Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 280-302

  Sefton, Martin ^a   Yavaş, Abdullah ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030268928     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0087     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Abreu, D., and Matsushima, H. (1992a). "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica 60, 993-1008.
2. Abreu, D., and Matsushima, H. (1992b). "A Response to Glazer and Rosenthal," Econometrica 60, 1439-1442.
3. Andreoni, J. (1988). "Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments," J. Public Econ. 35, 291-304.
4. Basu, K. (1994). "The Traveler's Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory," Amer. Econ. Rev. 84, 391-395.
5. Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T. W. (1992). "Communication in Coordination Games," Quart. J. Econ. 107, 739-771.
6. Glazer, J., and Rosenthal, R. W. (1992). "A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms," Econometrica 60, 1435-1438.
7. Harsanyi, J. C., and Selten, R. (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Kreps, D. M. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
9. Sefton, M., and Yavaş, A. (1995). "Risk and Coordination: Experimental Evidence," Center for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution working paper. Penn State University.
10. Straub, P. G. (1995). "Risk Dominance and Coordination Failures in Static Games," Quart. Rev. Econ. Finance 35, 339-364.