Corporate governance and game theoretic analyses of shareholder power: The case of Spain

Applied Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 7, 2003, Pages 847-858

  Leech, Dennis ^a   Manjón, Miguel C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORPORATE STRATEGY; GAME THEORY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; MANAGEMENT; POWER RELATIONS;

SPAIN;

EID: 0038661596     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0003684022000026593     Document Type: Article

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