After neoliberalism: The politics of reregulation in Mexico

World Politics

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 173-204

  Snyder, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC REFORM; NEOLIBERALISM; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

MEXICO;

EID: 0032907787     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100008169     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. Jonathan Fox, "Political Change in Mexico's New Peasant Economy," in Maria Lorena Cook et al., eds., The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994); and Wayne A. Cornelius and David Myhre, eds., The Transformation of Rural Mexico: Reforming the Ejido Sector (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1998).
2. Jonathan Fox, "Political Change in Mexico's New Peasant Economy," in Maria Lorena Cook et al., eds., The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994); and Wayne A. Cornelius and David Myhre, eds., The Transformation of Rural Mexico: Reforming the Ejido Sector (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1998).
3. Gabriela Ejea and Luis Hernández, eds., Cafetaleros: La construcción de la autonomía (Mexico City: Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras, 1991); and Horacio Santoyo Cortés et al., Sistema agroindustrial café en México: diagnóstico, problemática y alternativas (Chapingo, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, 1994).
4. Gabriela Ejea and Luis Hernández, eds., Cafetaleros: La construcción de la autonomía (Mexico City: Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras, 1991); and Horacio Santoyo Cortés et al., Sistema agroindustrial café en México: diagnóstico, problemática y alternativas (Chapingo, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, 1994).
5. Mexico is a federal system with thirty-one states.
6. See, for example, Joan M. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, eds., Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1993).
7. See, for example, Joan M. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, eds., Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1993).
8. See Joan M. Nelson, "Conclusions," in Nelson (fn. 4).
9. Miles Kahler "Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to Stabilization and Adjustment," in Nelson (fn. 4).
10. Thomas M. Callaghy, "Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria," in Nelson (fn. 4); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
11. Thomas M. Callaghy, "Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria," in Nelson (fn. 4); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
12. Thomas M. Callaghy, "Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria," in Nelson (fn. 4); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
13. Kahler (fn. 6); Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); John Waterbury, "The Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 310-14.
14. Kahler (fn. 6); Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); John Waterbury, "The Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 310-14.
15. Kahler (fn. 6); Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); John Waterbury, "The Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 310-14.
16. Kahler (fn. 6); Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); John Waterbury, "The Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process," in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 310-14.
17. Chile is a notable exception. See Alejandro Foxley, Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
18. On reregulation in advanced industrial countries, see Michael Moran, The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution: The U.S.A., U.K., and Japan (New York: St. Martin's, 1991); and Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
19. On reregulation in advanced industrial countries, see Michael Moran, The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution: The U.S.A., U.K., and Japan (New York: St. Martin's, 1991); and Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
20. According to Vogel (fn. 10), the "core agenda of regulatory reform" consists of efforts by bureaucrats to generate revenue and design new mechanisms for policy implementation (p. 19).
21. Roger G. Noll, "Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 2 (New York: North-Holland, 1989); Robert H. Bates, "The Nature and Origins of Agricultural Policies in Africa," in Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
22. Roger G. Noll, "Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 2 (New York: North-Holland, 1989); Robert H. Bates, "The Nature and Origins of Agricultural Policies in Africa," in Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
23. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
24. Bates (fn. 12), 131.
25. Ruth Berins Collier, The Contradictory Alliance: State-Labor Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute for International and Area Studies, 1992); Katrina Burgess, "Alliances under Stress: Economic Reform and Party-Labor Relations in Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1997); and Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Between a Shock and a Hard Place: The Dynamics of Labor-Backed Adjustments in Poland and Argentina," Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 (1998).
26. Ruth Berins Collier, The Contradictory Alliance: State-Labor Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute for International and Area Studies, 1992); Katrina Burgess, "Alliances under Stress: Economic Reform and Party-Labor Relations in Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1997); and Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Between a Shock and a Hard Place: The Dynamics of Labor-Backed Adjustments in Poland and Argentina," Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 (1998).
27. Ruth Berins Collier, The Contradictory Alliance: State-Labor Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute for International and Area Studies, 1992); Katrina Burgess, "Alliances under Stress: Economic Reform and Party-Labor Relations in Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1997); and Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Between a Shock and a Hard Place: The Dynamics of Labor-Backed Adjustments in Poland and Argentina," Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 (1998).
28. The term "soft state" is from Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), 66.
29. My efforts to develop a multilevel analysis of policy choice are influenced by Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
30. My efforts to develop a multilevel analysis of policy choice are influenced by Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
31. David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 402-3.
32. George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 3 (1995).
33. Such centralized regimes are exemplified by delegative and majoritarian democracies. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5 (January 1994); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
34. Such centralized regimes are exemplified by delegative and majoritarian democracies. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5 (January 1994); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
35. David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
36. On ideas and policy-making, see Peter A. Hall, "The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
37. See, for example, Barbara Geddes, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Sergio Zermeño, "Crisis, Neoliberalism, and Disorder," in Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig, eds., Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
38. See, for example, Barbara Geddes, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Sergio Zermeño, "Crisis, Neoliberalism, and Disorder," in Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig, eds., Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
39. Of course, politicians often try to anticipate how societal actors will respond to their policy choices, especially if regime institutions give them incentives to attend to societal interests. Hence, even in the absence of organized societal pressures, political incumbents may try to incorporate societal preferences into their policy decisions.
40. Between 1970 and 1989 coffee averaged 5.1 percent of the total value of Mexico's exports and 34 percent of the total value of agricultural exports. Approximately three million Mexicans depend on income from coffee production. See Santoyo Cortés et al. (fn. 2).
41. Small producers have less than twenty hectares of land (or approximately fifty acres).
42. See Richard Snyder, "After the State Withdraws: Neoliberalism and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes in Mexico," in Wayne A. Cornelius et al., eds., Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, forthcoming).
43. Carlos Martínez Assad and Alvaro Arreola Ayala, "El poder de los gobernadores," in Soledad Loaeza and Rafael Segovia, eds., La vida política mexicana en la crisis (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1987).
44. Wayne A. Cornelius, Mexican Politics in Transition: The Breakdown of a One-Party Dominant Regime (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1996).
45. Manuel González Oropeza, La intervención federal en la desaparición de poderes, 2d ed. (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1987); and Alba Teresa Estrada Castañón, Guerrero: sociedad, economía, política, cultura (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1994), 75.
46. Manuel González Oropeza, La intervención federal en la desaparición de poderes, 2d ed. (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1987); and Alba Teresa Estrada Castañón, Guerrero: sociedad, economía, política, cultura (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1994), 75.
47. The term "electoral connection" is from Mayhew (fn. 21).
48. Santoyo Cortés et al. (fn. 2), 25-30. This group comprises farmers with more than twenty hectares.
49. Export quotas were part of the International Coffee Organization's (ICO) regulatory regime, See Robert H. Bates, Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
50. Ejea and Hernández (fn. 2).
51. See Roderic Ai Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1993 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 575.
52. The concept of "social liberalism" was in vogue at the national level after 1988. See Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico, 2d ed. (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997), 205-10.
53. Del Oaxaca mágico al encuentro con la modernidad: Seis años de transformación y desarrollo, 1986-1992, marco legislativo (Oaxaca: Government of Oaxaca, 1992), 18.
54. Ibid., 45-46.
55. Fausto Cantú Peña, "Proyecto de ley para el fomento y desarrollo integral de la cafeticultura en el estado de Oaxaca," in Primer encuentro estatal de estudio, analisis y capacitación sobre cafeticultura (Oaxaca: Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural, 1989).
56. On the complex meanings of modernization among Mexican political elites, see Centeno (fn. 36), chap. 7.
57. Neil Harvey, "Rebellion in Chiapas: Rural Reforms, Campesino Radicalism, and the Limits to Salinismo" (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994).
58. Sergio Mota Marín, "Estructura económica de Chiapas," in María Luisa Armendáriz, ed., Chiapas, una radiografía (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994), 338-39.
59. Government of Chiapas, "1a. reunión del Subcomite Especial de Producción y Comercialización del Café: Minuta de trabajo" (Tuxtla Gutierrez, March 7, 1989).
60. Author interviews with leaders of coffee producer organizations, Chiapas, November 1995.
61. See Richard Snyder, "Reconstructing Institutions for Market Governance: Participatory Policy Regimes in Mexico's Coffee Sector," in Richard Snyder, ed., Institutional Adaption and Innovation in Rural Mexico (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, forthcoming).
62. Attempting to defeat the crony capitalist project would have been extremely costly for the small producers, given the state government's coercive capacities and demonstrated willingness to represent peasants. On state government repression in Chiapas, see Harvey (fn. 41).
63. On the Zapatista uprising, see Harvey (fn. 41).
64. See Jonas Pontusson, The Limits of Social Democracy: Investment Politics in Sweden (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 8), 340-45.
65. See Jonas Pontusson, The Limits of Social Democracy: Investment Politics in Sweden (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 8), 340-45.
66. On "state corporatism," see Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" Review of Politics 36 (January 1974).
67. In his study of rural food provision, Fox calls this the "sandwich strategy"; see Jonathan Fox, The Politics of Food in Mexico: State Power and Social Mobilization (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
68. It bears emphasis that neoliberal reforms may result in the hegemony of new, rather than traditional, elites, as illustrated by the nontraditional oligarchies that have recently emerged in Russia and other former communist countries of Europe and Central Asia.
69. Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 8), 9, 156-59. For an argument that this pattern of costs and benefits does not fit the post-Soviet context, see Joel S. Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," World Politics 50 (January 1998).
70. Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 8), 9, 156-59. For an argument that this pattern of costs and benefits does not fit the post-Soviet context, see Joel S. Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," World Politics 50 (January 1998).
71. The term "change teams" is from Waterbury (fn. 8), 191.
72. See, for example, Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
73. See, for example, Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
74. See, for example, Nelson (fn. 4), 23; Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 8); and Geddes (fn. 23).
75. See, for example, Nelson (fn. 4), 23; Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 8); and Geddes (fn. 23).
76. See, for example, Nelson (fn. 4), 23; Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 8); and Geddes (fn. 23).
77. "Whole-nation bias" is discussed in Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," Comparative Political Studies 8 (July 1975), 166-69.
78. On subnational comparisons, see Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); and Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 219-23.
79. On subnational comparisons, see Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); and Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 219-23.
80. See, for example, Interamerican Development Bank, "Fiscal Decentralization: The Search for Equity and Efficiency," in Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1994 Report (Washington, D.C.: Interamerican Development Bank, 1994).
81. See, for example, Callaghy (fn. 7); and Nelson (fn. 5).
82. See, for example, Callaghy (fn. 7); and Nelson (fn. 5).