From Linz to Tsebelis: Three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies?

Democratization

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 106-122

  Elgie, Robert ^a  

^a DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY   (Ireland)

Author keywords

Democratic consolidation; Governance; Parliamentarism; Political science; Presidentialism

Indexed keywords

GOVERNANCE APPROACH; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

EID: 13344277987     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1351034042000317989     Document Type: Review

References (112)

1. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: C.A. Watts and Co. Ltd., 1964 (original 1867));
2. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1885).
3. Don K. Price, 'The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems', Public Administration Review, Vol.3, No.4 (1943), pp.317-34;
4. Harold J. Laski, 'The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems', Public Administration Review, Vol.4, No.4 (1944), pp.347-59.
5. Bruce Ackerman, 'The New Separation of Powers', Harvard Law Review Vol.113, No.3 (2000), pp.634-729.
6. For example, Fred W. Riggs, 'The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-constitutional Practices', International Political Science Review, Vol.9, No.4 (1988), pp.247-78.
7. Juan J. Linz, 'The Perils of Presidentialism', Journal of Democracy Vol.1, No.1 (1990), pp.51-69;
8. Juan J. Linz, 'The Virtues of Parliamentarism', Journal of Democracy Vol.1, No.4 (1990), pp.84-91.
9. Donald L. Horowitz, 'Comparing Democratic Systems', Journal of Democracy, Vol.1, No.4 (1990), pp.73-9.
10. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
11. Scott Mainwaring, 'Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy. The Difficult Combination', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.26, No.2 (190), pp.198-228;
12. Arend Lijphart, 'Constitutional Design for Divided Societies', Journal of Democracy, Vol.15, No.2 (2004), pp.96-109.
13. George Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.25 (1995), pp.289-325.
14. George Tsebelis, Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
15. Kaare Strøom, 'Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.37 (2000), pp.261-89;
16. Kaare Strøom, 'Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation', in Kaare Ström, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (eds), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.55-106.
17. B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science. The 'New Institutionalism' (London: Pinter, 1999).
18. Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism' (note 5), and Linz, The 'New Institutionalism' (London: Pinter, 1999).
19. Juan J. Linz, 'Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?', in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp.3-87.
20. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation. Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism', World Politics, Vol.46 (1993), pp.1-22.
21. Timothy J. Power and Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.2 (1997), pp.123-55.
22. For example, Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (London: Macmillan, 1994).
23. Juan J. Linz, 'The Perils of Presidentialism' (note 5), p.51.
24. Ibid., p. 52.
25. Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy' (note 12). p.5.
26. I b i d.
27. Ibid., p.6.
28. I b i d.
29. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy. A Critical Appraisal', Comparative Politics, Vol.29, No.4 (1997), pp.449-71.
30. Juan J. Linz, 'The Perils of Presidentialism' (note 5), p.52.
31. Juan J. Linz, 'Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy' (note 12), p.70.
32. Fred W. Riggs, 'Conceptual Homogenization of a Heterogeneous Field', in Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil (eds), Comparing Nations. Concepts, Strategies, Substance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p.72.
33. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach (note 13), p.22
34. Ibid., p.17.
35. Ibid., p. 18.
36. Ibid., p.22.
37. Timothy J. Power and Mark J. Gasiorowski (note 14), p. 123.
38. Giovanni Sartori (note 15).
39. Robert Elgie (ed.), Semi-presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
40. idem., 'Semi-presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations', Political Studies Review, Vol.2, No.3 (2004), pp.314-30.
41. Juan J. Linz, 'Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy' (note 12), p.55.
42. Donald L. Horowitz (note 6), p.74.
43. Ibid., p.79 (emphasis original).
44. Juan J. Linz, 'The Virtues of Parliamentarism' (note 5), p.84 (emphasis original).
45. Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey (note 7);
46. Scott Mainwaring, 'Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy' (note 7).
47. Scott Mainwaring, 'Presidentialism in Latin America', Latin American Research Review, Vol.25, No.1 (1990), p. 168.
48. Scott Mainwaring, 'Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy' (note 7), p.205.
49. Ibid., p.207.
50. Ibid., p.212.
51. Ibid., pp.212-13.
52. Ibid., p.223.
53. Ibid., p. 199.
54. Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey (note 7), p. 1.
55. I b i d.
56. Ibid., p.156.
57. Ibid., p.165.
58. Ibid., p.283.
59. Ibid., p. 160.
60. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy' (note 22), p.463.
61. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 394-439.
62. José Antonio Chelbub and Fernando Limongi, 'Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered', Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.5 (2002), pp. 151-79.
63. Ibid., pp.175-6.
64. Ibid., p.176.
65. For example, Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
66. Arend Lijphart, 'Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations', in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp.91-105.
67. Arend Lijphart, 'The Virtues of Parliamentarism: But Which Kind of Parliamentarism?', in H.E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan (eds), Politics, Society and Democracy. Comparative Studies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp.363-73.
68. Arend Lijphart, 'Constitutional Design for Divided Societies' (note 7).
69. Ibid., p. 102.
70. For example, Scott Mainwaring, 'Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy' (note 7)
71. and Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy' (note 22).
72. Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey (note 7).
73. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy' (note 22), p.469.
74. R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, 'When and How do Institutions Matter?', in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (eds), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p.446.
75. R. Kent Weaver aod Bert A. Rockman, 'Assessing the Effects of Institutions', in Weaver and Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? (note 64), p.4.
76. Ibid., p.5.
77. Ibid., p.6.
78. I b i d.
79. Kent Eaton, 'Parliamentarism and Presidentialism in the Policy Arena', Comparative Politics, Vol.32, No.3 (2002), p.355.
80. Matthew Soberg Shugart, 'Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-developed Countries', Constitutional Political Economy, Vol.10 (1999), p.54.
81. Ibid., p.84.
82. Ibid., p.54.
83. Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Introduction. Political institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy', in Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins (eds), Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.4.
84. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
85. Ibid., p. 10.
86. Matthew Soberg Shugart and Stephan Haggard, 'Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems', in Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins (eds), Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.101.
87. I b i d.
88. George Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems' (note 8).
89. For example, George Tsebelis, Veto Players (note 9);
90. Kaare Strøm, 'Delegation and Accountability' (note 9);
91. Kaare Strøm, 'Parliamentary Democracy' (note 9).
92. George Tsebelis, Veto Players (note 9).
93. Ibid., p.19.
94. Ibid., p.2.
95. Respectively, George Tsebelis and Xenophon Yataganas, 'Veto Players and Decision-making in the EU after Nice', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, No.2 (2002), pp. 283-307;
96. and George Tsebelis and Eric C. C. Chang, 'Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in Advanced Industrialized Countries', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.43, No.3 (2004), pp. 449-76.
97. Reimut Zohlnhöfer, 'Partisan Politics, Party Competition and Veto Players: German Economic Policy in the Kohl Era', Journal of Public Policy, Vol.23, No.2 (2003), pp.123-56.
98. George Tsebelis, Veto Players (note 9), p.71.
99. Ibid., pp.90, 115.
100. Ronald Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, Vol.4, No.6 (1937), pp. 386-405.
101. Matthews, cited in Oliver E. Williamson, 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.38 (2000), p.595.
102. Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975).
103. For example, Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
104. Kaare Strøm, 'Parliamentary Democracy' (note 9), p.65.
105. I b i d.
106. For an earlier and less systematic analysis, but one nonetheless derived from the new institutional economics,
107. see Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, 'The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: a Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol.150, No.1 (1994), pp.171-95.
108. Kaare Strøm, 'Parliamentary Democracy' (note 9), p.98.
109. Thomas H. Hammond and Christopher K. Butler, 'Some Complex Answers to the Simple Question "Do Institutions Matter?" Policy Choice and Policy Change in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems', Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 15, No.2 (2003), pp. 145-200.
110. Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Introduction' (note 73).
111. Elinor Ostrom, 'New Horizons in Institutional Analysis', American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No.1 (1995), p.177.
112. I b i d.