"Rules vs. discretion" after twenty-five years

NBER Macroeconomics Annual

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 9-45

  Stokey, Nancy L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846102617     PISSN: 08893365     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1086/ma.17.3585272     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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