Topological social choice

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-39

  Lauwers, Luc ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Chichilnisky; Impossibility theorem; Social choice; Topological aggregation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042279684     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00036-0     Document Type: Article

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