The subnational politics of economic adjustment: Provincial politics and fiscal performance in Argentina

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 419-451

  Remmer, Karen L ^a   Wibbels, Erik ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034394059     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414000033004001     Document Type: Article

References (92)

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