The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 75-95

  Granot, Daniel ^a   Maschler, Michael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Bargaining set; Cooperative games; Games; Kernel; Projective game; Reactive bargaining set

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031285520     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01262514     Document Type: Article

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