Capital Structure Choice When Managers Are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency

Journal of Business

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 49-81

  Novaes, Walter ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141873475     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/344113     Document Type: Article

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