Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 349-375

  Kirchsteiger, Georg ^a,b   Prat, Andrea ^b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^d CEPR   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Common agency; Inefficiencies in lobbying; Natural equilibrium; Truthful equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035648516     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1     Document Type: Article

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