Mitigating Insurance Fraud: Lump-Sum Awards, Premium Subsidies, and Indemnity Taxes

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 68, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 403-436

  Boyer, M Martin ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347078754     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2678116     Document Type: Article

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