Two-person and majority continuous aggregation in 2-GOOD space in social choice: A note

Theory and Decision

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 199-209

  Macintyre, I D A ^a  

^a NONE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Majority games; Two person games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005297542     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004944209707     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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