Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: A critique

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 695-714

  Gintis, Herbert ^a  

^a Santa Fe Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary stability; Folk theorem; Private information; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 11144265857     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.041     Document Type: Article

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