Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 79, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 142-151

  Aoyagi, Masaki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism, transferable utility, budget balance, correlated types, compatibility condition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040092309     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2366     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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