The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 117-139

  Sudhölter, Peter ^a   Potters, Jos A M ^b  

^a BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Bargaining set; TU game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035460922     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820100068     Document Type: Article

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