A robust theory of resource allocation

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-10

  Chichilnisky, Graciela ^a  

^a 405 Low Library   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21844495837     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00179093     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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4. Chichilnisky G (1979) On fixed point theorems and social choice paradoxes. Econ Letters 3: 347-351
5. Chichilnisky G (1980) Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences. Adv Math 37: 165-176
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13. Chichilnisky G (1994) Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium with or without short sales. Econ Theory 5(1): 79-108
14. Chichilnisky G (1993) Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of the core. Working Paper, Stanford University
15. Chichilnisky G (1994) Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core, and limits voting cycles. (Working paper)
16. Chichilnisky G (1994) A unified perspective on resource allocation: limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibrium, the core and social choice. In: Arrow K, Sen A, Suxemura (eds) Social choice reexamined. McMillan (in press)
17. Chichilnisky G, Heal GM (1983) Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox. Econ Theory 31: 68-87
18. Heal G (1983) Contractibility and public decision making. In: Pattanaik PK, Salles M (eds) Social choice and welfare, Chapter 7. North-Holland, Amsterdam
19. Le Breton M, Uriarte JR (1990) On the robustness of the impossibility result in the topological approach to social choice. Soc Choice Welfare 7: 131-140