Topological aggregation, the case of an infinite population

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 319-332

  Lauwers, Luc ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031504171     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050068     Document Type: Article

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