The geometry of implementation: A necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 259-294

  Chichilnisky, G ^a   Heal, G M ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031499099     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050065     Document Type: Article

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