The reproducible properties of correct forecasts

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 151-159

  Sandroni, Alvaro ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Calibration; Forecasting; Minimax theorem; Testing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346991618     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820300153     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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