regions are considered in parallel, see Daniel Treisman, "After the Deluge: The Politics of Regional Crisis in Post-Soviet Russia" (Manuscript, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1996).
86. Author's interview with Yuri N. Blokhin, first deputy head of administration, Tambov Oblast Tambov, June 16, 1996.
87. See, in particular, Bates (fn. 1); also Rothschild (fn. 18).
88. On the role of such protests in India, see Subrata K. Mitra, Power, Protest and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in India (London: Routledge, 1992).
89. Treisman found that, in 1992, Russian regions which had declared sovereignty early on were on average rewarded with nearly 19,000 rubles per inhabitant in central fiscal transfers and tax breaks. See Daniel Treisman, "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia," British Journal of Political Science (July 1996). Treisman has also modeled why it might often be rational for a central government to appease such separatist regional leaders; see Treisman, "Crises and Stability in Federal States: A Game Theoretic Analysis" (Manuscript, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1995).
90. Treisman found that, in 1992, Russian regions which had declared sovereignty early on were on average rewarded with nearly 19,000 rubles per inhabitant in central fiscal transfers and tax breaks. See Daniel Treisman, "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia," British Journal of Political Science (July 1996). Treisman has also modeled why it might often be rational for a central government to appease such separatist regional leaders; see Treisman, "Crises and Stability in Federal States: A Game Theoretic Analysis" (Manuscript, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1995).
91. The contrasting cases of "highway crashes" in ethnic relations, such as Chechnya, merely highlight the general trend of negotiated compromise between center and ethnic regions.
92. Emizet and Hesli (fn. 25); Roeder (fn. 25).