An experimental comparison of reliance levels under alternative breach remedies

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 205-222

  Sloof, Randolph ^a   Leuven, Edwin ^a   Oosterbeek, Hessel ^a   Sonnemans, Joep ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042244179     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1593714     Document Type: Article

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