Relative Gains Concerns When the Number of States in the International System Increases

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 47, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 642-668

  Mosher, James S ^a  

^a OHIO UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Anarchy; International cooperation; Prisoner's dilemma; Relative gains; Security

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141815564     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703254296     Document Type: Article

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