Learning from defeat? Political analysis and the failure of health care reform in the United States

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 61-94

  Hacker, Jacob S ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035624919     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123401000047     Document Type: Article

References (160)

1. As Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin summarize the relevant literature, 'Cognitive psychologists have recently demonstrated ... that "outcome knowledge" contaminates our understanding of the past. Once people learn the outcome of an event, they not only perceive that outcome as more likely ex post than they did ex ante ... , they often fail to remember their ex ante assessment of what was and was not likely to happen' (Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 1-39, at p. 15).
2. Although writings on the failure of health care reform are legion, attempts at critical synthesis are rare Two recent books that review the competing explanations for reform's demise (without, however making much effort to adjudicate between them) are Carol S. Wiessert and William G. Weissert, Governing Health: The Politics of Health Policy (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press 1996), especially pp. 296-315; and Mark E. Rushefsky and Kant Patel, Politics, Power and Policy Making: The Case of Health Care Reform in the 1990s (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), especially pp. 243-53.
3. Although writings on the failure of health care reform are legion, attempts at critical synthesis are rare Two recent books that review the competing explanations for reform's demise (without, however making much effort to adjudicate between them) are Carol S. Wiessert and William G. Weissert, Governing Health: The Politics of Health Policy (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press 1996), especially pp. 296-315; and Mark E. Rushefsky and Kant Patel, Politics, Power and Policy Making: The Case of Health Care Reform in the 1990s (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), especially pp. 243-53.
4. This was not merely true of media commentary, which until mid-1994 was overwhelmingly of the view that some type of reform plan would be passed. See, for example, Adam Clymer, 'The Clinton plan is alive on arrival', New York Times, 3 October 1993, p. E3; William Schneider, 'Health reform: what went right?' National Journal, 1 October 1993, p. 2404; 'The Bush-Clinton health reform', New York Times, 10 October 1992, p. A20. In 1993, while writing a book on the Clinton health plan entitled The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), conducted interviews with nearly two dozen congressional and White House staff, journalists and interest group representatives. Although their forecasts varied, nearly all believed that reform legislation would be enacted, and many believed such legislation would be comprehensive in scope. After the defeat of reform in 1994, of course, assessments changed, with many who predicted the success of reform now declaring that it never had much chance. Compare, for example, Schneider's 1993 piece cited above with his diametrically opposed assessment in 'Why health care reform may be beyond saving', Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1994, pp. Ml, M6. In a second round of interviews that I conducted for my book in 1995, respondents not surprisingly offered retrospective assessments of the prospects for reform that were decidedly more negative, with most arguing that the Clinton plan and its competitors faced obstacles that were probably insurmountable.
5. This was not merely true of media commentary, which until mid-1994 was overwhelmingly of the view that some type of reform plan would be passed. See, for example, Adam Clymer, 'The Clinton plan is alive on arrival', New York Times, 3 October 1993, p. E3; William Schneider, 'Health reform: what went right?' National Journal, 1 October 1993, p. 2404; 'The Bush-Clinton health reform', New York Times, 10 October 1992, p. A20. In 1993, while writing a book on the Clinton health plan entitled The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), conducted interviews with nearly two dozen congressional and White House staff, journalists and interest group representatives. Although their forecasts varied, nearly all believed that reform legislation would be enacted, and many believed such legislation would be comprehensive in scope. After the defeat of reform in 1994, of course, assessments changed, with many who predicted the success of reform now declaring that it never had much chance. Compare, for example, Schneider's 1993 piece cited above with his diametrically opposed assessment in 'Why health care reform may be beyond saving', Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1994, pp. Ml, M6. In a second round of interviews that I conducted for my book in 1995, respondents not surprisingly offered retrospective assessments of the prospects for reform that were decidedly more negative, with most arguing that the Clinton plan and its competitors faced obstacles that were probably insurmountable.
6. This was not merely true of media commentary, which until mid-1994 was overwhelmingly of the view that some type of reform plan would be passed. See, for example, Adam Clymer, 'The Clinton plan is alive on arrival', New York Times, 3 October 1993, p. E3; William Schneider, 'Health reform: what went right?' National Journal, 1 October 1993, p. 2404; 'The Bush-Clinton health reform', New York Times, 10 October 1992, p. A20. In 1993, while writing a book on the Clinton health plan entitled The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), conducted interviews with nearly two dozen congressional and White House staff, journalists and interest group representatives. Although their forecasts varied, nearly all believed that reform legislation would be enacted, and many believed such legislation would be comprehensive in scope. After the defeat of reform in 1994, of course, assessments changed, with many who predicted the success of reform now declaring that it never had much chance. Compare, for example, Schneider's 1993 piece cited above with his diametrically opposed assessment in 'Why health care reform may be beyond saving', Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1994, pp. Ml, M6. In a second round of interviews that I conducted for my book in 1995, respondents not surprisingly offered retrospective assessments of the prospects for reform that were decidedly more negative, with most arguing that the Clinton plan and its competitors faced obstacles that were probably insurmountable.
7. This was not merely true of media commentary, which until mid-1994 was overwhelmingly of the view that some type of reform plan would be passed. See, for example, Adam Clymer, 'The Clinton plan is alive on arrival', New York Times, 3 October 1993, p. E3; William Schneider, 'Health reform: what went right?' National Journal, 1 October 1993, p. 2404; 'The Bush-Clinton health reform', New York Times, 10 October 1992, p. A20. In 1993, while writing a book on the Clinton health plan entitled The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), conducted interviews with nearly two dozen congressional and White House staff, journalists and interest group representatives. Although their forecasts varied, nearly all believed that reform legislation would be enacted, and many believed such legislation would be comprehensive in scope. After the defeat of reform in 1994, of course, assessments changed, with many who predicted the success of reform now declaring that it never had much chance. Compare, for example, Schneider's 1993 piece cited above with his diametrically opposed assessment in 'Why health care reform may be beyond saving', Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1994, pp. Ml, M6. In a second round of interviews that I conducted for my book in 1995, respondents not surprisingly offered retrospective assessments of the prospects for reform that were decidedly more negative, with most arguing that the Clinton plan and its competitors faced obstacles that were probably insurmountable.
8. This was not merely true of media commentary, which until mid-1994 was overwhelmingly of the view that some type of reform plan would be passed. See, for example, Adam Clymer, 'The Clinton plan is alive on arrival', New York Times, 3 October 1993, p. E3; William Schneider, 'Health reform: what went right?' National Journal, 1 October 1993, p. 2404; 'The Bush-Clinton health reform', New York Times, 10 October 1992, p. A20. In 1993, while writing a book on the Clinton health plan entitled The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), conducted interviews with nearly two dozen congressional and White House staff, journalists and interest group representatives. Although their forecasts varied, nearly all believed that reform legislation would be enacted, and many believed such legislation would be comprehensive in scope. After the defeat of reform in 1994, of course, assessments changed, with many who predicted the success of reform now declaring that it never had much chance. Compare, for example, Schneider's 1993 piece cited above with his diametrically opposed assessment in 'Why health care reform may be beyond saving', Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1994, pp. Ml, M6. In a second round of interviews that I conducted for my book in 1995, respondents not surprisingly offered retrospective assessments of the prospects for reform that were decidedly more negative, with most arguing that the Clinton plan and its competitors faced obstacles that were probably insurmountable.
9. Henry J. Aaron, 'The Problem That Won't Go Away', in Henry J. Aaron, ed., The Problem That Won't Go Away: Reforming US Health Care Financing (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995), pp. 1-12, at p. 3. The prediction is contained in Henry J. Aaron, 'Looking Backward, 2001-1991: The History of the Health Care Financing and Reform Act of 1998', Brookings Review, 9 (1991), 40-5.
10. Henry J. Aaron, 'The Problem That Won't Go Away', in Henry J. Aaron, ed., The Problem That Won't Go Away: Reforming US Health Care Financing (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995), pp. 1-12, at p. 3. The prediction is contained in Henry J. Aaron, 'Looking Backward, 2001-1991: The History of the Health Care Financing and Reform Act of 1998', Brookings Review, 9 (1991), 40-5.
11. Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (New York: Little, Brown, 1996), p. 639.
12. Cathie Jo Martin, 'Stuck in Neutral: Big Business and the Politics of National Health Reform', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 431-6, p. 435.
13. For conservatives opposed to the Clinton plan, the 'one-seventh' figure became a favourite rhetorical invocation. Senator Robert Dole charged during the first televised debate of the 1996 presidential campaign that Clinton 'wanted to give us this big system that took over about one-seventh [of] the economy' ('A transcript of the first televised debate between Clinton and Dole', New York Times, 7 October 1996, p. B8). This charge was ironic, since the Clinton plan was consciously designed to keep most health spending in the private sector by mandating that employers pay for their workers' health insurance. The charge was also misleading, since more than 40 per cent of American health spending is already public and hence Clinton could at most have 'taken over' about one-twelfth of the economy.
14. Aaron, 'The Problem That Won't Go Away', p. 3.
15. See, for example, David U. Himmelstein, Sidney Wolfe and Steffie Woolhandler, 'Mangled Competition', American Prospect, 13 (Spring 1993), 16-21.
16. Joseph White, 'The Horses and the Jumps: Comments on the Health Care Reform Steeplechase', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 371-83, p. 374.
17. Hugh Heclo, 'Clinton's Health Reform in Historical Perspective', in Aaron, ed., The Problem That Won't Go Away, p. 17.
18. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 52-73, 82-6. To be sure, the United States was involved in an undeclared war in Vietnam during much of this period. But not only did the legislative outpouring of the 1960s both predate and continue after the period of heavy American involvement, but, as noted below, the effect of the war on US social policy was almost entirely negative, fracturing liberals, distracting leaders and draining resources. On the impact of the Vietnam War on Johnson's Great Society and War on Poverty, see Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 399-405.
19. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 52-73, 82-6. To be sure, the United States was involved in an undeclared war in Vietnam during much of this period. But not only did the legislative outpouring of the 1960s both predate and continue after the period of heavy American involvement, but, as noted below, the effect of the war on US social policy was almost entirely negative, fracturing liberals, distracting leaders and draining resources. On the impact of the Vietnam War on Johnson's Great Society and War on Poverty, see Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 399-405.
20. See, in particular, Bartholemew H. Sparrow, From the Outside In: World War II and the American State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 33-66; Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, 'Redefining the New Deal: World War II and US Social Provision', in Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, eds, The Politics of Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 81-122.
21. See, in particular, Bartholemew H. Sparrow, From the Outside In: World War II and the American State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 33-66; Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, 'Redefining the New Deal: World War II and US Social Provision', in Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, eds, The Politics of Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 81-122.
22. Amenta and Skocpol, 'Redefining the New Deal', p. 121.
23. Gail R. Wilensky, 'Bite-Sized Chunks of Health Care Reform - Where Medicare Fits In', in Aaron, ed., The Problem That Won't Go Away, pp. 266-73, at p. 266.
24. Allen Schick, 'How a Bill Did Not Become Law', in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds, Intensive Care: How Congress Shapes Health Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings and American Enterprise Institute, 1995), pp. 227-72, at p. 267.
25. R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 109-10.
26. Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, p. 110.
27. Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, p. 110.
28. President Clinton in fact initially wished to include a version of his health care proposal in his 1993 budget plan, which would have been protected from a Senate filibuster by Congress's expedited budget-reconciliation procedures. This strategy was eventually thwarted by the complexity of the plan, divisions among Democrats about the propriety of the move, and the conviction of former Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd that including health care reform in the budget would violate Senate rules.
29. R. Kent Weaver, 'The Politics of Blame Avoidance', Journal of Public Policy, 6 (1986), 371-98.
30. The Health Care Study Group, 'Understanding the Choices in Health Care Reform', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 19 (1994), 499-541, pp. 501-3.
31. A related but distinct question is how detailed Clinton's reform proposal should have been. Should Clinton have prepared an entirely worked out piece of legislation for congressional consideration, or should he have established a set of principles or provided a rough blueprint and then asked Congress to fill in the specifics? Although often conflated with the question of how comprehensive Clinton's proposal should have been, the two questions are in fact different and must be treated separately. I believe President Clinton would have been better served by a more minimal legislative proposal, because this would have given congressional leaders greater leeway to reach compromise and to cut deals with affected interests. That said, Clinton's key demands - universal coverage and effective cost control - were inherently divisive and any proposal that attempted to achieve them would have faced similar conservative and interest-group countermobilization. To actually pass legislation in 1993 or 1994, these twin goals would have had to have been compromised, at least in the short term, and that is something that neither Clinton nor key congressional Democrats appeared willing to accept in early 1993. Moreover, a detailed proposal was demanded by congressional budget rules, which required that all plans be carefully assessed (or 'scored') by the Congressional Budget Office to ensure that they abided by fiscal constraints. Perhaps the best that can be said of the minimalist strategy is that it would have laid the cost of failure on Congress rather than President Clinton alone, and thus might have created electoral and political incentives for a cross-party compromise in Congress. By proposing a plan so closely allied with his and his party's fortunes, Clinton ended up giving congressional Republicans and medical industry interests an irresistible target for politically motivated attacks.
32. See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Managed Competition Act (Washington, DC: CBO, 1994); Joseph White, Competing Solutions: American Health Care Proposals and International Experience (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995), pp. 199-222; Mark A. Peterson, The Politics of Health Care Policy', in Margaret Weir, ed., The Social Divide: Political Parties and the Future of Activist Government (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998), pp. 181-229, at p. 190.
33. See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Managed Competition Act (Washington, DC: CBO, 1994); Joseph White, Competing Solutions: American Health Care Proposals and International Experience (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995), pp. 199-222; Mark A. Peterson, The Politics of Health Care Policy', in Margaret Weir, ed., The Social Divide: Political Parties and the Future of Activist Government (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998), pp. 181-229, at p. 190.
34. See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Managed Competition Act (Washington, DC: CBO, 1994); Joseph White, Competing Solutions: American Health Care Proposals and International Experience (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995), pp. 199-222; Mark A. Peterson, The Politics of Health Care Policy', in Margaret Weir, ed., The Social Divide: Political Parties and the Future of Activist Government (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998), pp. 181-229, at p. 190.
35. Nelson W. Polsby, Innovation in American Politics: The Politics of Policy Initiation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 161-5; Harvey Feigenbaum, Richard Samuels and R. Kent Weaver, 'Innovation, Coordination, and Implementation in Energy Policy', in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), pp. 42-107, at p. 45.
36. Nelson W. Polsby, Innovation in American Politics: The Politics of Policy Initiation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 161-5; Harvey Feigenbaum, Richard Samuels and R. Kent Weaver, 'Innovation, Coordination, and Implementation in Energy Policy', in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), pp. 42-107, at p. 45.
37. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 57.
38. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins, 1984), pp. 83-8.
39. Johnson and Broder, The System, p. 602.
40. Schick, 'How a Bill Did Not Become Law', p. 271.
41. Or, put another way, the supermajority requirements created by the presidential veto and the Senate filibuster increase the likelihood that successful legislation will include substantial numbers of legislators in both parties. For extended analyses of the way in which supermajoritarianism influences legislative decision making, see David W. Brady and Craig Volden, Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy From Carter to Clinton (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998); Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
42. Or, put another way, the supermajority requirements created by the presidential veto and the Senate filibuster increase the likelihood that successful legislation will include substantial numbers of legislators in both parties. For extended analyses of the way in which supermajoritarianism influences legislative decision making, see David W. Brady and Craig Volden, Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy From Carter to Clinton (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998); Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
43. Mayhew, Divided We Govern, pp. 121-2.
44. David R. Mayhew, 'Clinton, the 103rd Congress, and Unified Party Control: What Are the Lessons?' (paper prepared for a conference honoring Stanley Kelley Jr, Princeton, NJ, 1995), pp. 40-2.
45. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Schick, 'How a Bill Does Not Become Law', pp. 248-57.
46. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Schick, 'How a Bill Does Not Become Law', pp. 248-57.
47. Sarah A. Binder, 'Congress and the Incredible Shrinking Middle', Brookings Review, 14 (Fall 1996), 36-9.
48. Johnson and Broder, The System, p. 132.
49. Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994).
50. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System, pp. 20-1.
51. Theodore R. Marmor, The Politics of Medicare (Chicago: Aldine, 1973).
52. Theda Skocpol, 'The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Health Security Plan', in Aaron, The Problem That Won't Go Away, p. 53.
53. Aaron, 'The Problem That Won't Go Away', p. 2.
54. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books; 1982), pp. 235-419.
55. John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edn (New York: HarperCollins. 1995), p. 217.
56. Richard Benedetto, 'Education tops list of public's concerns in poll: respondents also tag health care, social security as priority issues', USA Today, 13 January 1999, p. A13; Mollyann Brodie and Robert J. Blendon, 'The Public's Contribution to Congressional Gridlock on Health Care Reform', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 403-10.
57. Richard Benedetto, 'Education tops list of public's concerns in poll: respondents also tag health care, social security as priority issues', USA Today, 13 January 1999, p. A13; Mollyann Brodie and Robert J. Blendon, 'The Public's Contribution to Congressional Gridlock on Health Care Reform', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 403-10.
58. This is the general conception of public opinion articulated by John R. Zaller in The Nature of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
59. Jacob S. Hacker and Theda Skocpol, 'The New Politics of US Health Policy', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 22 (1997), 315-38.
60. On social learning, see Hugh Heclo, Modem Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 304-22.
61. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1988), p. 1.
62. For explanations and evidence of the increasing prominence of historical analysis in the social sciences, see Terrence J. McDonald, ed.. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
63. See, for example, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Kathleen Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998); Paul Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996), and 'Not Just What, but When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998).
64. See, for example, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Kathleen Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998); Paul Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996), and 'Not Just What, but When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998).
65. See, for example, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Kathleen Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998); Paul Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996), and 'Not Just What, but When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998).
66. See, for example, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Kathleen Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998); Paul Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996), and 'Not Just What, but When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998).
67. See, for example, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Kathleen Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998); Paul Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996), and 'Not Just What, but When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998).
68. See, for example, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Kathleen Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998); Paul Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996), and 'Not Just What, but When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics' (paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1998).
69. See, for example, Tetlock and Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, and the special 1997 issue of International Security on 'History and Theory'.
70. See, for example, William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast, eds, Analytical Narratives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Douglas C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), and Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglas C. North and Barry W. Weingast, 'The Evolution of Institutions: Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England', Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989), 803-32; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
71. See, for example, William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast, eds, Analytical Narratives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Douglas C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), and Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglas C. North and Barry W. Weingast, 'The Evolution of Institutions: Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England', Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989), 803-32; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
72. See, for example, William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast, eds, Analytical Narratives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Douglas C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), and Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglas C. North and Barry W. Weingast, 'The Evolution of Institutions: Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England', Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989), 803-32; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
73. See, for example, William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast, eds, Analytical Narratives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Douglas C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), and Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglas C. North and Barry W. Weingast, 'The Evolution of Institutions: Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England', Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989), 803-32; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
74. See, for example, William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast, eds, Analytical Narratives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Douglas C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), and Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglas C. North and Barry W. Weingast, 'The Evolution of Institutions: Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England', Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989), 803-32; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
75. See, for example, William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast, eds, Analytical Narratives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Douglas C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), and Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglas C. North and Barry W. Weingast, 'The Evolution of Institutions: Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England', Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989), 803-32; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
76. This logic has been best articulated in the context of cross-national analysis, as in Arend Lijphart, 'The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', Comparative Political Studies, 8 (1975), 158-77; and Adam Przeworski and Henry Tuene, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, Flor.: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1970). There are, however, a few treatments of historical comparison, including: Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', Comparative Studies in History and Society, 65 (1980), 174-97; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time; Ira Katznelson, 'Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics', in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Structure, and Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and James D. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-95. With the exception of my discussion of Counterfactuals, much of the following advice applies to all forms of comparative analysis and draws on basic rules of non-experimental causal inference. As Joseph White has reminded me, however, verifying causal claims may not be the only aim of drawing lessons from history. Analysts and policy makers may also look to the past to gain a better appreciation of the range of variables that affect certain political processes, to understand how people conceived of their actions or contexts, or simply to find out what prior events led up to the present situation. Moreover, if analysts wish to make generalizations that approach universal laws of politics, they will want to look not at similar cases but at a wide range of dissimilar cases - a technique that will offer strong support for their findings if all the cases display the same basic causal relationship. For example, if health care reform proposals actively opposed by the medical profession are defeated under all circumstances, that would be extremely strong evidence for the claim that the absence of such opposition is a precondition for reform. The problem, however, is that widely divergent cases exacerbate the problem of isolating causal effects, especially when - as is usually the case - analysts are not quite certain which variables influence the outcome they are trying to account for. The advice here is based on the assumption that comparisons will only be made between a fairly small number of cases, indeed, at the extreme, between only two.
77. This logic has been best articulated in the context of cross-national analysis, as in Arend Lijphart, 'The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', Comparative Political Studies, 8 (1975), 158-77; and Adam Przeworski and Henry Tuene, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, Flor.: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1970). There are, however, a few treatments of historical comparison, including: Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', Comparative Studies in History and Society, 65 (1980), 174-97; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time; Ira Katznelson, 'Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics', in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Structure, and Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and James D. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-95. With the exception of my discussion of Counterfactuals, much of the following advice applies to all forms of comparative analysis and draws on basic rules of non-experimental causal inference. As Joseph White has reminded me, however, verifying causal claims may not be the only aim of drawing lessons from history. Analysts and policy makers may also look to the past to gain a better appreciation of the range of variables that affect certain political processes, to understand how people conceived of their actions or contexts, or simply to find out what prior events led up to the present situation. Moreover, if analysts wish to make generalizations that approach universal laws of politics, they will want to look not at similar cases but at a wide range of dissimilar cases - a technique that will offer strong support for their findings if all the cases display the same basic causal relationship. For example, if health care reform proposals actively opposed by the medical profession are defeated under all circumstances, that would be extremely strong evidence for the claim that the absence of such opposition is a precondition for reform. The problem, however, is that widely divergent cases exacerbate the problem of isolating causal effects, especially when - as is usually the case - analysts are not quite certain which variables influence the outcome they are trying to account for. The advice here is based on the assumption that comparisons will only be made between a fairly small number of cases, indeed, at the extreme, between only two.
78. This logic has been best articulated in the context of cross-national analysis, as in Arend Lijphart, 'The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', Comparative Political Studies, 8 (1975), 158-77; and Adam Przeworski and Henry Tuene, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, Flor.: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1970). There are, however, a few treatments of historical comparison, including: Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', Comparative Studies in History and Society, 65 (1980), 174-97; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time; Ira Katznelson, 'Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics', in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Structure, and Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and James D. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-95. With the exception of my discussion of Counterfactuals, much of the following advice applies to all forms of comparative analysis and draws on basic rules of non-experimental causal inference. As Joseph White has reminded me, however, verifying causal claims may not be the only aim of drawing lessons from history. Analysts and policy makers may also look to the past to gain a better appreciation of the range of variables that affect certain political processes, to understand how people conceived of their actions or contexts, or simply to find out what prior events led up to the present situation. Moreover, if analysts wish to make generalizations that approach universal laws of politics, they will want to look not at similar cases but at a wide range of dissimilar cases - a technique that will offer strong support for their findings if all the cases display the same basic causal relationship. For example, if health care reform proposals actively opposed by the medical profession are defeated under all circumstances, that would be extremely strong evidence for the claim that the absence of such opposition is a precondition for reform. The problem, however, is that widely divergent cases exacerbate the problem of isolating causal effects, especially when - as is usually the case - analysts are not quite certain which variables influence the outcome they are trying to account for. The advice here is based on the assumption that comparisons will only be made between a fairly small number of cases, indeed, at the extreme, between only two.
79. This logic has been best articulated in the context of cross-national analysis, as in Arend Lijphart, 'The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', Comparative Political Studies, 8 (1975), 158-77; and Adam Przeworski and Henry Tuene, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, Flor.: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1970). There are, however, a few treatments of historical comparison, including: Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', Comparative Studies in History and Society, 65 (1980), 174-97; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time; Ira Katznelson, 'Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics', in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Structure, and Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and James D. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-95. With the exception of my discussion of Counterfactuals, much of the following advice applies to all forms of comparative analysis and draws on basic rules of non-experimental causal inference. As Joseph White has reminded me, however, verifying causal claims may not be the only aim of drawing lessons from history. Analysts and policy makers may also look to the past to gain a better appreciation of the range of variables that affect certain political processes, to understand how people conceived of their actions or contexts, or simply to find out what prior events led up to the present situation. Moreover, if analysts wish to make generalizations that approach universal laws of politics, they will want to look not at similar cases but at a wide range of dissimilar cases - a technique that will offer strong support for their findings if all the cases display the same basic causal relationship. For example, if health care reform proposals actively opposed by the medical profession are defeated under all circumstances, that would be extremely strong evidence for the claim that the absence of such opposition is a precondition for reform. The problem, however, is that widely divergent cases exacerbate the problem of isolating causal effects, especially when - as is usually the case - analysts are not quite certain which variables influence the outcome they are trying to account for. The advice here is based on the assumption that comparisons will only be made between a fairly small number of cases, indeed, at the extreme, between only two.
80. This logic has been best articulated in the context of cross-national analysis, as in Arend Lijphart, 'The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', Comparative Political Studies, 8 (1975), 158-77; and Adam Przeworski and Henry Tuene, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, Flor.: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1970). There are, however, a few treatments of historical comparison, including: Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', Comparative Studies in History and Society, 65 (1980), 174-97; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time; Ira Katznelson, 'Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics', in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Structure, and Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and James D. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-95. With the exception of my discussion of Counterfactuals, much of the following advice applies to all forms of comparative analysis and draws on basic rules of non-experimental causal inference. As Joseph White has reminded me, however, verifying causal claims may not be the only aim of drawing lessons from history. Analysts and policy makers may also look to the past to gain a better appreciation of the range of variables that affect certain political processes, to understand how people conceived of their actions or contexts, or simply to find out what prior events led up to the present situation. Moreover, if analysts wish to make generalizations that approach universal laws of politics, they will want to look not at similar cases but at a wide range of dissimilar cases - a technique that will offer strong support for their findings if all the cases display the same basic causal relationship. For example, if health care reform proposals actively opposed by the medical profession are defeated under all circumstances, that would be extremely strong evidence for the claim that the absence of such opposition is a precondition for reform. The problem, however, is that widely divergent cases exacerbate the problem of isolating causal effects, especially when - as is usually the case - analysts are not quite certain which variables influence the outcome they are trying to account for. The advice here is based on the assumption that comparisons will only be made between a fairly small number of cases, indeed, at the extreme, between only two.
81. This logic has been best articulated in the context of cross-national analysis, as in Arend Lijphart, 'The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', Comparative Political Studies, 8 (1975), 158-77; and Adam Przeworski and Henry Tuene, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, Flor.: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1970). There are, however, a few treatments of historical comparison, including: Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', Comparative Studies in History and Society, 65 (1980), 174-97; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time; Ira Katznelson, 'Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics', in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Structure, and Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and James D. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-95. With the exception of my discussion of Counterfactuals, much of the following advice applies to all forms of comparative analysis and draws on basic rules of non-experimental causal inference. As Joseph White has reminded me, however, verifying causal claims may not be the only aim of drawing lessons from history. Analysts and policy makers may also look to the past to gain a better appreciation of the range of variables that affect certain political processes, to understand how people conceived of their actions or contexts, or simply to find out what prior events led up to the present situation. Moreover, if analysts wish to make generalizations that approach universal laws of politics, they will want to look not at similar cases but at a wide range of dissimilar cases - a technique that will offer strong support for their findings if all the cases display the same basic causal relationship. For example, if health care reform proposals actively opposed by the medical profession are defeated under all circumstances, that would be extremely strong evidence for the claim that the absence of such opposition is a precondition for reform. The problem, however, is that widely divergent cases exacerbate the problem of isolating causal effects, especially when - as is usually the case - analysts are not quite certain which variables influence the outcome they are trying to account for. The advice here is based on the assumption that comparisons will only be made between a fairly small number of cases, indeed, at the extreme, between only two.
82. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (London: Longman, Green, 1930 [1843]).
83. Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State', World Politics, 48 (1996), 143-79.
84. Pierson, 'New Politics of the Welfare State', p. 144.
85. Skocpol, Boomerang, p. 130.
86. Skocpol, Boomerang, p. 130.
87. Richard Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), p. 84.
88. Jacob S. Hacker, 'The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy', Studies in American Political Development, 12 (1998), 57-130.
89. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 91-4.
90. Cf. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy, p. 86. ('The fundamental problem of analogies is that historical details are ignored; instead, it is assumed that all other conditions remain equal between past and present.')
91. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy, pp. 88-90.
92. M. A. H. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky. 'On Change: or, There is No Magic Size for an Increment', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 371-89.
93. On the notion of 'critical junctures', see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), especially p. 29.
94. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', p. 169.
95. Interest in counterfactual analysis has increased in the last decade among historians and political analysts. See, for example, Tetlock and Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics; Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science'; Geoffrey Hawthorn, Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); William H. Honan, 'Historians warming to games of "what if" ', New York Times, 7 January 1998, p. B7;
96. Interest in counterfactual analysis has increased in the last decade among historians and political analysts. See, for example, Tetlock and Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics; Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science'; Geoffrey Hawthorn, Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); William H. Honan, 'Historians warming to games of "what if" ', New York Times, 7 January 1998, p. B7;
97. Interest in counterfactual analysis has increased in the last decade among historians and political analysts. See, for example, Tetlock and Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics; Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science'; Geoffrey Hawthorn, Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); William H. Honan, 'Historians warming to games of "what if" ', New York Times, 7 January 1998, p. B7;
98. Niall Ferguson, Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London: Picador, 1997).
99. Nevertheless, the purpose and rules of Counterfactuals are still not well understood (and, indeed, are not discussed at all in the two leading primers on lesson-drawing: Rose's Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy and Neustadt and May's Thinking in Time). Many historians and political analysts still appear to concur with the categorical judgement of Herder, who warned, 'History is the science of what is, not that which, according to secret intentions of fate, might have been' (quoted in Alexander Demandt, History That Never Happened: A Treatise on the Question What Would Have Happened If ...? 3rd edn (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993). p. 1).
100. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', p. 169.
101. King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 77. The two statements are not, however, identical. As Jon Elster has stressed, there is always the possibility of pre-emptive causation (C causes B in the absence of A) or epiphenomena (C causes both B and A) - both of which vitiate the symmetry between causal and counterfactual claims. See Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 34-6.
102. King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 77. The two statements are not, however, identical. As Jon Elster has stressed, there is always the possibility of pre-emptive causation (C causes B in the absence of A) or epiphenomena (C causes both B and A) - both of which vitiate the symmetry between causal and counterfactual claims. See Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 34-6.
103. Skocpol and Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', pp. 181-7.
104. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', p. 171.
105. Elster, Explaining Technical Change, pp. 38-9.
106. Elster, Explaining Technical Change, p. 38.
107. Adam Clymer, Robert Pear and Robin Toner, 'For health care, time was a killer', New York Times, 29 August 1994, p. A1.
108. James Fallows, 'A Triumph of Misinformation', Atlantic Monthly (January 1995), pp. 26-37.
109. For example, Vincente Navarro, 'Why Congress Did Not Enact Health Care Reform', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 455-62, p. 460.
110. Skocpol, Boomerang, p. 179.
111. Theodore R. Marmor and Morris L. Barer, 'The Politics of Universal Health Insurance: Lessons for and from the 1990s', in Theodore J. Litman and Leonard S. Robins, eds, Health Politics and Policy, 3rd edn (Albany, NY: Delmar, 1997), pp. 306-22, at p. 314.
112. Fearon 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', pp. 192-3.
113. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', p. 93; Nelson Goodman, 'The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals', Journal of Philosophy, 44 (1947), 113-38.
114. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', p. 93; Nelson Goodman, 'The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals', Journal of Philosophy, 44 (1947), 113-38.
115. Fearon draws a sharp theoretical line between cotenability and Elster's notion of 'legitimacy'. But as the example above suggests, the two are often difficult to disentangle. That we believe that an element of an historical event could not have occurred differently than it did usually means that the specific features of the event that we wish to change were deeply enmeshed with other features that would likely have their own effects on the outcome in question. Conversely, the features of an event that we view as least inevitable - for example, strategic decisions by policy makers - are often those that we could imagine being different without changing the myriad background conditions that we assume to remain constant across the counterfactual scenario and the actual historical event.
116. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', p. 178.
117. Elster, Explaining Technical Change, p. 34.
118. Fearon, 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science', p. 193.
119. Hacker, The Road to Nowhere.
120. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edn (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 222-5.
121. See Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics'; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; and Mark J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics', Harvard Law Review, 109 (1996), 641-68. For a sceptical appraisal of theories of path-dependence in economics, see S. J. Leibowitz and Stephen Margolis, 'Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 11 (1995), 205-26.
122. See Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics'; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; and Mark J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics', Harvard Law Review, 109 (1996), 641-68. For a sceptical appraisal of theories of path-dependence in economics, see S. J. Leibowitz and Stephen Margolis, 'Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 11 (1995), 205-26.
123. See Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics'; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; and Mark J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics', Harvard Law Review, 109 (1996), 641-68. For a sceptical appraisal of theories of path-dependence in economics, see S. J. Leibowitz and Stephen Margolis, 'Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 11 (1995), 205-26.
124. See Pierson, 'Path Dependence and the Study of Politics'; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; and Mark J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics', Harvard Law Review, 109 (1996), 641-68. For a sceptical appraisal of theories of path-dependence in economics, see S. J. Leibowitz and Stephen Margolis, 'Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 11 (1995), 205-26.
125. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 59.
126. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 59.
127. For an accessible review, see Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 739-78.
128. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, pp. 107-17.
129. John B. Gilmor, Strategic Disagreement: Stalemate in American Politics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
130. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 76.
131. Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
132. Stephen M. Walt, 'Rigor or Rigor Mortis: Rational Choice and Security Studies', International Security, 23 (1999), 5-48, p. 20.
133. Julie Rovner, 'Congress and Health Care Reform 1993-94', in Intensive Care, p. 179.
134. Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 79-83.
135. Morris P. Fiorina, 'Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise', Critical Review, 9 (1995), 85-94, pp. 88-9. Fiorina's contention is not easily squared with Olson's emphatic point predictions, such as his central claim that 'unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests [emphasis in original]' (Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 2). But the distinction that Fiorina draws between point predictions and comparative statics nevertheless remains useful for clarifying the difference between probabilistic and deterministic theories.
136. Morris P. Fiorina, 'Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise', Critical Review, 9 (1995), 85-94, pp. 88-9. Fiorina's contention is not easily squared with Olson's emphatic point predictions, such as his central claim that 'unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests [emphasis in original]' (Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 2). But the distinction that Fiorina draws between point predictions and comparative statics nevertheless remains useful for clarifying the difference between probabilistic and deterministic theories.
137. Probabilistic causal claims may reflect the probabilistic nature of the world itself or our limited understanding of a deterministic world. There is, however, at least one interesting additional possibility suggested by the concept of mixed strategies in game theory. Mixed strategies are strategies that involve a random selection among two or more pure strategies, according to a particular probability distribution. They occur in games in which neither player has a dominant strategy and in which players do not know which strategy will produce the best outcome, because those outcomes depend on the actions of other players. In these cases, it may be rational to choose among strategies using a random device that results in an appropriate proportional mix of strategies but which leaves every individual choice up to chance. Strategic interaction among rational actors, in other words, may cause outcomes to be probabilistic even if the world is deterministic.
138. Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, p. 269.
139. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edn, p. 225.
140. Jacob S. Hacker, 'National Health Care Reform: An Idea Whose Time Came and Went', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 21 (1996), 647-96.
141. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edn (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 88-108; Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind (New York: Farar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997).
142. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edn (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 88-108; Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind (New York: Farar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997).
143. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edn (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 88-108; Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind (New York: Farar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997).
144. Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', Review of Metaphysics, 25 (1971), 3-51; Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
145. Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', Review of Metaphysics, 25 (1971), 3-51; Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
146. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
147. Broder and Johnson, The System, pp. 349-58.
148. Carl G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History', Journal of Philosophy, 39 (1942), 35-48. As Graham Alison and Philip Zelikow endorse this position in the second edition of The Essence of Decision (New York: Addison, Wesley, Longman, 1999), 'Predictions or bets about future events are, in effect, the logical flipside of explanations' (p. 9). It is easy to see, however, that this is not true. We can predict with near certainty specific outcomes without having any understanding of the causal mechanisms that cause them, just as we can explain after the fact what are prospectively unpredictable events. To be sure, causal explanations can and do help us make predictions, but the former are not merely mirror images of the latter. Still, Allison and Zelikow provide a useful contribution in emphasizing that our predictions need not be determinate, but can in effect be 'bets about future events' - bets that reflect not only our best estimates of the likelihood of a specific event occurring, but also the degree of uncertainty that we attach to those estimates.
149. Carl G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History', Journal of Philosophy, 39 (1942), 35-48. As Graham Alison and Philip Zelikow endorse this position in the second edition of The Essence of Decision (New York: Addison, Wesley, Longman, 1999), 'Predictions or bets about future events are, in effect, the logical flipside of explanations' (p. 9). It is easy to see, however, that this is not true. We can predict with near certainty specific outcomes without having any understanding of the causal mechanisms that cause them, just as we can explain after the fact what are prospectively unpredictable events. To be sure, causal explanations can and do help us make predictions, but the former are not merely mirror images of the latter. Still, Allison and Zelikow provide a useful contribution in emphasizing that our predictions need not be determinate, but can in effect be 'bets about future events' - bets that reflect not only our best estimates of the likelihood of a specific event occurring, but also the degree of uncertainty that we attach to those estimates.
150. Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Debating Revolutions (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
151. Often, indeed, the search for equilibrium and the emphasis on determinate predictions are joined, as in William Riker's claim that 'equilibria are valid, indeed essential in theory in social science because they are identified consequences of decisions that are necessary and sufficient to bring them about' ('Political Science and Rational Choice', in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 163-81, at p. 175).
152. The end of the Cold War provides the best recent example. Although students of foreign affairs disagree as to whether dominant theories of international relations should have been able to predict this singularly important event, virtually all concede that scholars failed to anticipate it. The widespread acceptance of equilibrium-based analyses that characterized the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as one of stable bipolarity is generally cited as one reason for this predictive failure. Relatedly, most theories of international relations gave little scope to the role that key decision makers such as Gorbachev could potentially play in shaping state responses to the international system. For a more extended analysis of this topic, see the contrasting discussions in John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', International Security, 17:3 (Winter 1992/93), 5-58; and William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', International Security, 19:3 (Winterl994/95), 91-129.
153. The end of the Cold War provides the best recent example. Although students of foreign affairs disagree as to whether dominant theories of international relations should have been able to predict this singularly important event, virtually all concede that scholars failed to anticipate it. The widespread acceptance of equilibrium-based analyses that characterized the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as one of stable bipolarity is generally cited as one reason for this predictive failure. Relatedly, most theories of international relations gave little scope to the role that key decision makers such as Gorbachev could potentially play in shaping state responses to the international system. For a more extended analysis of this topic, see the contrasting discussions in John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', International Security, 17:3 (Winter 1992/93), 5-58; and William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', International Security, 19:3 (Winterl994/95), 91-129.
154. By contrast, journalists and political pundits have been much less willing to argue that defeat was inevitable. For them the dominant question has not been 'How could anyone believe that reform was possible?' but rather 'How could anyone have squandered the opportunities for reform that existed?' Ultimately, however, the endless criticism of specific strategies and individuals that is the staple of this vein of analysis misses - or at least downplays - the very real political and institutional constraints that the Clinton administration and its allies faced. If most political scientists who examine the 1993-94 interlude are too quick to dismiss the role of strategy or neglect the uncertainties that characterized the debate, most analysts outside the academy are too quick to blame failure on flawed individuals or faulty strategies rather than the clearly formidable underlying constraints on policy change.
155. Favourite among these 'defeat-was-inevitable' arguments are two somewhat conflicting contentions: that the fragmented structure of American government always dooms major social reforms and that the distribution of opinion in Congress during 1993-94 was so profoundly conservative that no reform plan could have passed. The first claim -that 'It's the institutions, stupid - fails to grapple with the past success of major American policy initiatives that faced similarly inauspicious institutional circumstances. Nor does it acknowledge that a number of the institutional characteristics that are commonly implicated in the demise of reform - for example, the decentralization of Congress and lack of Democratic party cohesion -were actually less severe in 1993-94 than they had been in the past. The second argument - that the demise of health care reform was 'A predictable failure' because the congressional votes were just not there - provides a simpler, indeed almost tautological, explanation of the failure of reform. But although it correctly highlights the fairly inhospitable legislative environment that reformers faced in 1993-94, it too provides an overly determinate account of reform's defeat. By portraying the preferences of members of Congress as easily identifiable and fixed, it ignores the complexities of the representative relationship connecting congressional action and public opinion while glossing over the significant and well-documented changes that occurred in the public positions of members of Congress as the health care reform debate unfolded (Sven Steinmo and Jon Watts, 'It's the Institutions Stupid! Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 329-72; Henry Brady and Kara Buckley, 'Health Care Reform in the 103rd Congress: A Predictable Failure', Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 20 (1995), 447-54). For a further critique of these arguments, see White, 'The Horses and the Jumps'; and Hacker, The Road to Nowhere, pp. 172-7.
156. Favourite among these 'defeat-was-inevitable' arguments are two somewhat conflicting contentions: that the fragmented structure of American government always dooms major social reforms and that the distribution of opinion in Congress during 1993-94 was so profoundly conservative that no reform plan could have passed. The first claim -that 'It's the institutions, stupid - fails to grapple with the past success of major American policy initiatives that faced similarly inauspicious institutional circumstances. Nor does it acknowledge that a number of the institutional characteristics that are commonly implicated in the demise of reform - for example, the decentralization of Congress and lack of Democratic party cohesion -were actually less severe in 1993-94 than they had been in the past. The second argument - that the demise of health care reform was 'A predictable failure' because the congressional votes were just not there - provides a simpler, indeed almost tautological, explanation of the failure of reform. But although it correctly highlights the fairly inhospitable legislative environment that reformers faced in 1993-94, it too provides an overly determinate account of reform's defeat. By portraying the preferences of members of Congress as easily identifiable and fixed, it ignores the complexities of the representative relationship connecting congressional action and public opinion while glossing over the significant and well-documented changes that occurred in the public positions of members of Congress as the health care reform debate unfolded (Sven Steinmo and Jon Watts, 'It's the Institutions Stupid! Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 329-72; Henry Brady and Kara Buckley, 'Health Care Reform in the 103rd Congress: A Predictable Failure', Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 20 (1995), 447-54). For a further critique of these arguments, see White, 'The Horses and the Jumps'; and Hacker, The Road to Nowhere, pp. 172-7.
157. Favourite among these 'defeat-was-inevitable' arguments are two somewhat conflicting contentions: that the fragmented structure of American government always dooms major social reforms and that the distribution of opinion in Congress during 1993-94 was so profoundly conservative that no reform plan could have passed. The first claim -that 'It's the institutions, stupid - fails to grapple with the past success of major American policy initiatives that faced similarly inauspicious institutional circumstances. Nor does it acknowledge that a number of the institutional characteristics that are commonly implicated in the demise of reform - for example, the decentralization of Congress and lack of Democratic party cohesion -were actually less severe in 1993-94 than they had been in the past. The second argument - that the demise of health care reform was 'A predictable failure' because the congressional votes were just not there - provides a simpler, indeed almost tautological, explanation of the failure of reform. But although it correctly highlights the fairly inhospitable legislative environment that reformers faced in 1993-94, it too provides an overly determinate account of reform's defeat. By portraying the preferences of members of Congress as easily identifiable and fixed, it ignores the complexities of the representative relationship connecting congressional action and public opinion while glossing over the significant and well-documented changes that occurred in the public positions of members of Congress as the health care reform debate unfolded (Sven Steinmo and Jon Watts, 'It's the Institutions Stupid! Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 329-72; Henry Brady and Kara Buckley, 'Health Care Reform in the 103rd Congress: A Predictable Failure', Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 20 (1995), 447-54). For a further critique of these arguments, see White, 'The Horses and the Jumps'; and Hacker, The Road to Nowhere, pp. 172-7.
158. Favourite among these 'defeat-was-inevitable' arguments are two somewhat conflicting contentions: that the fragmented structure of American government always dooms major social reforms and that the distribution of opinion in Congress during 1993-94 was so profoundly conservative that no reform plan could have passed. The first claim -that 'It's the institutions, stupid - fails to grapple with the past success of major American policy initiatives that faced similarly inauspicious institutional circumstances. Nor does it acknowledge that a number of the institutional characteristics that are commonly implicated in the demise of reform - for example, the decentralization of Congress and lack of Democratic party cohesion -were actually less severe in 1993-94 than they had been in the past. The second argument - that the demise of health care reform was 'A predictable failure' because the congressional votes were just not there - provides a simpler, indeed almost tautological, explanation of the failure of reform. But although it correctly highlights the fairly inhospitable legislative environment that reformers faced in 1993-94, it too provides an overly determinate account of reform's defeat. By portraying the preferences of members of Congress as easily identifiable and fixed, it ignores the complexities of the representative relationship connecting congressional action and public opinion while glossing over the significant and well-documented changes that occurred in the public positions of members of Congress as the health care reform debate unfolded (Sven Steinmo and Jon Watts, 'It's the Institutions Stupid! Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America', Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 (1995), 329-72; Henry Brady and Kara Buckley, 'Health Care Reform in the 103rd Congress: A Predictable Failure', Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 20 (1995), 447-54). For a further critique of these arguments, see White, 'The Horses and the Jumps'; and Hacker, The Road to Nowhere, pp. 172-7.
159. Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco, 'Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics', World Politics, 29 (1977). 489-522, p. 489.
160. Almond and Genco, 'Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics', p. 497.