Does public policy crowd out private contributions to public goods?

Public Choice

Volumn 115, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 397-418

  Nyborg, Karine ^a   Rege, Mari ^b  

^a RAGNAR FRISCH CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (Norway)

^b CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038082552     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1024245522958     Document Type: Review

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