Stakes and welfare in rent-seeking contests

Public Choice

Volumn 112, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 137-142

  Epstein, Gil S ^a,b,c   Nitzan, Shmuel ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036273408     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1015622002153     Document Type: Review

References (7)

1. Baik, K.H. (1999). Rent-seeking firms, consumer groups, and the social costs of monopoly. Economic Inquiry 37: 542-554.
2. Baik, K.H. (1994). Effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players. Southern Economic Journal 61: 367-378.
3. Gradstein, M. (1995). Intensity of competition, entry and entry deterrence in rent-seeking contests. Economics and Politics 7: 79-91.
4. Hillman, A.L. and Riley, J.G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1: 17-39.
5. Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 41-60.
6. Nti, K.O. (1999). Rent seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice 98: 415-430.
7. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D. and Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97-112. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.