Noisy directional learning and the logit equilibrium

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 106, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 581-602

  Anderson, Simon P ^a   Goeree, Jacob K ^b   Holt, Charles A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Fokker Planck equation; Logit equilibrium; Noisy directional learning; Potential games

Indexed keywords

LEARNING;

EID: 10444261173     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00378.x     Document Type: Article

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